PÄEVASÜNDMUSTE ÜLEVAATED ja kommentaarid

[Fucs]

Kiseljov uurib Arestovitši käest, et mis temaga toimub....
Арестович: Нужны ли выборы во время войны? @evgeny.kiselev
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=O8zarTyq_3k

Kaks Juliat, Litvinenko ja Latõnina, räägivad Arestovitšist.... aga ka Israelis toimuvast jpm
Спор об Арестовиче. Интервью Юлии Литвиненко из "Сейчас" @Yulia Latynina
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=czrqQQbkE-E

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Арестович: Можно ли уже говорить о провале контрнаступления?
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=l3jtDm1_RRI

[Fucs]

Kindralleitnant Valeri Kondratjuk (Экс-глава ГУР, СВР и контрразведки СБУ Валерий Кондратюк) räägib Budanovi naise mürgitamisest ja muust.
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=mqz6-0Th1Yw

[Fucs]

STALEMATE: UKRAINE’S FAILED COUNTEROFFENSIVE

In Ukraine, a war of incremental gains as counteroffensive stalls
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/20 ... -defenses/

WP: Контрнаступление, которое «пошло не по плану» | Украина и США разошлись в стратегии операции
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=iAJvPP7isU8

Контрнаступление пошло не по плану и Залужный был вынужден сменить тактику – Washington Post
https://war.obozrevatel.com/kontrnastup ... n-post.htm

"ВСЕ ПОШЛО НЕ ПО ПЛАНУ": ПОЧЕМУ КОНТРНАСТУПЛЕНИЕ ВСУ ПОТЕРПЕЛО НЕУДАЧУ – ДЕТАЛЬНЫЙ РАЗБОР WP 
https://www.5.ua/ru/ukrayna/vse-poshlo- ... 18369.html

Контрнаступ ЗСУ пішов не за планом, а Залужному довелося змінити тактику - WP про війну в Україні
https://informator.ua/uk/kontrnastup-zs ... v-ukrajini

[Fucs]

THE WASHINGTON POST: Просчеты и разногласия США и Украины отметили планирование наступления
1.osa
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=tE6NkTJW4jk&t=0s
2.osa
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=0M3zbpcAatQ

[teddybbeer]

THE WASHINGTON POST: Просчеты и разногласия США и Украины отметили планирование наступления
1.osa
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=tE6NkTJW4jk&t=0s
2.osa
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=0M3zbpcAatQ

Originaalartiklid ka, ilma logini jms pasata.
esimene osa: https://web.archive.org/web/20231205073 ... ussia-war/
teine osa: https://web.archive.org/web/20231205071 ... -defenses/

[Fucs]

Математика войны. Украина не выиграет с нынешним советским подходом. Юрий Романенко
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=rNjajVTq1z0

Украина рискует потерять весь левый берег. Мы не сделали выводов в войне с Россией. Юрий Романенко
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=MxLyr-XcvjQ

Terve 2h arutelu siin:
Strateegia ja ressursid sõjas VF-ga
Стратегия и ресурсы войны Украины с Россией. Романенко, Мосейчук, Загородний, Ехануров, Бондарчук
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=axYXPnoD2_8&t=0s

[Fucs]

Kuna endine rahva rahustaja Arestovitš on "ära pööranud" pessimismi siis tema endise optimismi aseaineks...

Gordon ja Svitan räägivad tulevikust.
Свитан. Отмена мобилизации, жизни в Донецке уже не будет, ловушка Буданова, война на 10 лет
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=FIVzLROPCKY

[Fucs]

Meie KAMIN nägemus ja analüüs asjadest.

The immediate and urgent objective is changing Russia’s assessment that the war could be wrapped up in 2024. Instead, 2024 will be a year of strategic defence for Ukraine – a time to build up the necessary military and industrial base to defeat Russia.
To this end, it is pertinent to support the training of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) and tailor the defence industrial output accordingly to provide the AFU the artillery ammunitions, UAVs, strike systems, air defences and fighter aircraft required to liberate their territory. ....

THE TASK
In order to bring about Russia’s defeat in Ukraine, it is necessary for Ukraine and its partners to pursue the following operational objectives:

Circumventing Russian defences by

• severing Russia’s ground lines of communication and making resupplying troops (either under the threat of artillery or by air
and sea) disproportionately costly and more time-consuming,
• inflicting sustained and increased attrition on Russian forces,
• sea denial to the Russian Black Sea fleet,
• conducting a sustained campaign to degrade Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS),
• training and preparing Ukrainian forces to be able to undertake offensive operations at an increased scale.

Continue to blunt Russian offensive operations

• If undisrupted, Russia has the capacity to train approximately 130,000 troops every six months into cohered units and formations available for launching operations.
Additional troops can be mobilised and pushed into Ukraine as untrained replacements, but these do not provide effective combat power.

• The Russian training system can be put under pressure and disrupted by inflicting sustained and increased attrition on Russian units in Ukraine, forcing the newly mobilised personnel to be deployed to the theatre prematurely. This would constrain the Russian training system to deliver approximately 40,000 additional troops instead of 130,000 every six months as cohered units (command and control, artillery, and other critical personnel must be trained to create a unit of action, irrespective of its size).
Deployments above this figure would serve as rapidly expendable gap fillers rather than an offensive fighting force.
• The objective therefore should be to inflict a sustained rate of attrition of at least 50,000 killed and severely wounded Russian troops per six months to consistently degrade the quality of Russian force, preventing Russia from regenerating offensive combat power – which Ukraine has so far successfully
achieved.
• Additional quantitative and qualitative training of Ukraine’s troops, together with the necessary military assistance, will
further increase Russia’s attrition, forcing Russia to enact full national mobilisation – accelerating the desired attrition rate and increasing the risk of domestic strife for the Russian regime....

Manpower

To enable the Armed Forces of Ukraine to liberate key objectives, it is necessary to provide sufficient training to expand the scale at which the AFU can conduct operations. At present, the AFU are unable to reliably train inside Ukraine above company-level because of the long-range strike threat to training areas. Ukrainian units therefore struggle to operate in a synchronised
way in larger formations above a company.

Ukraine’s army expanded from 150,000 ground forces to over 700,000 in 2022, while over the course of 2022 there was heavy attrition among experienced field officers and soldiers alike. As a result, AFU brigades lack sufficiently trained staff officers to enact commander’s intent and synchronise the actions of subnits laterally. The effective span of control of a brigade for offensive operations is therefore approximately two companies.

The result is that the AFU plans and executes operations with a horizon of exploitation limited to approximately 1200 meters. Furthermore, larger formations are missing or are not structured as combat formations. By the end of 2023, European training efforts under the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM) and the UK-led Operation Interflex will have collectively trained 60,000 Ukrainian troops. With additional training provided by the United States and the greater coalition, the total Western effort since Russia’s full-blown invasion in February 2022 has therefore reached close to 100,000 personnel over 20 months. The 30,000- troop European effort is estimated to have cost slightly over €100 million, placing the total cost estimate as low as approximately €350 million (or €3500 per trained soldier).

Despite this, the training was set up when Ukraine desperately needed more trained soldiers to defend an extended front. Because speed mattered, and defensive operations are simpler than offensive operations, training was expedited to five weeks. This is not sufficient to prepare soldiers for offensive operations.

During the Second World War, British infantry would receive over 20 weeks of training before they were considered basically proficient and the U.S. Army operated with 13-17 weeks of basic training. We must therefore develop our training packages to better prepare our Ukrainian partners for offensive operations.

It is time for us set new objectives, a new pace and a new standard of quality in training Ukrainian troops. In 2024, the aim should be to expand Ukrainian operations from brigade enabled company actions, to the ability to execute brigade attacks. In 2025, the aim should be for the AFU to conduct simultaneous brigade attacks, enabled by larger formations at a joint level.

There are three critical lines of effort in enabling this expansion of the scale of Ukrainian offensive operations:

1. Staff officers need to be trained to work at brigade and battalion levels to plan, synchronise, and control a greater span of battlespace. Leadership courses for field grade officers can contribute towards this, provided that the syllabus taught is tailored to build upon rather than supplant the existing workflow of Ukrainian command posts.

Therefore, the syllabi must be drafted based upon the observation of these command posts. Considerable improvements could be brought about in 2024 already, starting with a 10-week training programme building on the skills of an initial cadre of 250 officers, which can enable conducting battalion-plus sized attacks. At the same time, it is highly likely that better training could limit losses among officers, therefore extending the sustainability of Ukrainian forces.

2. Collective training in Europe at a battalion level needs to be expanded and extended to give Ukrainian units that are rotated out the ability to improve their cohesion at echelon.

It is critical that exercises at a battalion level would be supported by the necessary policies and permissions to realistically simulate battlefield realities in Ukraine, particularly including the density of unmanned aerial systems (UAS). Repetitions are vital in order to improve tactical battle drills. Costwise, a two-week exercise for an infantry battalion costs around €1 million only.

3. At present, Ukrainian fire control systems limit the ability to concentrate fire missions.
There is a significant cost to replacing these because personnel knows how to use them. Working with the Ukrainians to continue to develop the command and control tools they employ to increase the scale of effects the AFU can coordinate will be vital if increased manoeuvre forces are to be supported by appropriate fires and electronic warfare.

While the needs for basic and specialist training persist, it is a matter of priority to expand the scope of the AFU in order to allow turning overall manpower into an even more lethal fighting power.

Each of these lines of effort can bring enormous improvement to AFU in support of scaling the reach and effect of its operations,
for a modest amount of resources and within a relatively short timeframe. In return, it will provide a highly cost-effective and attainable toolbox for promoting Ukraine’s success on the battlefield.

Ja sealt edasi veel palju asjalikku juttu.
https://kaitseministeerium.ee/sites/def ... cess_0.pdf

[Fucs]

Huvitav. Soovitan.

Latõnina ja Osetškin
Владимир Осечкин: @MrGulagunet Самый высокопоставленный перебежчик дает показания в Гааге
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=JpUG_sewCu8

[Fucs]

Стратегическая оборона Украины: взгляд снайпера. Константин Прошинский, Юрий Романенко
https://m.youtube.com/live/SEgrbS5JE98? ... ld2niMzcPY

sealt eraldi lühidalt tänavalt jm kinni püütud mobiliseeritutest kes sundkorras rindele saadetakse

Командир спецназа ЗСУ: Бедолагам, которых ловят ТЦК хана на фронте! Константин Прошинский
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=ReX-qv6CBYo

Abrams tankidest ja STV vaehetusraudade puudusest

Командир спецназа ЗСУ: Американские танки «Абрамс» плохо себя зарекомендовали на войне с Россией
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=uQ7KsHlJ2vw

Mobilisatsioonist

Командир спецназа ЗСУ: Украинские политики просрали мобилизацию и мотивацию народа.
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=1RZ1SPlgxr8

[Fucs]

Juri Švets, Zalužnõi kangutamisest
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=CHRbsHieAV8

[Greta]

Toomas Hendrik Ilveselt ysna tabav maailmapoliitika analyys hetke seisust ja millest see johtub. Sobiks koolidesse loenguks.
https://vikerraadio.err.ee/1609265225/v ... k-ilvesega.

[Fucs]

Erukolonel Hannes Toomsalu "blogi". Muuhulgas ülevaated UKR sõjast
https://kolonelhans.ee/

[Fucs]

Воюющий под Курском политолог Сазонов. «Орешник» по Киеву, сюрприз для Путина, штурм Запорожья

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=vX58y0J6IO4

[Fucs]

Osetškin. Soovitan.
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=PYQk0U6hc ... ZGltaXI%3D