3. leht 83-st

Re: Rootsi nädalane vastupanuvõime

Postitatud: 16 Juul, 2013 12:42
Postitas Castellum
Kapten Trumm kirjutas:Peterburi oblastist
Oblast on paraku ikka veel 'Leningradi'...ise olen, kui roppu sõna ei taha tarvitada, siis kasutanud nt metafoori 'Peterburi ümbritsev oblast' vms...

Re: Rootsi nädalane vastupanuvõime

Postitatud: 16 Juul, 2013 17:42
Postitas tommy
Kolmanda jaanuari hommikul kell neli tõuseb õhku kakskümmend Mi-17 helikopterit Hiina eriväelastega, kes maanduvad peagi Venemaa Habarovski linna Lenini-nimelisel staadionil.

Istunud ümber Hiina konsulaadi varutud mikrobussidesse, suundub rühm üle võtma linnavaksalit ja Ida sõjaväeringkonna staapi. Pärast massiivset tulelööki WS-2D raketipatareidest Vene idaosa militaarobjektide pihta liiguvad juba suured Hiina rahvaarmee üksused üle Ussuuri- ja Amuurimaa piiri. Vastupanu on peaaegu olematu.

Paljud Vene tippjuhid on välismaal aastavahetust tähistamas, osa ei pöördugi tagasi. Rahuleppega saab Hiina endale suure osa Venemaa senistest idapoolsetest valdustest.

Eelnev pole militaarkiiksuga hullu unenägu pärast õlut ja viina segiläbi tarbides kulgenud suveõhtut, vaid Vene publitsisti Aleksandr Hramtšihhini hiljutises artiklis saidil snob.ru avaldatud stsenaariumi kokkuvõte.
Keda huvitab.....
http://www.snob.ru/profile/27172/blog/61865

Re: Rootsi nädalane vastupanuvõime

Postitatud: 16 Juul, 2013 18:46
Postitas Kapten Trumm
Kuidas haakub see vene masohisti fantaasia Hiina rämbodest selle, praegu käimasoleva reaalsusega:
http://www.almanar.com.lb/english/adeta ... eid=101605
The Defense Ministry announced the move which is the largest surprise check of combat readiness of the Russian military in the post-Soviet period.

The exercise, which involves over 80,000 servicemen, some 1,000 armored vehicles, 130 aircraft and 70 warships from the Pacific Fleet, will continue until July 20, Russian news agency, RIA Novosti reported.
:lol: :lol:
80 000 ei ole maksimum 400 hiinlast 20 relvastamata kopteriga.

Re: Rootsi nädalane vastupanuvõime

Postitatud: 16 Juul, 2013 19:13
Postitas Kapten Trumm

Re: Rootsi nädalane vastupanuvõime

Postitatud: 16 Juul, 2013 22:07
Postitas kaur3
Soovitan.
Learning from Intelligence Failures

John Hollister Hedley

Dr. John Hollister Hedley, during a career of more than thirty years with the Central Intelligence Agency, edited the President's Daily Brief, briefed President George H. W. Bush at the White House, served as Managing Editor of the National Intelligence Daily, and was Chairman of the CIA's Publications Review Board. He has also taught intelligence at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.,and is now an independent consultant on security matters. An earlier version of this article was prepared for the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, Canada, March 2004.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08850600590945416
Thinking "rationally".

Bureaucratically, the response to the warning failure on South Korea was to create the Office of National Estimates (ONE). The U.S., though hardly unique in recognizing the importance of estimative intelligence, became the first country to institutionalize it in a permanent bureaucracy. The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) became, in the U.S. experience, a truly national product, drawing upon the analytical resources and reflecting the considered judgment of the many organizations making up the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). Perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of that community is the degree to which it is organized for the systematic production of national estimative intelligence. 5

Thus, a much larger CIA addressed the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. The head of the ONE was a former professor of European history, Sherman Kent, whose 30-year career in intelligence would earn him a reputation as perhaps America's foremost practitioner of the analytic craft. Kent was directly involved in producing the estimate that, on 19 September 1962, pronounced the conclusion that the Soviet Union would be unlikely to introduce strategic offensive weapons into Cuba. Less than a month later, when the photographic evidence of 14 October became available, the assessment was proved wrong. Looking back, Kent himself analyzed the intelligence failure:

How could we have misjudged?…The short answer is that, lacking direct evidence, we went to the next best thing, namely information which might indicate the true course of developments. 6

Kent and his colleagues could do no less. They did have the luxury of waiting for more and better data. “In brooding over an imponderable,” he later reflected, “there is a strong temptation to make no estimate at all…or to go for the worst case.” 7 But unfolding events and the need for policy decisions on how to tackle them would not allow for making no intelligence assessment at all. And, in the case of the NIE on the Soviet military buildup in Cuba, Kent and his estimators' reading of the indicators led them off the mark. “We missed the Soviet decision to put the missiles into Cuba,” he reasoned, “because we could not believe that [Soviet leader Nikita] Khrushchev could make such a mistake.” 8

A lesson taught by this failure (one that unfortunately seems to require repeated relearning) is the need to be careful and skeptical in assuming that the object of an assessment is a rational actor according to the Western way of thinking. Some students of the Cuban missile crisis (Kent notably among them) ironically assert that the NIE actually was correct—in the sense that sending the missiles to Cuba was indeed a major error, one that a rational actor would have eschewed. In fact, this “irrational” act and the consequent humiliating Soviet withdrawal of the missiles contributed to Khrushchev's ouster in 1964. But at the end of the day, an insufficient U.S. understanding of Khrushchev's psychology and worldview resulted in the CIA's intelligence assessment that Moscow's sending its missiles would be an irrational move and thus not to be expected. Getting out of a “Western” mindset continues to be difficult, but is something CIA analysts acknowledge as being critically important in assessing the motives and policies of non-Western leaders in particular. 9

Later, the Arab–Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 illustrated that events in that troubled and tension-filled region have been as nettlesome for intelligence assessments as for policy initiatives. The two military conflicts provide interesting contrasts in successful and unsuccessful intelligence efforts to inform crisis decisionmaking. In 1967, the CIA and the rest of the U.S. Intelligence Community provided a valuable warning function. Although its intelligence analysis ran counter to views initially held by senior policymakers, President Lyndon B. Johnson and his National Security team ultimately adopted a policy based on intelligence analyses that alerted them to Arab troop movements, the thinking behind Egyptian plans regarding the Gulf of Aqaba, the likelihood of potential Soviet intervention in the support of the Arabs, and Israel's ability to defeat a combination of Arab military forces.

By contrast, the U.S. Intelligence Community was as unanimously wrong in 1973 as it had been correct in 1967, concluding in 1973—as late as the night preceding the Egyptian attack across the Suez Canal—that the Arabs would not attack. The result was that the joint Egyptian–Syrian assaults along the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights surprised U.S. policymakers as well as those of Israel. What was different? Part of the problem was the same “rational actor” assumption that caused the embarrassing misreading of Khrushchev in the 1962 Cuban missile estimate. The CIA's current intelligence analysis in one instance flatly stated, for example, that “For Egypt, a military initiative makes little sense at this critical juncture of President [Anwar] Sadat's reorientation of domestic and foreign policies. Another round of hostilities would almost certainly destroy Sadat's painstaking efforts to invigorate the economy and would run counter to his current efforts to build a united Arab political front… . For the normally cautious Syrian President, a military adventure now would be suicidal, and he has said so.” 10

By 1973 the military balance in the Middle East had shifted in Israel's favor, so that intelligence analysts in Washington and in Tel Aviv believed Arab military inferiority would militate against an attack on Israel. U.S. analysts failed to explore the possibility that Arab leaders might decide to go to war—even at the risk of losing—if they believed they could thereby attain certain political objectives. On the eve of the war, the CIA reported, for example, that “The exercise and alert activities underway in Egypt may be on a somewhat larger scale and more realistic than previous exercises, but they do not appear to be preparations for a military offensive against Israel.… Tel Aviv assesses the Egyptian activity as normal, large-scale maneuvers and has not alerted its forces.” 11

So why this intelligence failure, this misreading of the intelligence indications as the outbreak of hostilities approached? A reflection thirty years after the fact suggests several reasons:

1. Accepting statements, and their implications, at face value (taking statements by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Syrian President Asad about Israel's military superiority as indicating that they would not initiate a war);

2. Failing to look for or explore (or be trained for) denial and deception;

3. Placing blind faith in an intelligence liaison service's judgment—that of Israeli intelligence; and

4. Failing to second-guess Israeli judgments dismissing the significance of Arab military preparations.

Also figuring in this 1973 failure were cultural biases that led U.S. analysts to conclude that the Arabs could not have recovered so soon from their humiliating defeat in 1967, and could not have devised and concealed such an elaborate war plan. “If Arabs could not stand in line to get on a bus, how could they plan to cross the Suez Canal in the face of massive Israeli defensive lines on the other side?” 12

Rootsi otsib allveelaeva

Postitatud: 18 Okt, 2014 15:17
Postitas renard
http://www.postimees.ee/2959089/rootsi- ... -otsinguid

Mis sellest aktsioonist on saanud? Leiti üles see alveelaev või ei?

Re: Rootsi otsib allveelaeva

Postitatud: 18 Okt, 2014 21:23
Postitas Manurhin
Pole veel meedia ülesleidmisest teatanud. Vaevalt, et leitaksegi, allveelaev on praeguseks juba ammu ohutus kauguses. Aga juhul, kui leitaksegi, mis siis? Tuleb meelde anekdoot kalamehest, kes oma väikese paadiga sõudis kalale, kuid õnge hakkavad ainult väikesed särjed ja viidikad. Mees vannub, et krt, võiks ikka valaskala otsa tulla. Ja korraga, oh imet, ongi suur sinivaal konksu otsas, pistab pea veest välja ja ütleb: "Noh, ma tulingi. Ja edasi?" Täpselt samasuguse "ja edasi?" küsimuse võiks ka tolle allveelaeva kohta esitada. Mida rootslased peale hakkaks, kui üles leiakski? Põrutaksid kohe mõned süvaveepommid venelastele pähe? Väga sügavalt kahtlen selles. See tähendaks ju hoobilt sõjalist konflikti Rootsi ja Venemaa vahel. Mitte-NATO riigina poleks Rootsil koheselt kusagilt ka sõjalist abi loota, Soome vaevalt, et kohe ummisjalu konflikti sekkuma ruttab. Pealegi, üks üsna teravaks kippunud vahejuhtum rootslastel Vene (toona siis NSVL) allveelaevaga 1981. aastal juba oli: http://epl.delfi.ee/news/arvamus/kross- ... d=69973169

Re: Rootsi otsib allveelaeva

Postitatud: 18 Okt, 2014 22:17
Postitas smr
Manurhin kirjutas:Pole veel meedia ülesleidmisest teatanud. Vaevalt, et leitaksegi, allveelaev on praeguseks juba ammu ohutus kauguses. Aga juhul, kui leitaksegi, mis siis? Põrutaksid kohe mõned süvaveepommid venelastele pähe? Väga sügavalt kahtlen selles.
Loe kokku, mitte süvaveepommi ja torpeedot lasid Rootslased arvatavate CCCP allveelaevade pihta 80ndatel. Siis tule uuesti rääkima.

Re: Rootsi otsib allveelaeva

Postitatud: 18 Okt, 2014 22:47
Postitas Kurjam

Re: Rootsi otsib allveelaeva

Postitatud: 19 Okt, 2014 10:54
Postitas ruger
Asjaga tundub olema seotud Vene tanker http://www.postimees.ee/2959591/venemaa ... ele-nahtav
Venelaste arust pole midagi juhtunud http://www.postimees.ee/2959613/moskva- ... i-juhtunud

Re: Rootsi otsib allveelaeva

Postitatud: 19 Okt, 2014 12:38
Postitas ruger
Selle sündmusega seoses tuleb uudiseid ja arvamusi nagu Vändrast saelaudu
http://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/v ... d=69974579
http://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/v ... d=69974293 :mrgreen:

Re: Rootsi otsib allveelaeva

Postitatud: 19 Okt, 2014 12:54
Postitas soul
Nagu ikka, on venelaste arvates kõik risti vastupidi. :)
http://www.politonline.ru/comments/22878804.html
Скорее всего, предположения представителя Генштаба верны - и шведы ищут пропущенную всеми постами и средствами контроля НАТО подводную лодку, однако говорить о том, что это российская субмарина безосновательно и глупо.

Re: Rootsi otsib allveelaeva

Postitatud: 19 Okt, 2014 13:33
Postitas renard
http://compunews.com/s139/sp2.htm

Keda huvitab detailsem jutt ja pildid 1981 aasta sündmustest.

Re: Rootsi otsib allveelaeva

Postitatud: 19 Okt, 2014 14:51
Postitas Manurhin
Rootsi kaitsejõud suhtuvad intsidenti täie tõsidusega:
Pilt

Re: Rootsi otsib allveelaeva

Postitatud: 19 Okt, 2014 14:58
Postitas Lemet
Et siin teistes teemades on juttu olnud sest viiepäevase võimekusega sõjanädalast (ja ei ole Rootsi siin mingi erand), siis näikse, et seda kasutatakse huviliste poolt ära- rootsude paanika läks lahti reede õhtul. Mil piltlikult öeldes mõisameeste laager maani täis oli.