Mis Iisraeli relvatehingut Tšehhoslovakkiaga puudutab siis näib, et algselt Tšehhoslovakkia isegi keeldus Palestiinasse sionistidele relvi müümast sest Tšehhoslovakkia pidas juba läbirääkimisi relvade müügiks hoopis araablastele, Süüriale ja Egiptusele aga kuna Nõukogude Liidule antud idee siiski eriti ei meeldinud jäi tehing araablastega katki ja relvad pandi hoopis Iisraeli poole teele.
"They saved the country; I have no doubt of that. The Czech arms deal was the greatest help we then had, it saved us and without it I very much doubt if we could have survived the first month." This retrospective statement by David Ben Gurion in 1968 shows the importance of Czech arms to the young Jewish state. After the UN session on the Palestine issue in the spring of 1947, Ben Gurion regarded the acquisition of arms as the highest priority and dispatched Jewish paramilitary forces—Haganah agents—throughout the world to buy military equipment in order to prepare Jewish forces for war.
Haganah’s mission became quite difficult when, in November 1947, the United States imposed an arms embargo on Palestine and its neighboring states. American doors thus being closed, the chief of the Jewish Agency looked to Eastern European countries, in particular to Czechoslovakia. According to recently released Soviet and Israeli documents, Prague initially refused to sell arms to the Zionist movement because it was engaged in parallel negotiations with Egypt and Syria, which were also looking to buy arms. Czech motives for selling arms were more economic than political; the arms deal would provide much needed income. The Soviet Union opposed these negotiations by Czechoslovakia. In a letter to Molotov, Deputy Foreign Minister V. Zorin suggested that “given the position we have adopted on the Palestine question, it would be possible to authorize Comrade Bodrov, when an opportunity arises, to draw [Czech party leader Klement] Gottwald’s attention to the fact that the sale of weapons by the Czechoslovak government to the Arabs under present conditions, when the situation in Palestine is becoming more aggravated every day, could be used by the Anglo-Americans against the Soviet Union and the new democracies.” Zionist leaders thus succeeded in their request that Moscow intervene to stop the delivery of Czech arms to the Arabs.
1948. aastal tegi Iisrael isegi pingutusi saamaks sõjalist abi otse Nõukogude Liidult, loodeti saada 45 T-34 tüüpi tanki, 50 hävituslennukit, õhu- ja tankitõrjerelvi, Nõukogude vägede kätte langenud Natsi-Saksamaa trofeerelvi, militaarväljaõppe alast kirjandust, taheti koolitada Iisraeli ohvitsere Nõukogude Liidu sõjakoolides aga paraku Nõukogude Liit ei soovinud end liiga otseselt ja avalikult Palestiina sionistide toetamisega siduda.
Israeli diplomats opened talks with Soviet authorities about providing direct military aid. On 5 October 1948 Israeli military attaché Yohanan Ratner discussed training questions with General Seraev, asking about Soviet military textbooks and possibilities for Israeli officers to take advanced courses in the Soviet Union. A few days later, during a conversation with Red Army General Aleksei Antonov, Ratner suggested officer-training courses and the supply of German equipment that had fallen into Soviet hands. Antonov replied by asking for a detailed list of the Israeli needs.
On 7 November Ben Gurion sent such a list to Ratner, who submitted it on 11 November to Ivan Bakulin. The Jewish state wanted to purchase 45 T-34 tanks, 50 fighter planes, and anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns. Bakulin stated that he would transmit the Israeli requests but emphasized the difficulties due to the UN embargo: "True, others are violating this resolution,” he stated. “But if arms supplies from us are discovered, there will be an uproar." After this meeting, Bakulin sent a memorandum to Zorin suggesting that they officially reject the request because of the UN embargo. Golda Meyerson, the Israeli ambassador, asked Vyshinskii about this issue before his departure to Jerusalem in April 1949. He answered that it was "a tricky and complex problem, which could lead to a number of difficulties. According to Meyerson, the Soviet foreign minister explained: "Suffice it for us to give a small pistol and it will be said that we gave you an atom bomb. Moreover, there will be no end of interpretations about the special dimension of this arrangement: an alliance between the Soviets and the State of Israel.
“Moscow’s Surprise: The Soviet-Israeli Alliance of 1947-1949” By Laurent Rucker
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/defa ... WP_461.pdf