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a11 kirjutas:

nuhk.Albert kirjutas:Ega me sellest jamast päris puhtalt välja ei tule ja ennem olen nõus mingi rahanutsu türgile andma kui lasta siin oma eluruumi risustada.

Türgisuguste riikidega on nii, et kunagi ei või kindel olla, et see raha neile andes ka õige asja jaoks läheb. Võtavad raha vastu, aga müüvad kummipaate euroopassepürgijatele edasi.
Aga paistab jah, et rahapuudust Eestis ei ole, kui valitsus seda lahkelt vasakule ja paremale jagatab.

THE FAILURE OF FOREIGN AID

Following the September 11, 2001, attacks by Al Qaeda, U.S.-led forces swiftly toppled the repressive Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which was harboring and refusing to hand over key members of Al Qaeda. The Bonn Agreement of December 2001 between leaders of the former Afghan mujahideen who had cooperated with the U.S. forces and key members of the Afghan diaspora, including Hamid Karzai, created a plan for the establishment of a democratic regime. A first step was the nationwide grand assembly, the Loya Jirga, which elected Karzai to lead the interim government. Things were looking up for Afghanistan. A majority of the Afghan people were longing to leave the Taliban behind. The international community thought that all that Afghanistan needed now was a large infusion of foreign aid. Representatives from the United Nations and several leading NGOs soon descended on the capital, Kabul.

What ensued should not have been a surprise, especially given the failure of foreign aid to poor countries and failed states over the past five decades. Surprise or not, the usual ritual was repeated. Scores of aid workers and their entourages arrived in town with their own private jets, NGOs of all sorts poured in to pursue their own agendas, and high-level talks began between governments and delegations from the international community. Billions of dollars were now coming to Afghanistan. But little of it was used for building infrastructure, schools, or other public services essential for the development of inclusive institutions or even for restoring law and order. While much of the infrastructure remained in tatters, the first tranche of the money was used to commission an airline to shuttle around UN and other international officials. The next thing they needed were drivers and interpreters. So they hired the few English-speaking bureaucrats and the remaining teachers in Afghan schools to chauffeur and chaperone them around, paying them multiples of current Afghan salaries. As the few skilled bureaucrats were shunted into jobs servicing the foreign aid community, the aid flows, rather than building infrastructure in Afghanistan, started by undermining the Afghan state they were supposed to build upon and strengthen.

Villagers in a remote district in the central valley of Afghanistan heard a radio announcement about a new multimillion-dollar program to restore shelter to their area. After a long while, a few wooden beams, carried by the trucking cartel of Ismail Khan, famous former warlord and member of the Afghan government, were delivered. But they were too big to be used for anything in the district, and the villagers put them to the only possible use: firewood. So what had happened to the millions of dollars promised to the villagers? Of the promised money, 20 percent of it was taken as UN head office costs in Geneva. The remainder was subcontracted to an NGO, which took another 20 percent for its own head office costs in Brussels, and so on, for another three layers, with each party taking approximately another 20 percent of what was remaining. The little money that reached Afghanistan was used to buy wood from western Iran, and much of it was paid to Ismail Khan’s trucking cartel to cover the inflated transport prices. It was a bit of a miracle that those oversize wooden beams even arrived in the village.

What happened in the central valley of Afghanistan is not an isolated incident. Many studies estimate that only about 10 or at most 20 percent of aid ever reaches its target. There are dozens of ongoing fraud investigations into charges of UN and local officials siphoning off aid money. But most of the waste resulting from foreign aid is not fraud, just incompetence or even worse: simply business as usual for aid organizations.

The Afghan experience with aid was in fact probably a qualified success compared to others. Throughout the last five decades, hundreds of billions of dollars have been paid to governments around the world as “development” aid. Much of it has been wasted in overhead and corruption, just as in Afghanistan. Worse, a lot of it went to dictators such as Mobutu, who depended on foreign aid from his Western patrons both to buy support from his clients to shore up his regime and to enrich himself. The picture in much of the rest of sub-Saharan Africa was similar. Humanitarian aid given for temporary relief in times of crises, for example, most recently in Haiti and Pakistan, has certainly been more useful, even though its delivery, too, has been marred in similar problems.

Kriku kirjutas: Kui nüüd auväärt kaasforumantidele ei meeldi ei migratsioon ega põgenikelaagrite toetamine, mida nad siis tahavad? Et põgenikud koju tagasi läheks ja ootaks ilusti, kuni Assad või Putin või ISIS neile pommi pähe viskab?

Või mida?

Manurhin kirjutas:Mina tahaks, et põgenikud koju tagasi läheks, seal korra majja lööks ja ehitaks omale üles just täpselt sellise riigi nagu neile meeldib. Enamuses noored ja tugevad mehed

The BKA has published their findings about crime among immigrants. Cases where at least one was found involved have risen from 116,000 in the first three quarters of 2014 to 141,000 in the same time this year, however it is pointed out that this increase lags behind the number of arrivals (though the green crime graph below is obviously off, not quite reaching 140,000).



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By felony, fraud - most of which fare evasion, but also forgery - was most prevalent at 34 percent, which is logical considering motive and opportunity to snatch free rides and the fake ID issue; followed by theft at 33, general violence 16, drug-related 10, sexual assault not quite 1 and homicide 0.1 percent, other offenses 6. As usual, most offenses are against other immigrants, though to varying degree; inside shelters, by far the most cases are violence-related.



By nationality, 18 percent of suspects are Albanian, 17 Serb, 15 Kosovar and Syrian each, and 10 Afghan; this is in marked difference to composition of overall arrivals, where 42 percent are Syrian, 14 Albanian, 11 Afghan and 10 Iraqi. By my count, Serbs are most overrepresented in crime by a factor of 4.25, Kosovars by 2.14, Macedonians by 1.92, Nigerians by 1.67, Eritreans by 1.50; Syrians are most underrepresented by 0.36, Iraqis by 0.60, everybody else more or less average.



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Police also received more than 100 tips about alleged jihadists among refugees; 30 so far have turned out to be without any substance, mostly based upon personal grudges. Twelve cases of possible war crimes or terrorist acts in the respective countries of origin are currently investigated. However, at the same time there have been 56 cases of domestic Salafists trying to recruit among arrivals - which brings us back to the irony that these are heavily German converts trying to recruit people who have fled from Islamist terror. At the same time, there have been over 600 attacks on refugee shelters from outside this year so far, thrice as many as in the same time last year.

See The Guardiani lugu meie Harkust on üdini positiivne. Olen enam kui kindel, et info levib ja see artikkel aitab seeläbi me maad veidi puhtama hoida.

Täielik müstika, loogilist seletust ei leia ja hakka või vandenõu teoreetikuid uskuma.

Citizens Militia Magdeburg:
“The purpose of our militia is not to take over police duties! Nevertheless the police appear more and more to be at their limit when it comes to protecting our security.”