Mulle on jäänud (võib-olla ekslik) mulje, et A-10 vastu on sõdinud peamiselt Pentagoni standardiseerijad-ühtlustajad ja sellel teemal on tehtud päris uskumatuid samme, üks kurioossemaid on projekt nimega A-16 või F/A-16
http://www.f-16.net/f-16_versions_article18.html
Parafraseerides Leninit praktikast kui tõe kriteeriumist, siis praktika oli:
The USAF was rather reluctant to let the idea of a dedicated CAS F-16 go, and planned to replace its A-10's with F-16s fitted with a version of the Warthog's Avenger cannon. In November 1988, the 174th TFW of the New York ANG began transitioning from the A-10A Thunderbolt II to the F-16A/B block 10, becoming the first unit to operate the F-16 in a close air support role.
During Desert Storm, their 24 F-16A/B aircraft were equipped to carry the General Electric GPU-5/A Pave Claw pod on the centerline station. The pod houses a 30mm GAU-13/A four-barrel derivative of the seven-barrel GAU-8/A cannon used by the A-10A, and 353 rounds of ammunition. The aircraft received the new designation F/A-16, and were the only F-16s ever to be equipped with this weapon, intended for use against a variety of battlefield targets, including armor.
If the tests were successful, there were plans for a fleet of F/A-16C's with the same armament. To demonstrate the concept, the AF installed Pave Penny avionics, 30mm gun pods and European One paint jobs on 7 F-16C's (#83128, -129, -130, -131, -132, -144, -2??). F-16B no. 2 (#75752) was given similar treatment except for a Falcon Eye system. These aircraft flew from Nellis with the 'WA' tailcode.
The F-16s from the 174th were deployed to the Persian Gulf during Desert Storm, but the project proved to be a miserable failure. Precision aiming was impossible for several reasons:
The pylon mount isn't as steady as the A-10's rigid mounting;
The F-16 flies much faster than an A-10, giving the pilots too little time approaching the target;
Firing the gun shook the aircraft harshly and made it impossible to control;
Essential CCIP (continuously computed impact point) software was unavailable.
Pilots ended up using the gun as an area effect weapon, spraying multiple targets with ammunition, producing an effect rather like a cluster bomb. It took only a couple of days of this before they gave up, unbolted the gun pods, and went back to dropping real cluster bombs - which did the job more effectively.
The F/A-16C plan was quietly forgotten. The USAF still has plans to replace the A-10 with F-16s, but they no longer involve 30mm gun pods (or, apparently, a designation with an "A" in it).
Siia tuleb lisada, et nimetatud aktsioon F-16 abil tanke purustada leidis aset perioodil, kui Saddami peamiselt nõuka varustusega õhutõrje oli oma efektiivsusest 90% kaotanud, muidu polekski vist järeldusi võimalik teha materiaalosa mittesäilimise tõttu. Suhteliselt õrna ja igasuguse soomuskaitseta F-16 saatmine madallennul õhutõrjetulle on iseenesest üsna nüri tegu ja seda teevad need, kel pole raha spetsiaalsete ründelennukite ostmiseks.
USA eri lennuvägedes näivad suurimad kurioosumid olevat juhtunud siis, kui asjasse on sekkunud Pentagoni ökonomistid või mõne projekti lobi on käinud Washingtonis. Meenutame näiteks rumalusi nimega tekilennuk F-111 või ideid F-16/F-15 "navaliseerimisest". Tõsi, standardiseerimine oli F-4 ajal, kuid elu näitab, et mereväelennuk lendab ka maal, aga kuivamaalennuk merel eriti mitte
Edit: 30 mm Gatlinguga jõudsid ka analoogsetele järeldustele venelased, kes eksperimenteerisid sellega MiG-27 kõhu all, eriefektid olid üsna roppu laadi olnud ja kahuri tagasilöök tekitas probleeme juhtimisel ning kahuri kuumus ja vibratsioon probleeme pardaseadmete tööga.
/Veelgi hullem on see, et koos kohustusliku patriootliku riigioptimismi kehtestamisega nõrgeneks paratamatult ka meie ohutaju, mis on enesealalhoiuks vältimatult vajalik instinkt/ S. Mikser 2014.