Mida Ukrainast õppida?

[loomake]

Ei tea kas seda saaks Ukrainast õppida kuna ei ole kursis sealse majandusega... aga kui Eestis suudetaks sellises olukorras eluaseme laen "pausile panna" siis oleks vast ka kaitsjaid rohkem. Lihtsalt nõme kui sellise jama käigus veel kodu käest võetakse panga poolt. See selleks.

Aga mida võiksid siis näiteks minusugused "tsiviilid" teha, et olla pisutki abiks kui KV peaks sellises olukorras minu kanti sattuma?

Hoida peidus näiteks kanister diislit?
Hoida alles mõned vanad mobiilid?

Mida veel? Võiks ju olla üht-teist mida majapidamises peaks olema, et vähekenegi aidata?

[metssiga]

Ei tea kas seda saaks Ukrainast õppida kuna ei ole kursis sealse majandusega... aga kui Eestis suudetaks sellises olukorras eluaseme laen "pausile panna" siis oleks vast ka kaitsjaid rohkem. Lihtsalt nõme kui sellise jama käigus veel kodu käest võetakse panga poolt. See selleks.

Aga mida võiksid siis näiteks minusugused "tsiviilid" teha, et olla pisutki abiks kui KV peaks sellises olukorras minu kanti sattuma?

Hoida peidus näiteks kanister diislit?
Hoida alles mõned vanad mobiilid?

Mida veel? Võiks ju olla üht-teist mida majapidamises peaks olema, et vähekenegi aidata?

Astu Kaitseliitu! Ja diislikanistri asemel saad automaadi!

[EOD]

Me panime miinilõksud kõigile ja kõigele, see on sõda!

Ma usun, et kõigil oleks huvitav enamat kuulda.

Mis seal ikka - brikett (200 grammine) ja sütik sisse + neli-viis meetrit traati, seda jala lõksuks ning neid tuleb hästi palju panna.
PS Meil on siin ju EOD, tema oskab minust hoopis targemini neid asju seletada (ja vist teha ka).

NB! Viige see arutelu ise üle "UKR õppetundide" teemasse
(by Borja)

Ei tahaks avalikus foorumis teatud põhjustel väga üksikasjalikuks minna. Kes oskama peavad, saavad ka põhjaliku väljaõppe. Üldised põhimõtted, millised on ka kergelt netist leitavad, oleksid sellised:

Põhimõtteliselt – lõhkelaengut saab initsieerida:
Tulega. Vajalik lõhkekapsel ja süütenöör. Tavaline vene süütenöör põleb kiirusega 1 cm/sek. Rulli otsast lõigatud tükk võib põleda tunduvalt kiiremini, seetõttu see hävitatakse. Süütenöörile võib olla lisatud hõõgnöör, mille põlemiskiirus on väike ja sõltub tuulest. Kasutada saab tulega initsieerimist näiteks objektilt taganemisel, arvestades viite sellisena, et laeng plahvataks siis kui vaenulikud jõud on objektile jõudnud. Muidugi on reetlik süütenööri põlemisel tekkiv suits, kuid lahingumöllus võidakse seda mitte märgata.
Mehhaaniliselt. Kasutusel siis näiteks miinisütiku MUV mingi versioon ja lööktoimeline lõhkekapsel (MD mingi variant või tavaline lõhkekapsel koos näiteks padruni süütekapsli ja mingi löökmehhanismiga, kasvõi hiirelõksuga). Selline seadeldis võib rakenduda mistahes mõjutusel – tõmbel, survel, survest vabastamisel... Reeglina ohvripoolsel mõjutamisel.
Elektriliselt. Vajalik elektridetonaator, vooluallikas ja mingi „lüliti“. See võib reageerida raadiosignaalile, soojusele, valgusele..., kuid olla ka misiganes primitiivne seade, mis sulgeb vooluahela.
Pakutud 200 grammine brikett võib olla ebapiisav, samas ka kordades „overkill“. Kõik sõltub sellest, kus, millises kestas, kui kaugel ohvrist, kas ruumis või õues... see plahvatab.

Ja muidugi peab arvestama sellega, et diletantide poolt mistahes lõhkeseadeldiste valmistamise, transportimise ja paigaldamise käigus hukkub või saab vigastada kordades rohkem „pommimehi“ kui nende ohvreid. Eesti statistika kinnitab seda. Erandiks, mis kinnitab reeglit, on Pae tänava plahvatused.

[kaur3]

Saturday, December 20, 2014

Window on Eurasia: Putin Wants Donbas inside Ukraine for Same Reason Stalin Did – But the World has Changed

things have changed since that time that make Putin’s move less likely to work on the ground if not in Western chancelleries than he may think. First, many ethnic Russians and even more non-Russian speakers now have a civic identification with the countries in which they live and will not play the game as Putin hopes. That is why he has failed in Ukraine so far.

Second, Putin’s Anschluss of Crimea and his incautious language about becoming the latest “ingatherer of Russian lands” not only has alarmed the titular nationalities of the non-Russian countries but has also frightened many ethnic Russians there who know they are better off in those countries than in Russia.

And third, by his naked aggression in Crimea and other parts of Ukraine, Putin has alarmed enough people in the West that most will not be taken in by this latest turn in the Kremlin line. Instead, they will understand and act to make sure that Putin cannot play a Stalin-like role there or anywhere else beyond the borders of his country.

http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/20 ... onbas.html

[USP]

Üks mida õppida, on valmidus improviseerida. Me ei tohi klammerduda pimesi taktikaõpikute külge ja senistesse arusaamadesse ausast sõjapidamisest. Sest meie oletatav vastane ründab ilma eraldusmärkideta või kasutab koguni Eesti eraldusmärke. Ta kasutab tsiviilelanikke tulejuhtidena ning selleks, et takistada EKV üksuste liikumist. Ta saadab meie territooriumile humanitaarabi ja "ajakirjanikke", et näidata nende ründamise ja hävitamise korral EKV-d baariatena jne. Seega on improviseerimine, initsiatiiv, rünnakuvalmidus ja paindlikkus üliolulised faktorid!

[kaur3]

Kui natuke silma kinni pigistada, siis ehk mahub selle teema alla.

Toomas Alatalu: Mis on ühist Eesti lähiajalool ja Ida-Ukraina sündmustel?

http://epl.delfi.ee/news/arvamus/toomas ... d=70432317

[tommy]

Kõik kordub taas...
Lihtsalt moodne termin "hübriidsõda" on vahepeal leiutatud.

[Kapten Trumm]

Talvesõda ja UKR sõda ei ole küll taoliselt, triviaalselt, võrreldavad. Talvesõda ei olnud hübriidsõda.
Talvesõjas oli esindatud üksnes infosõda (sedagi põhiliselt siseriiklikult) ja konventsionaalne sõda.
Ukrainas on lisaks kasutusel ja assümmeetriline sõda ja kübersõda.
Kõige olulisemat, assümmeetrilist või mittekonventsionaalset sõda, venelased praktiliselt Talvesõjas ei pidanud.
Seda hakati pidama alles 1941, kui selgus, et sakslasi ei suudeta peatada, seegi katse kukkus esialgu läbi (kohalikud elanikud ei toetanud NKVD kõrilõikatest moodustatud "rahvatasujaid").

Hübriidsõna definitsioon:

Hybrid warfare is a military strategy that blends conventional warfare, irregular warfare and cyberwarfare.[1] In addition, hybrid warfare is used to describe attacks by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, improvised explosive devices and information warfare.[

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hybrid_warfare

[kaur3]

Trumm valis millegi pärast pikast nimekirjast välja ühe definitsiooni. Lingi all oleva käsiraamtu lk 7 leiab parema kirjelduse.

http://cdn.asktop.net/wp/download/5/TC7_100.pdf

Lisaks sobib ka Gerassimovi skeem koos kogu toolbox-iga.

Goble tsiteerib ühte autorit.

Then, one day into the fighting, the Soviet media announced that in a “liberated” village near the border, a new Finnish government had been formed, headed by Otto Kuusinen, the communist whose revolt Mannerheim had himself put down in 1918. A day later, he signed a mutual assistance pact with the Soviet government to “legalize” the Kremlin’s aggression.

In preparation for this campaign, the Soviet military had created, beginning in October 1939, a “Finnish Peoples Army,” filling it with Finns and Karelians who lived on Soviet territory and then even with Belarusians. That step led to a Soviet joke at the time, Shama says: “Minsk Finns will march onto Finnish mines.”

http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/20 ... ussia.html

[oleeg]

Talvesõda ja UKR sõda ei ole küll taoliselt, triviaalselt, võrreldavad. Talvesõda ei olnud hübriidsõda.
Talvesõjas oli esindatud üksnes infosõda (sedagi põhiliselt siseriiklikult) ja konventsionaalne sõda.
Ukrainas on lisaks kasutusel ja assümmeetriline sõda ja kübersõda.
Kõige olulisemat, assümmeetrilist või mittekonventsionaalset sõda, venelased praktiliselt Talvesõjas ei pidanud.
Seda hakati pidama alles 1941, kui selgus, et sakslasi ei suudeta peatada, seegi katse kukkus esialgu läbi (kohalikud elanikud ei toetanud NKVD kõrilõikatest moodustatud "rahvatasujaid").

Trumm eksib nagu tavaliselt, näidates oma teadmiste lünklikust ja üldteada info valikulist esitamist. Vantide tegevus soomlaste vastu 1939. a. lõpul - 1940 aasta algul oli küll "laiu rahvamasse" välistav, kuid erinevalt 41. aastal jne toimunust kontsentreeritum ja õpetlikum. Võta vaevaks pisutki põhjalikumalt kaevuda enne kui "tarkust" levitama hakkad...

Hübriidsõja fännide kurvastuseks jätan siinkohal parem ütlemata, mida sellest arvan

Hääd uut!
o

[Kapten Trumm]

Ootaks siis mitte kunagi eksivalt ja valikuta infot puistavalt oleegilt näiteid laiaulatusliku partisanisõja kohta Soome tagalas Talvesõja ajal 1939-1940, mida NSVL organiseeris.

[Kapten Trumm]

In preparation for this campaign, the Soviet military had created, beginning in October 1939, a “Finnish Peoples Army,” filling it with Finns and Karelians who lived on Soviet territory and then even with Belarusians. That step led to a Soviet joke at the time, Shama says: “Minsk Finns will march onto Finnish mines.”

Ja selle "Soome rahvaarmee" panus Talvesõja assümmeetrilises osas oli.....?

[kaur3]

The Bear went under the mountain: is Russia’s style of warfare really new?

By Jacob W Kipp
Adjunct Professor at the University of Kansas

By Roger McDermott
Affiliated Senior Analyst, Danish Institute for International Studies

Monday 15 December 2014

The term “hybrid warfare” came from U.S. national security literature devoted to “hybrid transnational threats.” Western analysis of events in Crimea sought to find a Russian theoretical source for “hybrid warfare” to describe those events. Those subscribing to this interpretation of the evolution of Russian military doctrine point to ideas developed in an article which appeared in February 2013, entitled “The Value of Science in Foresight,” [Tsennost’ nauki v predvidenii] Voenno-promyshlennyi kurier, (27 February 2013) which appeared under the name of the Chief of the General Staff, Army-General Valeriy Gerasimov. The problem with such analyses is fourfold: it takes the article out of context, implies “pre-planning” (motive, rather than contingency), mistranslates predvidenii as “prediction” or “anticipation,” fails to grasp the inherent limit on foresight in military affairs as a “labour of Sisyphus” and fails to take account of the specific circumstances which led the Kremlin to choose to act in February against the revolutionary government in Kyiv.

Naturally, following these events and subsequent Russian involvement in fuelling the insurgency in eastern Ukraine and sending additional regular forces to support “rebels”, much of the focus has been on Moscow using “hybrid” warfare strategies. In reality, the Russian approach to warfare may have changed in tone but not fundamentally in content.

NATO is now tasked with reassurance and deterrence in the Baltic region and eastern Europe. But what is the nature of the threat? And how certain are NATO governments that the threat is real? If indeed there are new or evolving approaches to operational and tactical Russian military operations, this must be seen in its context: Russia has acted, whether we like it or not, in its own national security interests. That is a very different proposition to suggesting that any Russian president would authorize an attack on a NATO member state.

More analysis and deeper understanding of Russian strategic thinking and military power is needed before policy is made in response to hypothetical threats to European security.

http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.or ... _2263.html

Trummile vastab Google. Gerassimovi mõttekäiku jälgides sobiks taolise Soome üksuse loomine kõikidesse faasidesse, mis puudutavad opositsiooni, sest sõjaliseks jõuks ei suudetud seda konverteerida.

When the Soviet Union invaded Finland on 30 Nov 1939, its excuse for doing so was to liberate the people of Finland from its capitalist oppressors. On the very next day was announced the founding of the People's Government of Finland, Finnish emigrant communist Otto Wille Kuusinen as the Prime and Foreign Minister (this 'government' is also known as the Government of Terijoki, after the Finnish seaside resort-town nearby the Fenno-Soviet border, where Kuusinen's government was allegedly founded).

The Soviet Union promptly recognized Kuusinen's crew as the one and only government of Finland, and made a Treaty of Friedship and Co-operation with it. Stalin could announce that Soviet Union has excellent realtions with the 'real' representatives of Finnish people. Of course, both Kuusinen's government and its Army were both carefully planned in advance by Stalin and his cronies to act as the fig-leaf of the Soviet aggression.

A government has to have a military force. Thus was born the curious and short-lived footnote to the history of the world's armed forces that was the People's Army of Finland. On 1 December 1939 was founded what was called the 1st Finnish Army Corps, which was directly under People's Comissar of Defence, Marshal of the Soviet Union Kliment Voroshilov. Its mission was to "bring the flag of the Democratic Republic of Finland (as Kuusinen's government was to rename Finland) to the Finnish capital, for the joy of all workers and the dread of all the people's enemies".

Commander of this corps was another emigrant Finn, komdiv Akseli Anttila, who was also Minister of Defence in Kuusinen's government. It had 22,594 men in two divisions, tank regiment and a fighter squadron. However, this corps was not used in fighting in the early stages of the Winter War. Anttila's corps was spared to be used in the expected victory parade at Helsinki, and it was strictly forbidden to use it in the front. After the start of war further People's Army divisions were founded, but they didn't belong to the Anttila's corps. 3rd Division was formed in northern Karelia, but it was and remained under-strength. In far north was founded the 4th Division, but it never reached operational status.

It was originally intended that the People's Army of Finland would field some 80,000 men, but it never came even near. It was supposed to get its men from the Finns and Finnish-speaking peoples living in Soviet Union, and once the war started, it was expected that tens of thousands of Finnish soldiers would desert to join its ranks. But after the Stalinist purges of late 1930s there weren't that many Finnish-speakers left, and even the exile Finnish Communist Party was purged almost to extinction. Thus many purely Russian, Ukrainian and Bielorussian men found themselves impressed into the People's Army. Finally about half of the Army's manpower was non-Finnish, and it didn't considerably help that -- in an ironic reversal of Stalin's national policy -- many of the non-Finns in the Army had their names changed into Finnish ones. And the Finnish deserters never materialized.

It was especially hard to find Finnish officers for the Army, and the Gulags were scraped clean of any men that could pass themselves as Finnish officers. CO of the 1st Division was a Russian, Aleksei Gretshkin, as was CO of the 2nd Division, Georgij Zverev. CO of the under-strength 3rd Division was Finnish Toivo Tommola, as was CO of the 4th Division Albert Saviranta (aka. Väinö Alanne), but this latter formation existed only on paper.

People's Army uniforms were different from the Red Army ones. They consisted mostly of items that came from the captured Polish Army stocks, but the badges of rank and other insignia was the same as in the Red Army. Its other equipment, like weapons, was wholly of Soviet origin. People's Army units had also heavy weapons, like artillery and tanks.

As said, it was strictly forbidden to use the People's Army troops in fighting, which naturally made its leadership quite unhappy once it became clear the war would be prolonged. The men had to contend themselves with rear security duties and field exercises. However, in the latter stages of the war some People's Army units were allowed to fight. For a short period of time the units of the 3rd Division fought on the northern shore of the Lake Ladoga, and on the Bay of Viipuri the Corps artillery took part in the fighting. After the Winter War ended on 13 March 1940, the People's Army was quietly disbanded.

My main source was the article about the People's Army in the book Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=85136

http://militaar.net/phpBB2/download/fil ... &mode=view

[Svejk]

Porošenko: UKR telekanalitel, kes on edastasid uusaastaööl UKR vastast jama (vene meelset estraadi - jutt käib siis sellest "Goluboi Ogonjokist", millest lauluke ka siin juba oli), tuleb hakata selle eest vastust andma.
У Порошенко заявили, что телеканалам придется ответить за антиукраинских исполнителей
01 января 2015, 15:10

Пресс-секретарь Президента Украины Святослав Цеголько заявил, что телеканалам придется ответить за антиукраинских исполнителей в новогоднюю ночь.

Об этом он написал в своем Twitter.

"Вакарчук бесспорно победил Кобзона в новогоднюю ночь. Но за антиукраинских исполнителей надо публично ответить", - заявил он.

Как сообщал "Обозреватель", в новогоднюю ночь принадлежащий Дмитрию Фирташу телеканал "Интер" транслировал программу с участием россиян, поддерживающих агрессию президента России Владимира Путина в Украине. Среди них лица, которым запрещен въезд в Украину и Латвию - Валерия, Иосиф Кобзон, Олег Газманов и многие другие.

Этот факт вызвал бурную реакцию среди экспертов и пользователей соцсетей.
http://obozrevatel.com/politics/01638-u ... itelej.htm

Samal teemal

В Госкино потребовали наказать "Интер" за "голубой огонек" с Кобзоном и Валерией
1 января 2015, 13:19
http://society.lb.ua/culture/2015/01/01 ... kazat.html

[soul]

Interi-i taustajõud!