NATO artikkel 5

[kaur3]

More Jets, Jamming Make Air Force’s Toughest War Game Even Tougher
By David Axe
03.07.13

The exercise enhancements underscore the Pentagon’s ongoing shift away from counterinsurgency and towards high-tech warfare, especially in the Asia-Pacific region, where China is developing air defenses arguably equal to those portrayed in Red Flag. “What is going on is the recognition that we need to be prepared to succeed across the spectrum of conflict, not just one part of it,” retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Dave Deptula, a former F-15 pilot and Air Force intelligence chief, told Danger Room. “That means exercising to perform against realistic threats that are rapidly acquiring increases in capability that reduce the advantages in the air domain that we have experienced over the last 20-plus years.”

Twice a day — once at noon and again at 6:00 p.m. — up to 125 jets launch from Nellis for mock combat, remaining in the air for up to five hours at a time, according to the Air Force. More flying than usual is taking place at night, when both Red and Blue sides must rely more on night-vision goggles, infrared cameras and radars. Most of the actual shooting is simulated using electronic systems, although some bombing runs include live munitions.

If there’s a downside to the increasingly realistic exercise, it’s the cost: each Red Flag costs some $19 million in fuel alone. The flying branch has warned it might cancel future Red Flags in light of ongoing automatic budget cuts at the federal level. In the worst case, that could reverse the progress the Air Force has made in boosting the war game’s realism — and give America’s aerial rivals more of a chance to catch up.

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/03/red-flag/

[rbl]

"THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN MILITARY POLICY AND FINLAND" - STEFAN FORSS, LAURI KIIANLINNA, PERTTI INKINEN & HEIKKI HULT

"The Baltic States could be occupied without any risk, and “Russia has all legal and moral rights to invade the Baltics. …Analysis shows that no one in the West is going to fight with Russia over [these countries]”, the INOBIS ana-lysts concluded. This assessment is probably still relevant, and it raises the question of the difficult problems of defending the Baltic countries."

http://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10 ... sequence=2

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/sh ... nd-Finland

[Tundmatu sõdur nr. 4]

"THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN MILITARY POLICY AND FINLAND" - STEFAN FORSS, LAURI KIIANLINNA, PERTTI INKINEN & HEIKKI HULT

"The Baltic States could be occupied without any risk, and “Russia has all legal and moral rights to invade the Baltics. …Analysis shows that no one in the West is going to fight with Russia over [these countries]”, the INOBIS ana-lysts concluded. This assessment is probably still relevant, and it raises the question of the difficult problems of defending the Baltic countries."

http://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10 ... sequence=2

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/sh ... nd-Finland

Kuidagi väga suvaliselt siin üleval postis tsitaate ja linke kokku topitud...
Võiks ikka ära mainida, et see kolmerealine kokkumiksitud karm tsitaat pärineb vaid suvaliselt USA jutupaunikult (-kasulik idioot?) ning ilmselt pole vaja tormata soola ja tikke kokku ostma

[piirivalvur]

Ühed elavad mingis paralleelmaailmas. Seal muudab allkiri meie NATO liikmelisust kinnitaval paberilipakal kõike: Lääneriikidel on järsku piiramatud sõjalised ja finantsressursid, Võlakriisis USA le pole mingi teema nagu muuseas mõnikümmend miljardit USD Eesti pärast peetavasse sõtta matta. Bundeswehr mis praegu hoiab oma kontingenti (vältimaks inimohvreid) Afganistani kõige rahulikumas kolkas vedelemas muutub hetkega Wehrmachtiks mida mõne diviisi kaotus ei loksuta. Sarkozy, Berlusconi jt. taolised lääne poliitikud kes armastavad Putiniga koos labrakaid pidada pööravad Eesti ründamisel temast ära ning nõuavad koheselt ja resoluutselt Eesti nimel sõtta minekut jne.

Ja on mingid imelikud tüübid kes mainivad et ajalugu, sõjalis-majanduslikud realiteedid ja demograafia maksavad ka midagi.

Kummad on suuremad jutupaunikud?

[herman30]

Seda mina olen varem õelnud.

See article 5 on sama väärtus kui WC paberil. Kölbab ainul takumiku puhastamiseks.

Kui Putin tahab Eesti võtta, ta võtab ja NATO riigid ainult vaatavad mujale.

[Tundmatu sõdur nr. 4]

Kui Putin tahab Eesti võtta, ta võtab ja NATO riigid ainult vaatavad mujale.

...ja sina oled vist seks puhuks juba varakult Soome pakku läinud vä

[rbl]

Borja eelistab karmile reaalsusele jätkuvalt marksistlik-orwellistliku roosat udu!

[herman30]

...ja sina oled vist seks puhuks juba varakult Soome pakku läinud vä

Olen Soome kodanik olnud kogu elu.
Aga ei mul ole suurem lootust ka Soome kaitsevõimest. Kui Putin tahab Soome endale, ta võtab. Võib olla nädala aja saame talle natuge molli anda aga pärast seda peame nii kui niin vene keelt õppima.

[soesilm]

Rbl - mis su art. 5 alternatiiv on?

[Madis22]

Olen Soome kodanik olnud kogu elu.
Aga ei mul ole suurem lootust ka Soome kaitsevõimest. Kui Putin tahab Soome endale, ta võtab. Võib olla nädala aja saame talle natuge molli anda aga pärast seda peame nii kui niin vene keelt õppima.

Nädala? Palju liikusid venelased Gruusias viie päevaga? 80km. Ja sedagi ajakirjanduse sõnul grusiinide poolse vastupanu puudumise tingimustes. Ei torma venelased ka uisa-päisa paraadrivis ringi. Kus ikka kedagi vastas olema on karta toimetavad üsna rahulikult ja metoodiliselt.

[rbl]

Nädala? Palju liikusid venelased Gruusias viie päevaga? 80km. Ja sedagi ajakirjanduse sõnul grusiinide poolse vastupanu puudumise tingimustes. Ei torma venelased ka uisa-päisa paraadrivis ringi. Kus ikka kedagi vastas olema on karta toimetavad üsna rahulikult ja metoodiliselt.

Gruusia sõja eesmärk ei olnud vallutada Tbilisit vaid siiski pigem karistada Saakašvilit!

[Drax]

Võiks ikka ära mainida, et see kolmerealine kokkumiksitud karm tsitaat pärineb vaid suvaliselt USA jutupaunikult (-kasulik idioot?) ning ilmselt pole vaja tormata soola ja tikke kokku ostma

Täpsemini on need kolm rida refereering ühe Venemaa poolametliku instituudi järeldustest, mida nood omakorda tegid Kissingeri vihjamisi öeldud lausetest hea 7 aastat enne seda, kui Balti riigid NATOsse said.

[kaur3]

THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN LANDPOWER: DOES FORWARD PRESENCE STILL MATTER? THE CASE OF THE ARMY IN EUROPE

In fact, the primary purpose of U.S. forces in Eu- rope today is to build interoperability and military capability within and among America’s most capable and most likely future coalition partners through se- curity cooperation activities like exercises and train- ing events. This shift in purpose means that U.S. force presence in Europe is no longer—if indeed it ever was—a useful tool in extracting a greater commitment to increased defense spending on the part of America’s European allies. Nonetheless, through security coop- eration, America’s forward-based military forces in Europe play a critical role today in shaping the capa- bilities of allied military forces. Given the necessity of capable, interoperable coalition partners for the future security threats Washington most expects to encoun- ter, the role of America’s forward military presence in Europe remains as vital as it was at the dawn of the Cold War, but for different reasons. Unfortunately, continuing calls to withdraw even more U.S. forces from Europe threaten to undermine Washington’s ability to develop and maintain capable, interoperable coalition partners.

...

Instead of countering a conventional military attack on NATO territory—par- ticularly from Russia—American military forces have come to focus on security cooperation as their primary reason for remaining forward-based in Europe. Given the necessity of capable, interoperable coalition part- ners for the future security threats Washington most expects to encounter—and the downsizing of military force structure occurring across the Alliance—the role of America’s forward military presence in Europe re- mains as vital as it was at the dawn of the Cold War, but for very different reasons. Unfortunately though, threatening to reduce or actually reducing that pres- ence further is no longer useful—if indeed it ever was—as a means of extracting greater defense com- mitments or expenditures from European allies.

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.ar ... cfm?q=1130

[kaur3]

NATO in the Land of Pretend

At the moment, both sides of the Atlantic are pretending that nothing fundamental is happening within NATO today. But pretending only delays a needed intervention to begin to arrest the problem.
The United States pretends that its posture in and commitment to Europe is not changing while Europe watches the last A-10 Thunderbolt aircraft and the last U.S. tank depart the continent. This is compounded by the planned closing of 40 U.S. bases in the next two years (combined with the other 100 facilities closed over the past decade). Clearly, Europe doesn’t need tanks and they don’t need U.S. bases in Europe. Apparently, Europe also doesn’t need the fourth phase of a missile defense shield or U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. Europe sees the United States rushing to the exit but goes along with it, pretending that it doesn’t really matter.
And Europe pretends that the U.S. security umbrella over Europe is a permanent fixture, allowing it to divert resources to other forms of security, specifically social security and pensions for a rapidly aging population. Americans may scold Europe from time to time about this but Washington pretends that all they really need from Europe is political support and validation of U.S. policy objectives.
This self-deception represents a real crisis for an institution that remains a crucial provider of stability and security, not only within Europe but globally. Given this cognitive dissonance, the question becomes how to change this dynamic in light of diminished political leadership and defense budgets on both sides of the Atlantic.

http://csis.org/publication/nato-land-pretend

[kaur3]

DEVELOPMENT OF THE BALTIC ARMED FORCES IN LIGHT OF MULTINATIONAL DEPLOYMENTS
James S. Corum August 201

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.ar ... cfm?q=1168