Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in COINs

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Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars

Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III

Abstract During the nineteenth century, states routinely defeated insurgent foes+ Over the twentieth century, however, this pattern reversed itself, with states increas- ingly less likely to defeat insurgents or avoid meeting at least some of their demands+ What accounts for this pattern of outcomes in counterinsurgency ~COIN! wars? We argue that increasing mechanization within state militaries after World War I is pri- marily responsible for this shift+ Unlike their nineteenth-century predecessors, modern militaries possess force structures that inhibit information collection among local populations+ This not only complicates the process of sifting insurgents from noncombatants but increases the difficulty of selectively applying rewards and pun- ishment among the fence-sitting population+ Modern militaries may therefore inad- vertently fuel, rather than deter, insurgencies+ We test this argument with a new data set of 286 insurgencies ~1800–2005! and a paired comparison of two U+S+ Army divisions in Iraq ~2003–2004!+ We find that higher levels of mechanization, along with external support for insurgents and the counterinsurgent’s status as an occu- pier, are associated with an increased probability of state defeat+ By contrast, we find only partial support for conventional power- and regime-based explanations, and no support for the view that rough terrain favors insurgent success+

http://www.jasonlyall.com/wp-content/up ... _Final.pdf

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