www.militaar.net

Olemasolevad kuusteist 120-mm miinipildujat, nelikümmend üks 81-mm miinipildujat, kolmkümmend 106-mm tankitõrjekahurit, sada 23-mm õhutõrjekahurit, üheksateist

Also suitible for patrol ships, possibly modified for 105-106 mm recoilless rifles, UAVs, HMMWVs, SPAAGs. Unlike other tank rounds, LAHAT does not need a tank gun for operation.

Some of the problems of forward defense are avoided by a system of defense in depth. '6 Here, attrition by firepower is achieved not so much by a formidable concentration of fire on one zone, but by confronting the attacker with a never-ending network of anti-tank groups, con-stantly engaging in small fights, using prepared positions, artificial barriers and natural obstacles, avoiding a big battle, but slowly absorbing the attacking force. Horst Afheldt (1976) has developed this idea in its purest form. He proposed to cover all of West-Germanyw with a network of 'technokommando' units. These units are similar to those that figure behind the firebarrier in the Barnaby/Boeker proposal. They operate in very small groups, armed with several kinds of PGMs for use against tanks and air targets, supported by some heavier arms and reconaissance units. Weapons and mobility will differ with the terrain. Afheldt has recently (1983) emphasized that 'immobility under fire' is an important attribute of his 'techno-kommando' system. Such immobility in pre-pared shelters seems feasible, if the concealed troops do not betray themselves as soon as they fire at the enemy. A combination with remotely controlled launchers of PGMs will be necessary. Constructing thousands of such hide-outs, using prefabricated parts, should be especially useful in open spaces, where unprotected infantry would have great difficulties in sur-viving. An important advantage of a relatively static defensive network is that there is no need for large movements of troops and munitions 5.3 Defense in depth Some of the problems of forward defense are avoided by a system of defense in depth. '6 Here, attrition by firepower is achieved not so much by a formidable concentration of fire on one zone, but by confronting the attacker with a never-ending network of anti-tank groups, constantly engaging in small fights, using prepared positions, artificial barriers and natural obstacles, avoiding a big battle, but slowly absorbing the attacking force. Horst Afheldt (1976) has developed this idea in its purest form. He proposed to cover all of West-Germanyw ith a network of 'technokommando' units. These units are similar to those that figure behind the firebarrier in the Barnaby/Boeker proposal. They operate in very small groups, armed with several kinds of PGMs for use against tanks and air targets, supported by some heavier arms and reconaissance units. Weapons and mobility will differ with the terrain. Afheldt has recently (1983) emphasized that 'immobility under fire' is an important attribute of his 'techno-kommando' system. Such immobility in pre-pared shelters seems feasible, if the concealed troops do not betray themselves as soon as they fire at the enemy. A combination with remotely controlled launchers of PGMs will be necessary. Constructing thousands of such hide-outs, using prefabricated parts, should be especially useful in open spaces, where unprotected infantry would have great difficulties in surviving. An important advantage of a relatively static defensive network is that there is no need for large movements of troops and munitions transitional model is not clear. There is none in the earlier model, which Afheldt still considers to be the ideal system. He and his associates have not been able to define an air force role which does not conflict with other fundamental principles of their system, i.e. which is non-offensive and does not offer targets for nuclear attack. An advantage of static defense without an air force is that there is no need for discrimination when an airplane or helicopter appears. Anything flying can be shot at by the defender. In the transitional model, one of the problems of the earlier model is absent, namely how an enemy who has come to a standstill somewhere in the network, can be forced out again. For this purpose the offensively structured mechanized NATO forces can be used. Naturally, it would be better to prevent enemy forces from penetrating so far, and Afheldt suggests that in the future this could be done by the introduction and further development of minelaying short range rockets (10 km) and medium range precision guided rocket artillery. Hundreds of thousands of such missiles would have to be purchased, which is less impossible than it sounds, because they are much cheaper than the systems which are abandoned, like MRCA and Leopard. Calculations show that such massive, but decentralized artillery could improve the effectiveness of the network dramatically, if rockets have a chance of 10%or more to destroy their targets. In fact, this would give the network a completely different character. However, presently existing rocket systems are estimated to have a chance of 1Wo or less to hit and destroy their targets. Therefore artillery can only have a supportive role in the transitional period and mechanized forces for counter attack remain necessary to prevent the loss of too large parts of territory. In the long run then, defense in depth a Ia Afheldt or Ldser could converge with forward defense a la Hannig, if the efficiency of missile artillery increases as prophesied by many technologists. The proponents of defense in depth remain somewhat more sceptical toward the capabilities of high technology than those who favor forward defense.

Võitlusgrupid peaksid võitlema vaenlase tagalas, igasugustest veoautodest, maastikuautodest, ATVdest, soomukitest rääkimata oleks ainult kahju - nad reedaksid sissid välja

kaur3 kirjutas: Juhani, kes ütles, et võitlusgrupp peab võitlema nagu Soome sissid? Kui tõmmata paralleeli Soome sissitaktikaga, siis võib-olla pool VG'd võiks kasutada sisside vaatluspunktide taktikat teede ääres (külgmiine kasutatakse siis eelkõige kolonni peatamiseks), kuid teine pool VG'st on nagu sissikompanii MP üksus. Mina näeksin ideaalis, et kui juttu on konkreetselt MP'st, siis tuleks rääkida 120 millisest ja täpsusmoonast ning kui rakettidest, siis vt. eelmiste linkide all olevat juttu. Selline lähenemine oleks küll ilmselgelt Soome kompanii proportsioonidest väljas, kuid kas me peame mõtlema nagu soomlased. Raud per km stiilis ost D-30 näol on juba tehtud ja võiks edasi liikuda Kui ma nüüd väga puusse ei pane, siis Soomes kadus sissetaktika arendamine laiema üldsuse eest varju enne kaudtule täpsusrelvade laiemat levikut ehk nii 1980. aastate alguses. Juhani, paranda mind, kui eksin.

Juhani Putkinen kirjutas: Mul pole midagi selle vastu kui Eesti Kaitsevägi muretseb ka raskerelvastust nagu rakette. Aga esiteks on vaja luua see väga odav ja tõhus sissisõja pidamisvõimalus - nimelt nende külgmiinidega. See ei maksa praktiliselt midagi, aga sellega saa teha vaenlase elu põrguks.

Kapten Trumm kirjutas:Millest tuleneb väärarvamus, et Eestis külgmiine pole? Rootsi külgmiine, nii soomuse või jalaväe vastaseid on siin muide virnadena. See, et neid kaitseliitlastele koju jagatud pole, ei tähenda, et neid pole. Nende väljaõpe käib muide ka täna.

Ma tahaks kohe näha, kuidas VG pataljoni kolonni peatab.