www.militaar.net

If necessary priorities to fulfil military reform materialise, an armed forces numbering a
total of 500,000-750,000 men is conceivable. Russia could also maintain a force of
150,000 contracted soldiers with reasonable capability for offensive operations in
local/regional conflicts. Conscript-based units would mainly be assigned for defensive
operations.

With its conventional forces Russia will be able to keep and increase its capability to
operate on parts of the Eurasian land mass. It will thus develop a considerable regional
power projection capability.

Russia will likely be able to develop a capability to perform single, limited preventive/preemptive
strikes in more remote corners of the world. In the near future Russia is however
limited to carry out such attacks in areas bordering on the Russian Federation.

To effectively respond to terrorists we would need to assemble a force of at least 65,000 men. But of all the military land forces, only 55,000 were in battle-ready condition,” recalled Putin, referring to the level of federal forces in 2006. “The Army has 1.4 million personnel, but none of them can fight. So they sent unseasoned kids into battle.”

And here is why the figures do not add up. For exactly the reason that the figures from any organizer of a pyramid scheme will not add up. In private conversation, senior military leaders admit: in recent years they have hardly succeeded in bringing in as many new recruits as those that have left the army. It would appear that the number of military service members in contract units hovers somewhere around 50,000.

Победные реляции и густой пиар не компенсируют упадок оборонно-промышленного комплекса и неэффективность ассигнований по гособоронзаказу. Как заявил на днях генерал-лейтенант Владимир Шаманов, число выходов российских подлодок на боевую службу в 2007 году сократилось на 20% по сравнению с 2006 годом. Оно вызвано ухудшением технического состояния кораблей, большинство которых построено в 1985–1991 годах.

Mulle jäi analoogiline teema näppu veidi teisest vaatevinkilist
138, 200 motolaskurbrigaadid + 76 õhudessantdiviis + näpuotsaga laevastikku ja muud eksterritoriaalset tegelaskonda peaks Leningradi Sõjaväeringkonnas tegema 30-40 tuhat nägu, mida ei ole sugugi palju.

The russian military at present is far more frightening on paper than in reality, but even on paper it is not a force that could pose a credible threat to the U.S and its nato allies in the foreseeable future. As was widely noted, a significant shortcoming of Putin ’s first term was the failure to carry out his pledge to comprehensively rebuild the Russian armed forces. Nearing the end of his second term and the 16-year mark after the Soviet collapse, the radical reform the military needs has not been implemented.

Nevertheless, the period of deterioration and stagnation seems to have ended and the recovery has begun. Even if all the new defense minister achieves is curbing corruption and rooting out hazing, he will have surpassed his predecessor ’s lackluster record in transforming the military and will have increased both societal support for and the prestige of the armed forces.

In the meantime, Western supporters of nato expansion may congratulate themselves for prevailing in the face of opponents’ arguments throughout the past decade that Russia was unable and disinclined to threaten the countries on its western borders. Thanks to the recent rounds of the Atlantic Alliance ’s expansion, the nations suppressed by the Soviet Union for half a century no longer need to face an aggressive Russia on their own. Little wonder that they are the most enthusiastic American allies in Europe.

As for the United States, it is time to focus on Russian deeds rather than words. Notwithstanding its frequent declarations of cooperation and partnership, the Kremlin’s actions show that it has, for quite some time now, viewed Russian-American relations as a zero-sum game: Whatever is bad for the U.S. must be good for Russia. There are many examples. A rift develops between the United States and some of its nato allies following the 2003 invasion of Iraq? Moscow steps into the fray to forge new ties with France and Germany. The U.S. — and the West — strongly objects to Iran’s nuclear program? Russia insists on continuing to supply Iran, even though an unstable nuclear power on Russia ’s border might not be the wisest policy. Hamas — an organization that openly repudiates Israel’s right to exist and with whose leaders the U.S. refuses to bargain — wins the Palestinian elections? Russia is quick to hold talks with its leaders in Moscow. Venezuela ’s virulently anti-American president, Hugo Chávez, wants to re-arm to “deter or repel any invasion by U.S. forces”? Russia is happy to oblige with a sale of 100,000 Kalashnikov rifles, a new Kalashnikov factory, and 24 Sukhoi-30 fighter jets. Calling Putin “our friend” does not alter the fact that Moscow considers Washington its primary potential enemy.

Still, despite the recent infusions of resources, Russia’s army remains a pale shadow of its former self. If it is, indeed, on the road to recovery, it has a very long way to go considering its present condition, confusion about its future direction, and the enormous advances the U.S. armed forces have made since the Cold War.

The russian military at present is far more frightening on paper than in reality, but even on paper it is not a force that could pose a credible threat to the U.S and its nato allies in the foreseeable future. As was widely noted, a significant shortcoming of Putin ’s first term was the failure to carry out his pledge to comprehensively rebuild the Russian armed forces. Nearing the end of his second term and the 16-year mark after the Soviet collapse, the radical reform the military needs has not been implemented.

Nevertheless, the period of deterioration and stagnation seems to have ended and the recovery has begun. Even if all the new defense minister achieves is curbing corruption and rooting out hazing, he will have surpassed his predecessor ’s lackluster record in transforming the military and will have increased both societal support for and the prestige of the armed forces.

In the meantime, Western supporters of nato expansion may congratulate themselves for prevailing in the face of opponents’ arguments throughout the past decade that Russia was unable and disinclined to threaten the countries on its western borders. Thanks to the recent rounds of the Atlantic Alliance ’s expansion, the nations suppressed by the Soviet Union for half a century no longer need to face an aggressive Russia on their own. Little wonder that they are the most enthusiastic American allies in Europe.

As for the United States, it is time to focus on Russian deeds rather than words. Notwithstanding its frequent declarations of cooperation and partnership, the Kremlin’s actions show that it has, for quite some time now, viewed Russian-American relations as a zero-sum game: Whatever is bad for the U.S. must be good for Russia. There are many examples. A rift develops between the United States and some of its nato allies following the 2003 invasion of Iraq? Moscow steps into the fray to forge new ties with France and Germany. The U.S. — and the West — strongly objects to Iran’s nuclear program? Russia insists on continuing to supply Iran, even though an unstable nuclear power on Russia ’s border might not be the wisest policy. Hamas — an organization that openly repudiates Israel’s right to exist and with whose leaders the U.S. refuses to bargain — wins the Palestinian elections? Russia is quick to hold talks with its leaders in Moscow. Venezuela ’s virulently anti-American president, Hugo Chávez, wants to re-arm to “deter or repel any invasion by U.S. forces”? Russia is happy to oblige with a sale of 100,000 Kalashnikov rifles, a new Kalashnikov factory, and 24 Sukhoi-30 fighter jets. Calling Putin “our friend” does not alter the fact that Moscow considers Washington its primary potential enemy.

Still, despite the recent infusions of resources, Russia’s army remains a pale shadow of its former self. If it is, indeed, on the road to recovery, it has a very long way to go considering its present condition, confusion about its future direction, and the enormous advances the U.S. armed forces have made since the Cold War.

При сохранении существующих тенденций силы общего назначения РФ в течение ближайших 8–10 лет достигнут размеров вооруженных сил средней европейской страны, что не позволит обеспечить обороноспособность РФ, особенно в условиях параллельной деградации СЯС.

В результате с 2000 года было истрачено до 50 млрд долл., а реально, скажем для ВВС, закуплено всего 2 новых бомбардировщика Су-34 и 2 новых боевых вертолета Ми-28Н. Кстати, первые Су-34 и Ми-28Н до сих пор фактически обкатываются в центрах боевого применения и переучивания летного состава.

Только для внутреннего употребления

Холодная война не начнется до тех пор, пока Запад не увидит реальной угрозы своей безопасности. А этой угрозы нет. Более того, пока официальная пропаганда доказывает жителям страны, что родная армия только и делает, что готовится дать отпор супостатам, военные без лишнего шума предпринимают меры, дабы сохранить с супостатом партнерские отношения. Именно сейчас в Германии проходят совместные российско-американские учения «Торгау-2007», по замыслу которых в ходе миротворческой операции создается объединенная бригада. В эти же дни начальник российского Генштаба подписал в Вашингтоне российско-американский меморандум о военном сотрудничестве. Детали не разглашаются. И, думаю, не из-за того, что договоренность содержит какие-то государственные секреты. Просто странно развивать военное сотрудничество с тем, кого именуешь «коварным врагом». Одновременно следует, очевидно, отчаянно подмигивать этому «врагу», намекая, что «враг» он лишь для внутреннего употребления

Teemast natuke laiemalt ehk millisel eesmärgil on vaja oma võimekust tõestada.