www.militaar.net

Krimmis ôhutôrje töös
https://twitter.com/sanderregter/status ... 45057?s=46

Relvajõud puhastavad miinivälju käsitsi.
Väidavad, et 1 x 2 km suurusel miiniväljal on/võib olla umbes 1 miljon miini.
(https://ukrrain.com/kontrnastup_na_pivd ... n_min.html)

Veits kurb et NATO absoluutselt ei taha musta mere laevastikku korrale kutsuda. Sisuliselt käitub Venemaa nii,nagu tegu oleks nende sisemerega.

https://www.err.ee/1609043966/briti-luu ... blokaadiks

Kardavad konflikti Venemaaga, mis siin enam imestada. Vastasel korral oleks ka Ukrainal vahendid neid laevu rünnata ja ei vaadataks pealt, kuidas pidevalt tsiviiltaristut rünnatakse.

Turist 47 kirjutas: ↑26 Juul, 2023 6:25 Relvajõud puhastavad miinivälju käsitsi.
Väidavad, et 1 x 2 km suurusel miiniväljal on/võib olla umbes 1 miljon miini.
(https://ukrrain.com/kontrnastup_na_pivd ... n_min.html)

Ehk siis 1 miin 2 ruutmeetri kohta (ühtlase jaotuse eeldusel)

Miine võiks ju droonidelt proovida vastava tehnoloogiaga tuvastada - 21.saj. siiski? Droon ei pea taevalaotustes olema vaid võib ju ka meetri kõrgusel etteantud marsruudil kulgeda ning leitud "anomaaliad" kaardistada.

Parasiidid väidavad, et ukrainlased suuremate jõududega suruvad peale Robotynest ida poole.

https://twitter.com/markito0171/status/ ... 1917151232
https://twitter.com/markito0171/status/ ... 8565246976
https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/ ... 2344166400

Parasiidid on hõivanud idarindel Luhanskis 3 asulat, milleks on Nadiya, Serhiivka ja Novoyehorivka.

https://twitter.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/sta ... 0513063938

Walter2 kirjutas: ↑26 Juul, 2023 9:52 Miine võiks ju droonidelt proovida vastava tehnoloogiaga tuvastada - 21.saj. siiski? Droon ei pea taevalaotustes olema vaid võib ju ka meetri kõrgusel etteantud marsruudil kulgeda ning leitud "anomaaliad" kaardistada.

On olemas - Mistral Hound
https://www.mistralsolutions.com/homela ... ion-drone/

SEPKA: ukrainlased on nüüd omakorda parasiidid Staromaiors'kest välja löönud.

https://twitter.com/WarFrontline/status ... 3604106241

Aga räägiti siis mürsukoalitsioonist - miljon mürsku Ukrainale. Muidugi, miine on suuri ja väikseid, aga tohutu logistika ja ettevõtmine ikka.

Gideonic kirjutas: ↑25 Juul, 2023 14:37

EDIT: Robotnye kohta on seis tänaseks väidetavalt selline:

Tom Cooper kirjutas: Of course, since ‘there are no videos’, nothing of this has ever happened…. or ‘is going to happen’ in a few days…

Ehk kui igasugu OSINT kaardid nüüd paari päeva jooksul (esimeste videode ilmumisel) oma "jooni"sinnapoole nihutama hakkavad, eks siis ole näha kas rääkis õiget juttu. Senimaani ei näe põhjust kahelda.

Vaikselt hakkab twitter OSINT kanalitele ka jõudma see info.

Interesting geolocation.
These are being filmed by drones, and as of now no images of them from the ground. Which might indicate RuAF are not at the location. This should be from a few days ago.
https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1684151903079260161

"Luganski Rahvavabariigi" 4. Brigaadi tegelane "Murz" on telegrammis üsna mures Ukrainlaste tegevuse ja hilise mobilisatsiooni pärast. Inimtõlgitud tekst inglise keelde:

Originaal telegrammi link vene keeles: https://t.co/J2CJ9EJ3hw

https://twitter.com/wartranslated/statu ... 4338040832

Tõlkija kommentaar:

While Girkin is gone, his mate Murz from the 4th "LPR" Brigade is taking the turn in doom posting: he says Ukrainians are successfully realising their plans of strong pushes in any area of the frontline that is available, destroying Russian artillery and taking out trained forces. He says if this goes on, the late summer and fall can be very difficult for Russia when it starts running out of personnel. And then the Russian authorities who are delaying the next mobilisation will be forced to throw new mobiks into battle from trains in WW2 style just to try and stop the continued Ukrainian offensive.

Tekst ise:








Ja mis tema sõnul juhtub kui mobilisatsiooni ei tehta kohe (vaid oktoobris nagu praegu tundub)

Tõlkija kommentaar:

Dmitri kirjutas:Doom posting is not an overstatement, he's genuinely very concerned about the lack of people to conduct even the most basic of tasks, not even talking about military operations. He says Ukrainian strikes are forcing Russians to disperse stockpiles which leads to a significant slowing down of transportation of ammo. Current attempts to bring as many troops as possible from various formations to the hotspots on the frontline cannot compensate for technical improvement for Ukrainians.

Tekst ise:

Täiesti võhikuna on mulle jäänud mulje, et nii tavameedia kui ka kõiksugu analüütikud olid sügavalt eksklikud vene armee logistilise võimekuse ja mingil määral ka üldise võitlusvõime suhtes. Ikka pidevalt jäi mulje, et kohe-kohe saavad neil otsa relvastus või inimesed või deserteerutakse. Aga endiselt jätkub neil võimekust rinnet hoida ja droonisõjas pigem isegi peale jääda.

nagu Tom Cooper kirjutas:

Problem No. 1: driven by both the mainstream- and the social media, expectations about this counteroffensive in the Ukrainian public and Western are far too high. They were (and largely remain) ‘maximalist’: creating the impression of ‘ZSU just needs to attack like in eastern Kharkiv last year, and the Russians are going to fold and flee’.

Problem No. 2: such expectations seem to have created a political necessity. A situation where Ukrainian government began expecting from the ZSU to do, and to succeed, regardless the circumstances. Unsurprisingly: the offensive was launched too early, while ill-prepared, and with too-high expectations.

Problem No. 3: both the Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR MO), and all of NATO intelligence services have failed to run proper field intelligence, so to find out about the extension of the Russian minefields, and to find out that the Russians are planning to defend already at the first line of contact.

Problem No. 4: NATO advisors simply have no combat experience in fighting big, conventional wars with so-called ‘peer’ opponents. They have no combat experience in fighting the VSRF. Correspondingly, they never expected plenty of things. They did not expect the Russians to exploit the opportunity of having almost a year of time to prepare their defence positions. They did not expect the Russians to deploy as huge minefields as they did. They did not expect the Russians to fight ‘already’ on the line of contact, etc., etc., etc….

Problem No. 5: ….and, because ZSU commanders have no experience in running large-scale offensive operations, they were listening to NATO advisors.

Problem No. 6: lacking precise intelligence on the Russian minefields and defence positions, and lacking experience in operations of this kind, neither NATO-advisors nor ZSU-planners have figured out how would the Russians defend. They expected shallow minefields, which are – relatively: this depends on amount of heavy equipment one has – ‘easy’ to either flank or clean and cross; then a drive and assault on the 1st Line of Russian defences; and then a repeat of the exercise at the 2nd, and then the 3rd Line, pending the breakthrough into the operational depth of the VSRF.

Problem No. 7: NATO was late (about a year late) with decision to start delivering heavy equipment, and then late with deliveries of at least enough heavy equipment necessary for an operation of this kind.

Problem No. 8: NATO supplied far too few engineering/de-mining equipment.

Problem No. 9: unsurprisingly, NATO was late in providing training for ZSU on that equipment, too.

Problem No. 10 (though ‘worst of all’): I’m not surprised if idiotic and corrupt CEOs called ‘politicians’ in charge of different NATO-countries can’t comprehend the sheer scope and size, and thus the expenditure of ammunition in this war. If they’re lacking the foresight to understand what shall they do the next month, next six months, a year or longer (anything longer than until the next elections; and in countries like Austria: not even that). And, generally, I taught myself not to have any kind of expectations. Thus I’m not surprised (nor disappointed) if it was only this year – at least 12 months into the all-out Russian invasion – that they came to the idea to seriously increase their ammunition production

https://xxtomcooperxx.substack.com/p/uk ... guerrillas

Täiesti võhikuna on mulle jäänud mulje, et nii tavameedia kui ka kõiksugu analüütikud olid sügavalt eksklikud vene armee logistilise võimekuse ja mingil määral ka üldise võitlusvõime suhtes...

Ei usu. Arvamusena, siis tõde on tore, aga kogu karmi tõde ei ole vaja igapäevaselt esitleda. See lihtsalt ei anna midagi, ei ole abiks.

- Murmanski lennuväljalt tõusis õhku 12 (rekord) orkide Tu-95.
Ukrainas kuulutati välja ulatuslik õhuhäire - 17.00 või + on arvatavalt vene raketid Ukraina taevas...
Õhujõud - https://t.me/kpszsu/3641 (meedia "kerib" onlines erakordsest raketiohust - viimase poole tunniga on ilmunud vähemalt 30-40 uudist)

Peaaegu 3 lk. postitusi läksid miinisõja teemasse: viewtopic.php?p=798927#p798927