Hinna-kvaliteedi, kvaliteedi-kvantiteedi suhe räägib üheselt pigem K9 kasuks ega ega erilisi alternatiive ei ole ka?After seeing a tracked, armoured Dutch PzH2000 based at Tarin Kowt lobbying shells into the distance, the powers that be decided they wanted one of those.
Pigem huvitab, kas eestlased võtavad soomlaste kutse vastu osaleda koos K9 hankel või on kusagil veel olemas meile sobivas hulgas PzH 2000-ndeid, mida noolida üritatakse.Kogu sellest tõmblusest liikurite teemal on Eestil kindlasti võita üks asi - Soomes tekib varsti turule mingi hulk 122 ja 152 veetavaid haubitsaid, millega me saaks enda põhivajadused elementaarsel tasemel ära rahuldatud (ja need vajadused ei koosne ainult kahe brigaadi suurtükipataljonidest).
Samal põhjusel, miks ka Saksamaa oma tanke ja haubitsaid müüs, et oma kaitsetööstusele uusi turge tekitada.Miks Lõuna-Korea oma liikursuurtükid ära müüb?
Mina vaatan seevastu huviga, kas ka seekord "Soome hästitöötav hangete masin" annab teistsuguse arvutustulemuse sarnastes oludes kui Eesti oma.Roamless kirjutas:
Pigem huvitab, kas eestlased võtavad soomlaste kutse vastu osaleda koos K9 hankel või on kusagil veel olemas meile sobivas hulgas PzH 2000-ndeid, mida noolida üritatakse.
Kui sa 122 all mõtled D-30, siis seda võib endale kuhugi kaarhalli konserveerituna vedelema võtta küll (kui tasuta saab), kuid 152-sed ex-soviet torud ajaksid meie torupargi natukene juba liiga kirjuks.
Ahh, panevad kuhugi mereväe lattu ja ütlevad, et ära kadus.Kapten Trumm kirjutas:Kogu sellest tõmblusest liikurite teemal on Eestil kindlasti võita üks asi - Soomes tekib varsti turule mingi hulk 122 ja 152 veetavaid haubitsaid, millega me saaks enda põhivajadused elementaarsel tasemel ära rahuldatud (ja need vajadused ei koosne ainult kahe brigaadi suurtükipataljonidest).
SUURTÜKIVÄEST [lk 16]The Russian are employing no less than 14 different drone designs – 13 fixed wing and at least one quad-copter design -- over the Donbas in varying ranges and with differing sensor suites, some launched from the “separatist” areas and some from Russia proper:
• Very long-range strategic surveillance high-altitude UAV flying along the border and Ukrainian southern coast;
• Long range higher-altitude fixed wing drone flying over Ukrainian positions beyond Brigade rear area;
• Medium-range fixed with drone used in target acquistion and real-time engagement with less than 15 minute response time, associated with Urgan and Smersh Multiple Launch Rocket Systems;
• Short-range fixed wing drone particularly associated working with BM-21 MLRS targeting;
• Very short-range tactical quad-copter used for scouting defense positions and post-strike Battle Damage Assessment (BDA).
JA [lk 36]In the Ukraine conflict the author has witnessed units firing 300-400 rounds per tube per day.
[lk 17]
Data from the Ukraine conflict show that artillery is producing approximately 85% of all casualties on both sides.
...
[lk 18]
In the space of six weeks, the Russians launched 53 fire strikes at 40 different locations, which decimated the Ukrainian forces. For example, at Zelenopillya, in a combined MLRS fire strike that lasted no more than three minutes, two Ukrainian mechanized battalions were virtually wiped out with the combined effects of top-attack munitions and thermobaric warheads.
The Russian emphasis on MLRS has grown since the Cold War. In the mid-1980s the ratio of one MLRS to four traditional artillery systems. However, the Russians have substantially increased their ratio of rocket launchers to artillery so that, in the Donbas, it is now three MLRS to four traditional tubes.
A second noteworthy fire-support trend coming from the Russo-Ukrainian War is the emphasis on both sides of direct fire artillery. The Cold War era design of the 2S1 Gvozdika (Carnation), Self-propelled 122 mm has been extremely successful and popular on both sides.
Even though “an old system” its high maneuverability (particularly in soft soil and marshy areas) and mechanical reliability make it popular in roles for which it was not designed.
For the Russian side, the 2S1 is used in the dual role of both indirect Howitzer and as an assault gun. In this latter direct fire role it is used as an over-watch system targeting at a range of 1 to 6 km Ukrainian strong points and suppressing anti-tank defenses. In interviews with the author, numerous Ukrainian anti-tank missiles and anti-tank gun operators have noted their reticence in opening fire against Russian armor because of the expectation that they themselves will immediately be targeted by the Gvozdika.
2S1 Gvozdika [lk 19]Fire Strike at Zelenopillya
...
where a combination of artillery and MLRS, with the latter employing top-attack munitions and thermo-baric warheads, caught two Ukrainian mechanized battalions in the open. This intensely concentrated fire strike created high casualties and destroyed most of the armored vehicles in a shelling that lasted only a few minutes.
D30 moonast veel, sest siin autor eksib, D30 jaoks on olemas ka soomustläbistav moonConversely, the Ukrainians have been using their 2S1 systems less as an assault gun but rather in the anti-tank role — to compensate for their lack of effective antitank weapons against Russian armor. Although the 122 shell is not designed for armor penetration, the force of the impact of the shell when fired at a reasonably close range can have a disastrous effects even without penetrating the armor, such as knocking the turret off the tank. However, there is a negative consequence in using a light-skinned armored vehicle in direct fire engagements that results in very high loss rates for Gvozdika.
Interestingly, there is no comparable system to the 2S1 in the American or West European armies. However, there are large stocks of Gvozdika inherited by former Warsaw Pact countries. For example, Poland has an inventory of 2S1T Goździk of these systems —most in storage— but they could play a critical role in Baltic defenses, where their amphibious and dual direct/indirect capability would make a noteworthy contribution.
A third trend, manifested uniquely only on the Russian side, is the decentralization of artillery down to the level of maneuver battalions.
[lk 20]
But there is a unexpected rationale for this trend— it is necessitated by the abnormal dispersed nature of combat where the battalions are operating on a much broader front and thus the area typical of a Cold War brigade. The increased operating area of Russian maneuver battalion reflects both a condition and an imperative: the Donbas battlefield has a relatively low force-to-space ratio; and the increase lethality on it mandates wider dispersion for survivability.
A fourth fire-support trend, complementing the others, is the pursuit of increased range of artillery.
...
discussions with Ukraine artillery commanders suggest that the objective in counter-battery fire is less the destruction of the opposing artillery than disruption of its fire missions by forcing it to move.
[lk 21]
The reciprocal of that is also important – not being able to conduct real-time counter-battery fire condemns the recipient to prolonged fire strikes and each salvo becoming more lethal. This is a trend that is made possible by a combination of both UAVs on the battlefield and the increased capability of counterbattery radar.
The fifth trend in fire-support is the increased emphasis by both sides on counter-battery radar.
Tuleme jälle tagasi esimese artikli juurde:...
The Special Technology Center of the Mikhailovo Artillery Military Academy made public materials concerning the experimental reconnaissance-strike complex consisting of Orlan-10 UAVs and a battalion of self-propelled 2S1 Gvozdika 122mm howitzers, and the effects of its use on the Donbass.
...
The Orlan-2S1 reconnaissance-strike complex also suppressed 3 company positions, eliminating at least 30% of personnel and equipment located at these sites, destroyed 3 Tochka-U short-range ballistic missile launchers, at least 17 tracked and 20 wheeled vehicles, two 2A36 152mm cannon, at least 3 82mm mortars, and an artillery ammunition storage. Ukrainian forces lost at least 90 killed and 220 wounded, numbers which were confirmed by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission.
...
According to the report, 112 shells were launched at the position, instead of 3240 shells specified by artillery firing norms.
SOOMUKITESTTherefore, the prime antitank weapon in the Donbas is the high velocity 125 mm gun of the main battle tank.
Infantry are once again, rendered impotent against concentrated tank attack due to the lack of effective antitank weaponry.
[lk 25]
But when the T-90 participates in battle, it has had a decisive effect.
[lk 26]
The impact of disparity in modernization between Ukrainian and Russian MBT forces in the Donbas is empirically measureable. Against tanks of equal generation and capability, the Ukrainian gunners have generally been able to achieve a favorable loss exchange ratios. This reverses, when the modern T-72M are introduced, with Ukrainians losing three tanks to every one killed. In five company size engagements documented where T-90s have participated, the Ukrainians have taken double their normal losses and there is no evidence they have been able to kill a single T-90. For NATO’s East European forces, most of whom retain, like the Ukrainians, and inventory of Soviet era armor and have few or no tandem warhead ATGMs, the task of taking on new Russian tanks will be no less challenging.
KOKKUVÕTE [lk 42]Since the end of the Cold War, armies around the world have given increased emphasis to light Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV), which prioritizes mobility and fire-power over survivability. The evidence coming in from the Ukrainian conflict seriously questions the validity of that emphasis.
...
But the big killer of IFVs is artillery sub-munitions and thermobaric warheads == when hit, these vehicle tend to suffer catastrophic damage, killing or severely burning everyone on board.
Millised järeldused me võiksime enda jaoks teha?Bottom-line on Operations:
First, the increased availability of overhead surveillance, combined with massed area fires of artillery and MLRS has produced a new level of intensity in modern conventional combat.
In theory, this should be to the advantage of the defense because it increases their awareness of offensive movement and concentration and the attacker is more exposed to lethal fires. However, when the defender is not able to conduct a maneuvering defense (due to a lack of heavy armor and long-range anti-tank guided missiles) light infantry in fixed positions become extremely vulnerable to the attacker’s UAV target acquisition and massed fires.
This lesson is important for NATO countries who have, for reasons of economy or strategic mobility, decided to rely on light infantry and precision artillery fires.
Second, when the defense is penetrated by armored forces threatening a deeper breakthrough, without equally strong and modern armored forces of their own, they do not have the means of active counterattack, become surrounded, and take disproportionally high losses.
Third, Airland battle has been noticeable by its absence in Ukraine. Initially, the defenders tried to use the Ukrainian Air Force for deep attack. However,their limited target acquisition and lack of air-to-surface guided munitions seriously limited their effectiveness. When the Russians introduced large quantities of air-to air defenses, the Ukrainians were shot out of their own skies.
Huvitav lugemine, kuid Ukraina ei anna täit pilti.Tux kirjutas:
Millised järeldused me võiksime enda jaoks teha?
1. Gvosdika on hirmus ja väga paindlik relvasüsteem eriti koos laserjuhitava moonaga ja sobib hästi ka vastase soomustehnikat hävitama ja väidetavalt viskab hästi sihitud kildmürsk tankil torni pealt minema! Võib-olla peaks ikkagi neid mingi koguse hankima? Kitolovi sarnast moona on võimalik osta nii Hiinast, kui Ukrainast, kui ilmselt ka mönest läänes olevast tehasest.
2. MRLS on samuti trendimas ja meil on see süsteem täiesti puudu!
3. Droonid koos haubitsate ja MRLS on tegijad. Kuidas me peaksime droonidega võitlema? Mistraliga neid ju hästi ei lase... Harjutada kuulipildujast õhumärkide tabamist? Ma pole kuulnud, et meil keegi sellega tegeleks...
Antud põhjused pole päris õiged. Korraliku TT raketiga on väga raske tegutseda vastase otsetule all - demaskeerivad efektid pluss SACLOS (paremat UKR vaevalt kätte saaks) rakettidega tuleb piltlikult öeldes tinavihmas lõpuni vastu pidada. Lisaks ka lage maastik.1. Gvozdika kasutamine on kallis alternatiiv korraliku TT raketi puudumisele, mis oli UKR krooniline häda.
2. Gvozdikat kasutati laialt selle pärast, et seda oli lihtsalt laialt käes.
saksa M109A3G (ja itaalia M109L?) on pmst. FH-70 toru ja laadimissüsteemid M109 tornisKapten Trumm kirjutas: Kuna FH-70st ei ole taolist roomikul versiooni olemas, ei saa kahjuks teada, palju seal see "liikur" juurde annab.
Kasutajad foorumit lugemas: Registreeritud kasutajaid pole ja 3 külalist
