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A4 kirjutas: ei saa öelda, et kopterihankest loobumine annaks kuskile mujale ülisuure kvalitatiivse võidu (isegi kui arvestada, et seda prognoositud raha on masu ja kaitsekulude ajutise külmutamise tõttu plaanitust vähem). Võrdluseks proovi välja arvutada, kui palju võib maksta ainuüksi üks DOS lahingumoona kogu KV SA-strtuktuurile (st. mitte ainult automaadipadrunid, vaid ka mürsud, miinid, TT- ja ÕT-raketid, tulevikus ilmselt ka keskmaa-ÕT moon ja tankikahurimürsud). Ühesõnaga – ei ole mõtet hakata sellest kopterihankest kujundava mingit müütilist elukat, millest loobumine lahendaks nõiaväel kõikide teiste väe- ja relvaliikide mured ja puudujäägid.

Mis puudutab nende võimalikku maksumust, siis olukorras, kus kogu SKAK-i hangeteks kümne aasta peale on arvestatud üle 20 miljardi krooni vanas rahas, ei saa öelda, et kopterihankest loobumine annaks kuskile mujale ülisuure kvalitatiivse võidu (isegi kui arvestada, et seda prognoositud raha on masu ja kaitsekulude ajutise külmutamise tõttu plaanitust vähem).

Kapten Trumm kirjutas:Millise efekti annavad 4 kopterit? Null.

A4 kirjutas:Õnneks või kahjuks ei ole tegutsemine täiemahulises konventsionaalses konfliktis ainukene stsenaarium, milleks Eesti riigikaitse valmistuma peab. Sellele „täiemahulisele konventsionaalsele“ võib eelneda (või hoopis selle asemel rakenduda) mitmeid „pehmemaid“ ja „segasemaid“ stsenaariumeid, kus võime väiksemaid üksusi kiirelt transportida, otsingu- ja päästelende teostada, õhuvaatlust ja seiret teostada, MEDEVAC-i teostada võib olla olulise või isegi otsustava tähtsusega. Selles mõttes tuleneb vajadus täiendavate ja korralike kopterite järele ohustsenaariumitest, mitte mõne üksiku õhuväelase või ametniku märjast ja assümeetrilisest unenäost

Õnneks või kahjuks ei ole tegutsemine täiemahulises konventsionaalses konfliktis ainukene stsenaarium, milleks Eesti riigikaitse valmistuma peab. Sellele „täiemahulisele konventsionaalsele“ võib eelneda (või hoopis selle asemel rakenduda) mitmeid „pehmemaid“ ja „segasemaid“ stsenaariumeid, kus võime väiksemaid üksusi kiirelt transportida, otsingu- ja päästelende teostada, õhuvaatlust ja seiret teostada, MEDEVAC-i teostada võib olla olulise või isegi otsustava tähtsusega. Selles mõttes tuleneb vajadus täiendavate ja korralike kopterite järele ohustsenaariumitest, mitte mõne üksiku õhuväelase või ametniku märjast ja assümeetrilisest unenäost

täiendavate ja korralike kopterite järele

THE WAR’S PECULIAR PROPHETS

Perhaps the oddest thing about the cellular anti-tank defense Hezbollah employed is that it had been proposed three decades earlier — for NATO, by off-the-reservation European generals. The prophetic books for Hezbollah-style warfare were impractical, military-utopian tomes written at a time of decreasing European defense budgets and the ascendancy of quantitative analysis — and, ironically, in the shadow of the anti-tank missile’s success in the Yom Kippur War.

Senior officers such as Emil Spannochi of Austria (“Verteidigung ohne Selbstzerstoerung” — “Defense Without Self-Destruction”), Franz Uhle-Wettler of Germany (“Gefechtsfeld Mitteleuropa” — “Battlefield Central Europe”) and Guy Brossolet of France (“Essai sur la non-bataille” — loosely, “The Non-Battle War”) suggested that an effective and economical method of defeating massed Warsaw Pact armor would be to field large numbers of small cells equipped with anti-tank weapons to wage a territorial defense in depth.

The prophets called the European battlefield’s dynamics utterly wrong. Relying on faulty math that assumed X number of kills for each team, they failed to take into account the psychological effects of masses of armor on small, isolated groups of European reservists — or even active-duty troops. Although the techniques they recommended varied somewhat in their details, all assumed that soldiers would wait patiently for Soviet tanks to come into range, coolly and accurately discharge their weapons in the required number of volleys, then safely escape to fight again. The theories also assumed that the right number of anti-tank teams could be concentrated at precisely the right points along exactly the right avenues of approach to pick off passive Warsaw Pact armored vehicles that would present themselves as cardboard ducks in a shooting gallery. It was utter nonsense in the European context.

But it was exactly right for Hezbollah, an organization that had the two crucial ingredients that were missing in Central Europe and NATO: a relatively small piece of restrictive terrain to defend — and fighters willing to die on the spot to kill their enemies. And the IDF, for all its strength, had nothing approaching the number of Warsaw Pact tanks. Furthermore, the Israelis had a distinctly non-Soviet attitude toward friendly casualties.

It’s a bizarre quirk of history that European military thinkers in quest of defense on the cheap unwittingly predicted the tactics of a 21st-century terrorist army. And the predictions don’t end with the examples above: In a collection of articles edited by Carl Friedrich von Weizsaecker in 1984 (“Die Praxis der defensiven Verteidigung” — “The Practice of Defensive Defense”), the entry by Alexander Acker is titled “Einsatz von Raketenartillerie im Verteigigungsnetz,” or “The Employment of Rocket-Artillery in a Defensive Network,” although the author didn’t quite foresee the use of tactical rockets as strategic terror weapons. Another pertinent essay from the same book dealt with the social and political consequences of alternative concepts of defense — an issue Hezbollah managed to turn into a weapon in and of itself as it lured the IDF to strike civilian targets.

While it wouldn’t do to assume that Hezbollah’s doctrine designers had read the European texts, it’s not beyond the realm of plausibility, given the terrorist organization’s extensive ties to northern Europe. But that’s a question for historians with time on their hands. What matters is that, however it managed to conceive its battlefield doctrine, Hezbollah developed effective forms of defense and elastic organizational structures superbly suited to its strategic goals. If we can overcome our vanity and set aside, for one moment, our disgust with terrorist organizations, we might recognize that no formal military establishment in our time has done a better job than Hezbollah of preparing for the war it would fight — against a superior enemy. If David didn’t kill Goliath this time, he certainly gave the big guy a headache.

Ma olen nõus, et laiaulatuslikus konventsionaalses sõjategevuses Eesti ja Venemaa vahel oleks rohkem kasu tankitõrjerelvadest kui paarist/neljast kopterist.....(sellest NLAW-fetišist samas aru ei saa, sisuliselt kusti tegevusraadiusega relv)
Paraku, unustame, et oluliselt tõenäolisem võib tulevikus olla olukord mida allpool kirjeldatakse....
A4 kirjutas:
Õnneks või kahjuks ei ole tegutsemine täiemahulises konventsionaalses konfliktis ainukene stsenaarium, milleks Eesti riigikaitse valmistuma peab. Sellele „täiemahulisele konventsionaalsele“ võib eelneda (või hoopis selle asemel rakenduda) mitmeid „pehmemaid“ ja „segasemaid“ stsenaariumeid, kus võime väiksemaid üksusi kiirelt transportida, otsingu- ja päästelende teostada, õhuvaatlust ja seiret teostada, MEDEVAC-i teostada võib olla olulise või isegi otsustava tähtsusega. Selles mõttes tuleneb vajadus täiendavate ja korralike kopterite järele ohustsenaariumitest, mitte mõne üksiku õhuväelase või ametniku märjast ja assümeetrilisest unenäost

Mul on paraku raske sellele vastu vaielda...
Ei ole ise üldsegi selle eeldatava kopterihanke eriline pooldaja, kuid näha tulevikus ette ainult üht, ainumast stsenaariumi pole kah eriti tark tegu.

sellest NLAW-fetišist samas aru ei saa, sisuliselt kusti tegevusraadiusega relv

tommy kirjutas: sellest NLAW-fetišist samas aru ei saa, sisuliselt kusti tegevusraadiusega relv)

ubiquitous fiber optic cable, these missiles combine uncanny accuracy and long (30-kilometer) range nearly unlimited choice of firing position. Sufficently cheap so as to be deployable in adequate numbers, these weapons promise to drive tanks far from the open ground that is their natural home.
Once they begin to hide in woods, towns, and the shadows of mountains, tanks become vulnerable to well-trained infantry. Provided with simple short range antitank weapon of adequate power, such infantry need fear little from tanks. The mechanized infantry that is sure to accompany the tanks presents more of problem. Once separated from their vechicles, these latter day dragoons will, more often than not, lack both the numbers and the light infantry skills needed to deal with full-time infantry protected by infnantry-friendly terrain.
It is tuhus quite possible that the army of the future will consist largely of only two combat arms - the "long range assassins" of the fiber optic missile troops and the "retail Warriors" of a greatly expanded infantry of the type advocated by Uhle-Wettler. In addition to tanks and armored personnel carriers, both tube artillery and long range rocket weapons (such as multiple launch rocket system) will be pushed to the margins. While a clever commander might find some limited use for such weapons, they will be relegated to a few specialist units. Even then, they will be less usefulthan weapons such as 120-millimeter and 160-millimeter mortars., which, as more and more fighting takes place in woods and built-up areas, have rare virtue of being able to penetrate significant overhead cove before bursting.
All other thins being equal, an army composed of properly trained light infantry backed up by fiber optic guided missiles could defend a given area for an almost indifinte amount of time. Using far less fuel than a conventional force of similar combat power and almost completely free of the need for artillery ammunition, is chief needs would be food, small arms ammunition, and replacement missiles. Difficult to defeat in a "fair fight", such force would also be far less vulnerable to a loss of contact with its source of supply.
The same virtues would give such a force consideralbe offensice power. While the fiber optic guided missiles would need some mechanical transport, their low "weight per kill" and their long range would permit a corps sized force to use the sort of road currently associated with a mechanized or armoured brigade. Marching over secondary roadsa nd, if need be, cross country, the infantry component would be no more dependent on the paraphernalia of modern logistics than General Juin's mountain troops of the Italian campaign of 1943-45.
Thourh more at home inwoods and cities, such a force would also able to operate in more open terrain. An extra ration of fibre optic guided missiles as well as a liberal sprinkling of the hand held anti-aircraft missiles that proved themselves so effective in Afganistan would enable the force to deal with both armoured vechicles and helicopters.

Siinkohal oleks kohane tsiteerida kindral Laaneotsa: Sõjaväe ülesanne on olla valmis halvimaks stsenaariumiks, selleks ta ongi loodud. Armee ei saa kunagi lähtuda kõige kenamast stsenaariumist. Kas me oleme selleks halvimaks stsenaariumiks vähemalt rahuldavaltki valmis?

Kapten Trumm kirjutas:Kõige hullem, mis saab juhtuda, on idanaabri massiivne invasioon - Gruusia ad hoc korrutada näiteks viiega. Selle tagajärjed on igas valdkonnas täiesti totaalsed, sama efekti annab võibolla mingi suur loodusõnnetus või tuumapommi kasutamine nt Tartu vastu.