Paramilitaarid hävitavad Süüria lennuki

Relvastatud gruppide tegevus väljaspool ametlikke väeosi. Metsavendlus, sissisõda, mittekonventsionaalne sõda, gerilja, banditism ja mis iganes nimed sellele nähtusele antud on.
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kaur3
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Paramilitaarid hävitavad Süüria lennuki

Postitus Postitas kaur3 »

This video, allegedly filmed on Mar. 7, 2012, shows rebels hitting a Syrian Arab Air Force Mig-23MS on the ground at Abu-Dhahur air base in the north west region of Idlib, with an AT-13 Saxhorn-2 (NATO designation for the Russian 9K115-2 Metis-M Anti-tank).
http://theaviationist.com/2012/03/14/sy ... destroyed/
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soesilm
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Re: Paramilitaarid hävitavad Süüria lennuki

Postitus Postitas soesilm »

Tuleb meelde kohe Radujev, kes kopterite hävitamiseks pidas kõige targemaks 70km kaugusel oleva lennuvälja juurde sõita. Täna tuntakse seda Kizljari operatsiooni järgi ... kuigi lennumasinaid nad vist ei hävitanudki.
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Kapten Trumm
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Re: Paramilitaarid hävitavad Süüria lennuki

Postitus Postitas Kapten Trumm »

Venekeelsed allikad väidavad, et Iraani-Iraagi sõja ajal hävitas Iraagi Mi-24 tiivaaluse TT raketiga (vist AT-4) Iraani F-4E.
Kui viimase piloot ei märganud raketti ning otsejoones kopteri suunas tuli, siis teoorias võimalik.
Muidu lendava reaktiivlennuki tabamine TT raketiga on üsna võimatu, kuna lennuk suudab manööverdades lihtsasti väljuda sihikult (TT relvad ei ole üldiselt mõeldud relva suhtes nii suure nurkkiirusega liikuvate märkide vastu).
/Veelgi hullem on see, et koos kohustusliku patriootliku riigioptimismi kehtestamisega nõrgeneks paratamatult ka meie ohutaju, mis on enesealalhoiuks vältimatult vajalik instinkt/ S. Mikser 2014.
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kaur3
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Re: Paramilitaarid hävitavad Süüria lennuki

Postitus Postitas kaur3 »

kuigi lennumasinaid nad vist ei hävitanudki.
Miks nad neid ei hävitanud:

- kas mõtlesid ümber, sest lennuväli oli liiga tugev sihtmärk ja valisid lihtsamini teostatava ülesande nagu pantvangide võtmine (samas müts maha meeste ees, kes suutsid nii pika maa üldse sihtmärgi suunas maha sõita).

Nüüd peaks sissi-, partisani-, gerilja-, 4-põlvkonna, võitlusgruppide jne teemades kaasa mõtlejad arutama, et kuna mehed on meil olemas (nagu süürialastel videos), sõiduautod on oleamas (nagu süürialastel videos), siis kas kõikidel sissitaolistel on meil siin olemas sellised relvad (mis mahuvad autosse ja mida saab käeotsas tassida), millega pika maa pealt tugevaid sihtmärke hävitada? Jah, meil on need olemas. Milanid on ja Gustid on. Järgmine küsimus on, et kas hard targeteid otse rünnates ei või ise sattuda ise perimeetri kaitses olevate riistade tule alla. Ja edasi jõuame juba GRAMM'ini.
The real game changer is guidance and precision, he said. CSBA calls it the “G-RAMM effect”: Guided Rocket, Artillery, Mortar and Missile. In modern warfare, the majority of casualties are caused by artillery and mortar blasts and fragments. Those munitions are now getting ever more precise. What makes the IED such an effective weapon is it allows insurgents to put artillery rounds precisely on target.

The implications of the proliferation of precision are huge. If an enemy lobs a few hundred rounds and only a few hit the intended target, its harassment fire. But if the enemy fires 100 rounds and they hit with precision, “ then the concern must turn to the enemy’s inventory levels,” Wood said, “and how it matches up to the limited set of equipment that I have.”
A look at the G-RAMM components:

Rockets: During the 2006 war, the IDF was never able to stop Hezbollah firing thousands of rockets into civilian centers. These were mostly unguided, short-range Katyushas. The Guided MLRS rocket, uses a GPS guidance package, a maneuverable warhead and has a 70 km range. It has proven itself in Iraq and Afghanistan. As CSBA said, “the cat is now out of the bag”, and guided rockets can be expected to proliferate anytime after 2010, depending on foreign nation development timelines.

Artillery: The U.S. developed guided artillery rounds in the 1980s with the 155mm Copperhead, a laser guided round designed to kill tanks using top attack; no tank in the world can survive a direct hit from a heavy artillery round on its thinly armored roof. Although Copperhead suffered reliability problems, it was a technological breakthrough, requiring high G-force hardened electronics that could survive being fired out a cannon tube. The Russians quickly followed suit in the mid-1980s, developing the 152/155 mm Krasnopol laser-guided round and the Kitolov 122 mm round. Krasnopol was considered superior to Copperhead, with greater accuracy and range. The newest U.S. programs are primarily GPS-guided, such as Excalibur and LRAP. CSBA said these weapons have not yet been used by terrorists, but they are available now.

Mortars: Guided mortars are what CSBA calls the big, near-term, irregular warfare threat. They’re attractive to terrorists and irregular fighters because they’re cheap, easy to use, agile and very lethal. Laser guided mortar rounds have been around for some time. The more dangerous development is fire and forget rounds, such as infrared homing anti-armor rounds, anti-radiation and GPS. These rounds take the man out of the loop and require only the most basic training to achieve unheard of accuracy. For example: the Israeli built Fireball 120mm mortar round has a 1 meter CEP, compared to the 110 meter standard. The range of guided mortar rounds is increasing as well.

Missiles: A wide variety of guided missiles will flood future battlefields, CSBA said. Advanced man portable anti-aircraft missiles will be particularly prevalent, as will be heavy anti-tank-guided missiles used both against vehicles and as portable artillery for direct fire support. The 2006 Lebanon war was certainly not the first time Israeli armor faced large numbers of anti-tank missiles. There are stories of Israeli tanks on the Golan strung with guidance wires from so many Sagger missiles being fired at them during the 1973 war. The Sagger required the operator to guide the missile into its target using a small joystick controller. The missiles were slow and targeted tanks could often move fast enough to get out of the way or fire at the operator and cause him to miss. The newest anti-tank missiles are faster, have greater range, are “fire and forget” weapons, meaning the missiles lock onto their targets, and the warheads can defeat all known tanks.
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/07/01/hezbo ... -steroids/

Kuidas meie sissitaolised saaks arendada GRAMM'i võimekuse piisavalt veenvaks?
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Kapten Trumm
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Re: Paramilitaarid hävitavad Süüria lennuki

Postitus Postitas Kapten Trumm »

In modern warfare, the majority of casualties are caused by artillery and mortar blasts and fragments.
Keskmine paik ütleb, et ega WWII ajal ka suurt teisiti ei olnud, rasked torud tegid põhitöö ja püssitorud, miinid ja lennukid ülejäänu.
/Veelgi hullem on see, et koos kohustusliku patriootliku riigioptimismi kehtestamisega nõrgeneks paratamatult ka meie ohutaju, mis on enesealalhoiuks vältimatult vajalik instinkt/ S. Mikser 2014.
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