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Viimane näide ei päde - Battle of Bulge´i puhul ei mänginud anglosakside õhujõud pea mingit rolli (polnud lennuilma).
Saksa head aga liigrasked tankid jäid mutta LääneEuroopa liigpehma talve tõttu ning pärast lõppes neil ka kütus - game over.
(by Borja)

Once the weather permitted, all available Tactical Air Forces were focused on
supporting the Allied counter-offensive in the Battle of the Bulge. Beginning December
23rd, and continuing through January 16th, Allied fighter-bombers targeted armored
spearheads and supply lines. Medium and heavy bombers hit bridges and marshalling
areas along the Rhine, bridges on the rail lines leading west from the Rhine, and key
choke points in the road network.

This change in primary focus from strategic to tactical operations brought on the first
real test for the flexibility of air power. The challenge concerned how quickly and
effectively tactical air power could be employed without prior planning and coordination
in a particular area. The Ardennes battle marked the first time air power was being
employed in a capacity other than a carefully constructed offensive. Additionally, the
enemy was on its first offensive in three years, and was attempting this bold move
without the assurance of air superiority.

Fighters and fighter bombers concentrated on the battle areas and along supply lines
close to the front, while medium and heavy bombers attacked rail and road
communications farther behind the front lines. The highest priority targets were
communication centers, bridges, rails, roads, moving vehicles, and troop concentrations.

The weather permitted intensive tactical operations on eight of the first nineteen days, but
visual bombing for the heavies on only three. Despite this, interdiction behind the enemy
lines seriously disrupted the German timetable. Adverse weather prevented the tactical
operations from having an even more decisive outcome because it allowed time for some
repairs. Attacks on vehicles and armored spearheads inside the Bulge proved of even
greater importance. Aircraft destroyed material in use or in immediate reserve and forced
a halt in the German offensive while materiel and troops were dispersed or concealed.

“Here the fighter stole the show and became a truly decisive factor in tactical warfare.”
“This combined effort had a great effect in turning the tide of battle, and by January
16th, the strategic air arm was returned to its usual primary missions.”

Küsin hästi rahulikult, et kas Sina, Trumm, lõpetad oma hüplemise teemalt-teemale ja lõpuks kavatsed vastata siin lehekülgede jooksul räägitule? Või jääbki lihtsalt nii, et

Kunnase võlu on selles, et ta suudab esitada probleeme (või mida ta probleemiks peab) lihtinimesele arusaadavas emakeeles. Lihtsalt loe ja naudi.
Kuidas siis Sinu jaoks on? Kas on "probleemid" või lihtsalt "probleemiks pidamised"? Või Sa lihtsalt kirjutad ja naudid?

Tsiviilkontroll.
Hajutatud formeerimine (millisel määral hajutada? milliste üksuste kaupa? linnakute kasutamine?).
Isikliku varustuse ja relvastuse kojuandmine (kulutatud ressurss vs saadav kasu).
Tsiviilvahendite kasutuselevõtt.
Ja kuidas siis see juhtimisstruktuur selle kõigega seotud on?

Trumm: Miks ei tekitata vähemalt õhutoetust siia (mingid luureandmed raamatus tulevad, vene laevade liikumise kohta), tuleks küsida autorilt, ilmselt eeldab ta, et Soome ja Rootsi keeluga oma õhuruumi kasutada ei lenda lääne lennukid enam siiani.

Veiko Palm kirjutas:Hajutatud formeerimine (millisel määral hajutada? milliste üksuste kaupa? linnakute kasutamine?).

HeiniR kirjutas: Kui NATO riigid Rootsi majandusele pidurit panevad ekspordi osas, on Rootsi majandus käpukil, sest just NATO liikmesriikidesse peaks toimuma suurim osakaal Rootsi ekspordist.

mis annab alust arvata, et NATO riigid midagi sellist teeksid?

Kriku: Ah, ei hakkaks keegi Rootsile neutraalsuse eest blokaadi kuulutama.