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Viiskümmend kirjutas:Patt oleks mitte panna, kui lugeda Hollandi enda soomukiostu kokkuvõtteid (see hange toimus neil ajavahemikul 2003-2004)

Kamp wrote that the GD Steyr-Daimler-Puch Ulan would have to be extensively modified to meet Dutch requirements, while the German Puma was still in development by Krauss-Maffei Wegmann and Rheinmetall Landsysteme.

Furthermore, Hägglunds has offered 36% Dutch industry participation in production of the CV9035s, as against 22% for the Ulan and an undeterminable percentage for the Puma.

tommy kirjutas:Holland hankis omal ajal kokku 445 Leo 2 tanki.
Esimene saadi kätte 1981 ja viimane 1986.

Millised need teised "Hollandi enda soomukiostu kokkuvõtted" on peale selle ühe Šveitsi artikli ...

Viiskümmend kirjutas:

Millised need teised "Hollandi enda soomukiostu kokkuvõtted" on peale selle ühe Šveitsi artikli ...

Osta selline e-raamat nagu: Defence Procurement and Industry Policy: A small country perspective
Seal on artikkel Hollandi kaitsetööstusest, mida seletatakse lahti just selle CV9035 hankimise ja suures osas Hollandis valmistamise näite varal. Loodan, et on abiks.

Minule jääb arusaamatuks kaitseministeeriumi pressiesindaja esimene vihje, et Eestile müüdud soomukite kõrge hinna taga on riik-riigile tüüpi tehing. Kas see ei peaks olema asjade hankimise odavaim viis (nagu need soomlastele müüdud tankid)?

Ka see kõige modernsemate CVde jutt ei pea Hollandi soomukite puhul ju paika. Soomukite valmistaja BAE Systems kuulutab oma kodulehel, et hiljuti põhjalikult renoveeritud: Norway’s vehicles are most advanced CV90s ning enamus nendest "most advanced" Norra soomukitest on algselt hoopis 90 keskel ostetud CV9030 MkI-d.

Viiskümmend kirjutas:Patt oleks mitte panna, kui lugeda Hollandi enda soomukiostu kokkuvõtteid (see hange toimus neil ajavahemikul 2003-2004) siis oli hollandlaste valikus kolm soomukit ning nende peamiseks mureks oli, et Puma on liiga uus (loe toores), Ulan on liiga kallis ja CV90 on liiga vana.

Defence Procurement and Industry Policy: A small country perspective kirjutas: In 1997, the Dutch MoD initiated the programme Vervanging Pantservoertuigen
YPR765 en M577 (Replacement for Armoured Vehicles YPR765 and M577),
involving the procurement of three new families of armoured vehicles for the
Royal Netherlands Army. The three vehicle types involved were the Fennek
(a light-wheeled armoured vehicle), the CV-90 (a tracked infantry combat
vehicle), and PWV/Boxer (a large-wheeled armoured vehicle). The following
two cases focus on the CV-90 and Boxer acquisitions.

The CV-90 tracked infantry combat vehicle was to replace the YPR 765, a
substantially improved and upgraded version of the M113 ‘battle taxi’ that
was first introduced in 1979 and due for replacement between 2007 and 2012.
The YPR 765 vehicle had reached the end of its useful life and had become
obsolete, given the demands of the modern battlefield and the likely deployment
scenarios. The Dutch Army’s requirement was for 200 new vehicles,
including training and reserve fleets: 150 ‘pantser-rups infanterievoertuigen’
(PRI – a tracked armoured infantry combat vehicle), 34 ‘pantser-rups commandovoertuigen’
(PRCO – a tracked armoured command vehicle), and 16
‘pantser-rups bergingsvoertuigen’ (PRB – a tracked armoured recovery
vehicle).

After initial screening, three candidate vehicles were considered: the Ulan
(produced by Steyr Daimler Puch), the CV-90 (produced by Alvis-Hägglunds),
and the Puma (produced by the PSM-consortium, a 50/50 joint venture of
Krauss-Maffei Wegmann and Rheinmetall Land Systems). In February 2004,
the three shortlisted suppliers were invited to tender for the provision of both
an evaluation vehicle and the entire requirement. Following evaluation of the
tenders and field trials of test vehicles, the CV-90 emerged as the preferred
option. The CV-90 offer met all the requirements, was least risky, had the
shortest delivery schedule and was the least costly. Also, the CV-90 had
already been introduced in Finland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. There
were therefore opportunities for international collaboration in procuring spare
parts and maintenance.

The other two candidate vehicles offered less value for money. The Ulan
needed substantial modification to meet the Dutch requirements. This involved
high developmental risks and, even after successful modifications, it had little
growth potential as its weight reserve was already used up to meet present-day
protection requirements. If extra armour were to be applied, this would reduce
the vehicle’s driving power and, thus, its operational mobility. The price of the
Ulan was also considerably higher than that of the CV-90 and batch deliveries
could only begin in 2010. The Puma, on the other hand, was completely new
and, at the time, it was still under development. The vehicle had yet to be
tested and, at the time the Dutch MoD had to commit itself, the German
MoD had not yet decided on further development of the vehicle. Thus, the
risks inherent in the acquisition were deemed to be excessive. The Puma
model under consideration was also too small to transport a Dutch infantry
group with its essential equipment and much more expensive than the CV-90.

The differences between the three offers were clear enough to enable the
Dutch MoD to select the CV-90 in late 2004. This allowed an earlier delivery
than had previously been anticipated with the first batch expected to be supplied
in 2007 to replace the aging and increasingly obsolete YPR combat
vehicles. The delivery was to be completed in 2011. The chosen vehicle variant
was the CV-9035 Mk III with a 35 mm Bushmaster cannon. In 2005, the
total sum budgeted for the project was €988 million (in 2004 prices), of which
the Alvis-Hägglunds contract represented €891 million and the balance of €97
million included the testing expenditure, a simulator, supplies of ammunition,
and a management reserve for unforeseen expenditures.

All three shortlisted suppliers were willing to offset the total tender value
through orders in The Netherlands. Again, the CV-90 was viewed as representing
a better deal since at least 36 per cent in offset orders were guaranteed,
against 22 per cent for the Ulan, and an as yet unspecified amount for
the Puma (for which, given its early stage of development, no meaningful
guarantees could be given). A separate offset agreement had been concluded
between the Dutch MEA and Alvis-Hägglunds before the order to supply the
CV-90 was placed with the Swedish supplier. The offset arrangement included,
among other things, the sourcing in The Netherlands of thermal-image
field glasses developed in The Netherlands, a combined air-conditioning and
NBC protection system, and the production of road wheels and complete
road-wheel systems. In February 2005, Hägglunds announced that it had
selected a relatively small Dutch firm, Van Halteren Metaal, as its main local
production partner. It would assume responsibility for the complete turret
assembly. The selection of Van Halteren Metaal was a major blow to Thales
Nederland, the largest defence contractor in The Netherlands and the only
competing contender for the turret contract.

In sum, this case illustrates a successful procurement project, with the tendering
and evaluation stages concluded promptly and the deliveries planned
ahead of previously anticipated schedule. The case also shows how offsets
requirements are applied.

Ka see kõige modernsemate CVde jutt ei pea Hollandi soomukite puhul ju paika. Soomukite valmistaja BAE Systems kuulutab oma kodulehel, et hiljuti põhjalikult renoveeritud: Norway’s vehicles are most advanced CV90s ning enamus nendest "most advanced" Norra soomukitest on algselt hoopis 90 keskel ostetud CV9030 MkI-d.

Selles on kahel vennasrahval suur erinevus, et soomlased on tihti rahul piisavalt heaga, mis ei pruugi olla parim, sest parim on tihti ka kalleim.
Samas Eesti juhtkonnale tundub tavaliselt kõlbavat ainult parim, mis on tihti ka kalleim ja selletõttu on hanked minimaalsed.

Küsimusi tekitab asjaolu, et kui vaadata ühe masina hinda, siis said soomlased tankid 0,6 miljonit eurot odavamalt kui meie saime lahingumasinad (olgugi, et nende tankide tootmisaasta on vanem, kui CV-del).

tommy kirjutas:...
Hinnalt, lahinguvõimelt, kasutuskindluselt jne.
Kõige selle kokkuvõttes..?

tommy kirjutas: Kui ühe masinal on vanust 30 aastat ja teisel 7 siis.....
Polegi nagu vahet või.??
Mis hinna oleks hollandlased siis pidanud määrama??
100 000 eest ära andma või..??
Enamus tulpidest peavad praegustki hinda röövimiseks.
Ja ikka veel kord küsin...
Kui CV-9035NL tehingu tulemus oli halb, siis milline oleks olnud parem.??
Hinnalt, lahinguvõimelt, kasutuskindluselt jne.
Kõige selle kokkuvõttes..?

ribikardin kirjutas:

tommy kirjutas: Kui ühe masinal on vanust 30 aastat ja teisel 7 siis.....
Polegi nagu vahet või.??
Mis hinna oleks hollandlased siis pidanud määrama??
100 000 eest ära andma või..??
Enamus tulpidest peavad praegustki hinda röövimiseks.
Ja ikka veel kord küsin...
Kui CV-9035NL tehingu tulemus oli halb, siis milline oleks olnud parem.??
Hinnalt, lahinguvõimelt, kasutuskindluselt jne.
Kõige selle kokkuvõttes..?

Näiteks 7 aastat vana CV90 vs 30 aastat vana T72 - väga suur vahe on sees. Nii suur, et vahet pole, kas panna CV asemele BMP, või Pasi.

Aga CV9035 hind on minu arust täitsa hea.

Kilo Tango kirjutas:
Üldiselt kui kõrvutada IFV hanget IFV hankega ongi Sul õigus ja keegi ei peaks kobisema. Aga antud puhul on vastus küsimusele väga lihtne - needsamad 100 L2A6-t. Lihtsalt küsimus, mida antud puhul ilmselt erinevalt vastatakse on, et "millal peab neid reaalselt kasutama". Kui hangete läbiviijate ja nende tuliste toetajate arusaam räägib ilmselt ca. 15-20 aastasest piirist (miks muidu hankida suure ressursiga IFV-sid vähese ressursiga tankide asemel), siis suur hulk foorumlasi lähtub perskeptiivist 1-5 aastat. Viimasel juhul tuleks eelistada 30-aastaseid tanke 7-aastastele IFV-dele igast asendist.

Ma pakun, et konkreetsetel masinatel on ainult karp 30 aastat vana. Kõik muu peaks olema prakatikas juba välja vahetatud/taastatud/uuendatud.

Tommy kirjutas:Et soomlased suudavad lihtsalt hankida rohkem(ja erinevat), siis tuleks ehk arvestada ka lihtsaid tõsiasju.
Rääkides meie ja soomlaste võimalustest.
Kuigi Soome kulutab riigikaitsele protsentuaalselt selgelt vähem, kui Eesti.....
(Kui meie suudame siiski panustada 2% piires, siis soomlaste panus jääb sellele oluliselt alla.)
Küll aga on...
1.Soome rahvastik meist nii 5 korda suurem ja majandus ajaloolistest realiteetidest tingituna veelgi mahukam.
2.Soome ei alustanud 1992 aastal täiesti nullist.