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Qwerty226 kirjutas: ↑16 Juul, 2024 7:40 Kas sellel mingi põhjus on miks Storm Shadow ei kasutata? Inglismaa ja Prantsusmaa lubasid ju rünnata?

On the night of July 16, a kamikaze drone of the Shahed type entered the airspace of Belarus for the 3rd time lately. This was first reported by the Telegram channel “Nikolayevskyi Vanyok” at 04:10.

According to our data, the Shahed entered Belarus near Belaya Saroka village on the territory of the Palessie Radiation-Ecological Reserve and was flying north, in the direction of Khoiniki. Then the UAV made a turn to the southeast and, via Brahin, headed towards Kamaryn.

At 5 a.m., the UAV left Belarus and returned to the territory of Ukraine. In total, the kamikaze drone spent about 50 minutes on the territory of the country and flew at least 60 kilometers. According to our data, no flights of the Belarusian Air Force were recorded in the mentioned areas at that time.

Another Shahed drone flew into Belarus this morning

At around 08:40, the 4th kamikaze drone of the Shahed type flew into Belarus. The drone was heading from Zhytomyr region of Ukraine towards Naroulia and then flew towards Babruisk.

Right now, a Su-30 fighter and a Mi-24 helicopter of the Belarusian Air Force, which were raised from Baranavichy and Machulishchy airfields, are flying in the sky over Homiel and Mahiliou regions of Belarus.

In addition, Ukrainian monitoring Telegram channels report that right now two targets, which are moving from Homiel region of Belarus, are observed near the Belarus-Ukraine border.

HAT kirjutas: ↑12 Juul, 2024 21:25 Paduvene "3tärni cassad" teatel - vene Beloussov helistas omal intsiatiivil Lloyd Austinile.
lühitõlkes: päevakorras ohtude ennetamine ja riskide maandamine . https://t.me/boris_rozhin

Putin has surrounded his bunker with dozens of air defense systems, here are their exact coordinates

On Google satellite maps, around Putin's residence in Valdai, we noticed at least 7 air defense systems, 11 surface-to-air missile systems, as well as long-range radar stations. We publish the exact coordinates of each of them.

An air defense system has been installed at #Valdai, about a few kilometers from #Putin's residence. The Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft missile and cannon system appeared on Ryabinovy Island this spring. The system can be seen on Google satellite images from May 6. Radio Liberty journalists noticed it.

Putin's residence in Valdai: https://maps.app.goo.gl/afYcpUCZCqw3s6EJA

SAMs were placed on a special platform. Judging by the images from previous months, it was built in March 2024.

Our editorial team found several more such systems, as well as more than a dozen S-300/400 systems and long-range detection radar stations.

One "Pantsir" we found literally on the neighboring shore, one and a half kilometers from Putin's residence. The next SAM system guarding the bunker of the Russian dictator is located 3 kilometers from his residence and adjacent to the highway. By the way, most of the air defense complexes are located close to the roads, for convenient movement and quick access to them.

The next Pantsir-S1 SAM system is located 2.5 kilometers from the Valdai-Avia airfield (ULNA) and 8 kilometers from Putin's residence. The airfield is used for civil aviation, but the strip is also designed for landing and private flights, which are often used by government officials and oligarchs who come to bow to the dictator.

We also found several empty air defense sites. Although Google maps do not show the systems themselves, it is possible that they may be there now or may appear at any time. They are also located in the coverage area of Pantsir-S1 systems, which is up to 30 km.

Cherry on the cake

The systems described earlier are, in our opinion, only part of the auxiliary facilities in the "sky dome" of Putin's bunker.

The main place from where the defense will be conducted is the base, where, according to our calculations, as many as 11 S-400/300 systems were driven by the order of a war criminal (perhaps there is one more system there, but not in a deployed state). You can also notice the Pantsir-S1 SAM system, which is installed on a platform next to this base.

And for better detection of targets threatening the dictator's favorite bunker, he ordered to put several long-range radar stations at once.

Thus, Putin's sweet sleep in his underground bunker in Valdai is guarded by at least 7 Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile systems (we do not rule out that several more could be hidden between the trees), 11 S-400/300 surface-to-air missile systems, as well as long-range detection radar stations.

And, of course, to consolidate the effect of protection - the ground consecrated personally by Patriarch Gundyaev.

ruger kirjutas: ↑16 Juul, 2024 19:54 xuilo on oma Valdai kompleksi ÕT-ga ümbritsenud. Pildid ja kordinaadid postituse lingil.
Lisaks vähemalt 7-le Pantsir-i lühimaakompleksile ka 11 S-300 ja S-400 kompleksi ning radarijaamad.

Chupacabra kirjutas: ↑16 Juul, 2024 22:21 Ukraina ajalehed väidavad et Krynkist tõmmati juba paar nädalat tagasi välja
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1813305209939984801

Samal ajal olla kahe merejalaväe brigaadi elemendid ületanud Dnepri Antonivka silla piirkonnas
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1714433456283791564

FOR A LONG time, it seemed that a war of attrition between Ukraine and a Russia with five times its population could only end one way. But the much-vaunted Russian offensive against Kharkiv in the north that started in May is fizzling out. Its advances elsewhere along the line, especially in the Donbas region, have been both strategically trivial and achieved only at huge cost. The question now is less whether Ukraine can stay in the fight and more how long can Russia maintain its current tempo of operations.

The key issue is not manpower. Russia seems able to go on finding another 25,000 or so soldiers each month to maintain numbers at the front of around 470,000, although it is paying more for them. Production of missiles to strike Ukrainian infrastructure is also surging. But for all the talk about Russia having become a war economy, with some 8% of its GDP devoted to military spending, it is able to replace its staggering losses of tanks, armoured infantry vehicles and artillery only by drawing out of storage and refurbishing stocks built up in the Soviet era. Huge though these stocks are, they are not infinite.

ruger kirjutas: ↑17 Juul, 2024 18:42The Economist tasuline artikkel

Venemaa on sõja esimesel kahel aastal kaotanud vähemalt umbes 3000 tanki ja 5000 muud soomusmasinat. Hollandi OSINT-grupp Oryx leidis visuaalseid tõendeid 3235 tanki hävitamise kohta, kuid märgib, et tegelik arv on palju suurem.

Kui endine kaitseminister Sergei Šoigu 2023. aasta detsembris hooples, et sama aasta jooksul on Vene armeele üle antud 1530 tanki, ei maininud ta, et rahvusvahelise strateegiliste uuringute instituudi hinnangul pole peaaegu 85% neist uued, vaid vanad tankid (peamiselt T-72-d, ka T-62-d ja isegi mõned T-55-d, mis toodeti vahetult pärast teist maailmasõda), mis võeti laost ja seati tehastes uuesti töökorda. Pärast sõja algust on rindele saadetud umbes 175 üsna nüüdisaegset tanki T-90M. Neid võidakse sel aastal toota umbes 90. Kuid ka enamik T-90M-i tanke on tegelikult ümber ehitatud vanad T-90A tankid. T-90A on tegelikult 1990-ndate alguses toodetud T-72 variant. Uute T-90M-i tankide toodang ei tohiks analüütikute meelest sel aastal olla suurem kui 30.

Probleem on see, et nõukogudeaegset relvatarneahelat enam ei eksisteeri. Ukraina, Gruusia ja Ida-Saksamaa tehased mängisid Nõukogude sõjatööstuskompleksis suurt rolli. Isegi T-72 tankide torne tootis Harkivi tankitehas. Ka sõjatööstuskompleksi töötajate arv on nii või naa Venemaal palju väiksem, kui oli Nõukogude Liidus.

Teine suur probleem on suurtükiväega. Venemaal näib tänu Põhja-Koreale olevat piisavalt mürske, kindlasti rohkem kui Ukrainal. Kuid nii intensiivse tule negatiivne külg on raudade kulumine. Mõnel juhul tuleb suurtükirauad iga paari kuu järel välja vahetada. Venemaal on ainult kaks tehast, millel on raudade valmistamiseks vajalikud keerukad pöörlevad sepistamismasinad, mis Austrias valmistatud. Venemaa pole kunagi oma sepistamismasinaid tootnud. Venelased importisid neid veel 1930. aastatel Ameerikast ja peale teist maailmasõda röövisid neid kokku Saksamaalt. Seni oli lahendus vanade järelveetavate suurtükkide raudade eemaldamine ja nende paigaldamine iseliikuvatele haubitsatele. Aga kui kaua saavad venelased nii jätkata?

Suurim probleem on aga tankide ja jalaväe lahingumasinatega, mis on endiselt üliolulised suuremahulistes maapealsetes pealetungioperatsioonides. Kuigi Venemaal võis selle aasta veebruari seisuga laos olla umbes 3200 tanki, oletavad analüütikud, et 2/3 neist ei saa taastada. Suurem osa T-72-dest on 1990. aastate algusest seisnud lageda taeva all ja tõenäoliselt on need väga halvas seisukorras.

Putinil on praegu tõsine probleem ja ta valikus on kaks varianti. Emb-kumb, kas „külmutada“ Ukraina sõda mingiks ajaks ja selle aja jooksul uuesti tehnikat koguda või siis proovida osta tehnikat sellistelt riikidelt nagu Põhja-Korea ja Hiina. Põhja-Korea ka vaevalt et Venemaale palju tehnikat annaks. Venelased peavad selle probleemi lahendama. 2023. aastal tekkis Vene armeel samasugune probleem suurtükiväe laskemoonaga, kui neil laod tühjaks said ja Vene armee sai vaid selle laskemoona, mis tehastest tuli. Enne „mürsunälja“ algust kasutasid nad ööpäevas 60 000–70 000 mürsku, pärast ladude tühjenemist hakkas Vene suurtükivägi ööpäevas tegema 6000–7000 lasku. Puudust leevendas vaid Põhja-Korea ja Hiina abi.

Eelmisel aastal tekkis Vene armeel probleeme mürskudega ja selle aasta lõpuks tekib probleeme sõjatehnikaga. Ja kui Ukraina saab tõhusat täiendust oma õhutõrjele ja kohale jõuavad hävitajad F-16, siis võib järgmiseks venelastel tekkida selline probleem sõjalennukite ja helikopteritega. Ning selle pärast on muutunud Venemaa ametlik jutt ja aeg-ajalt kuuleb, et mingi kummaline seltskond tuleb lagedale rahuettepanekuga. Eelmisel nädalal tulid sellega Ukraina tiktokkerid, sel nädalal nobelistid... Aga pole vaja anda Vene armeele võimalust taastuda, see tekitab ainult uusi probleeme.

Russian telegram channels report a major naval drone attack in Novorossiysk with this video

Crimea was also attacked according to these

Awaiting clarification

Sevastopol, this morning
A Ukrainian drone is targeted

looks like a drone hit a sizable ship that was already on fire. if you go frame by frame you see a large object blocking the explosion from expanding to the right, and between 02 and 03 you see a large ship moving out of the cloud, towards the camera

kummikomm kirjutas: ↑18 Juul, 2024 13:30 Tom Cooper kirjutab talle omases teravas toonis Ukraina õhuväe süsteemsetest probleemidest ja pilootide inglise keele oskamatusest.
https://xxtomcooperxx.substack.com/p/th ... s-overture