The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict
Postitatud: 23 Mär, 2013 10:27
Alati ei pea oma eesmärke saavutama vägivallaga. Oma uurimusega tõestavad järgmised autorid ära, et mittevägivaldsete meetoditega on edušansid suuremad. Eesti-sugusel väikeriigil peaks selline jõu tootmise vahend raudselt arsenalis olema.
The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict
Abstract
The current literature on resistance and popular insurgency takes for granted several important assumptions. One is that armed struggle is the most forceful and effective way for non-state actors to prosecute conflict against militarily superior opponents. Another assumption is that nonviolent civil resistance, a form of asymmetric warfare whose "weapons" includes boycotts, strikes, protests, civil disobedience and mass non-cooperation, is inherently weaker than armed struggle—even when used against similar opponents and to achieve the same objectives. However, in this project we argue that emphasizing armed struggle as tactically advantaged is misguided. On the contrary, preliminary findings suggest exactly the opposite—that nonviolent campaigns are actually more effective in achieving ultimate political goals. Why is this the case? And are there certain structural or institutional conditions that privilege one campaign over the other? Compiling an original dataset on the strategic effectiveness of violent and nonviolent asymmetric warfare types, we systematically compare the relative effectiveness of these types of struggle across time, space, and circumstance. Our statistical findings reveal that major nonviolent campaigns have achieved success 55% of the time, compared to 28.4% for violent resistance campaigns. To explain the causal mechanisms driving this outcome, we compare our statistical findings with historical cases featuring periods of both violent and nonviolent resistance. The cases suggest the following: nonviolent campaigns are more likely to win legitimacy, attract widespread domestic and international support, neutralize the opponent's security forces, and compel loyalty shifts amongst erstwhile opponent supporters than armed campaigns, which enjoin the active support of a relatively small number of people, offer the opponent a justification for violent counter-attacks, and are less likely to prompt loyalty shifts and defections. We conclude with a discussion of policy implications for external actors—governmental and nongovernmental—in positions to assist local nonviolent campaigns.
http://humansecuritygateway.com/documen ... nflict.pdf
2011. aastal ilmus ka põhjalik raamat, kus on Eesti Laulev revolutsioon ilusasti sees.
http://cup.columbia.edu/book/978-0-231- ... ance-works
Aegu tagasi sai siin foorumis juba järgmisele saidile viidatud, kuid teen seda uuesti. Eestikeelsed raamatud, palun
http://www.aeinstein.org/organizations03a8.html
The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict
Abstract
The current literature on resistance and popular insurgency takes for granted several important assumptions. One is that armed struggle is the most forceful and effective way for non-state actors to prosecute conflict against militarily superior opponents. Another assumption is that nonviolent civil resistance, a form of asymmetric warfare whose "weapons" includes boycotts, strikes, protests, civil disobedience and mass non-cooperation, is inherently weaker than armed struggle—even when used against similar opponents and to achieve the same objectives. However, in this project we argue that emphasizing armed struggle as tactically advantaged is misguided. On the contrary, preliminary findings suggest exactly the opposite—that nonviolent campaigns are actually more effective in achieving ultimate political goals. Why is this the case? And are there certain structural or institutional conditions that privilege one campaign over the other? Compiling an original dataset on the strategic effectiveness of violent and nonviolent asymmetric warfare types, we systematically compare the relative effectiveness of these types of struggle across time, space, and circumstance. Our statistical findings reveal that major nonviolent campaigns have achieved success 55% of the time, compared to 28.4% for violent resistance campaigns. To explain the causal mechanisms driving this outcome, we compare our statistical findings with historical cases featuring periods of both violent and nonviolent resistance. The cases suggest the following: nonviolent campaigns are more likely to win legitimacy, attract widespread domestic and international support, neutralize the opponent's security forces, and compel loyalty shifts amongst erstwhile opponent supporters than armed campaigns, which enjoin the active support of a relatively small number of people, offer the opponent a justification for violent counter-attacks, and are less likely to prompt loyalty shifts and defections. We conclude with a discussion of policy implications for external actors—governmental and nongovernmental—in positions to assist local nonviolent campaigns.
http://humansecuritygateway.com/documen ... nflict.pdf
2011. aastal ilmus ka põhjalik raamat, kus on Eesti Laulev revolutsioon ilusasti sees.
http://cup.columbia.edu/book/978-0-231- ... ance-works
Aegu tagasi sai siin foorumis juba järgmisele saidile viidatud, kuid teen seda uuesti. Eestikeelsed raamatud, palun
http://www.aeinstein.org/organizations03a8.html