Brasiilia F-X2 hävitajate konkurss

[Qtec]

Mhm, kui ma eksi siis Gripenist oli pakutud NG versioon, millel on eelmiste versioonidega võrreldes oluliselt suurenud tegevusraadius. Nii, et see väike praktiline tegevusraadius ei pruugigi Gripeni puhul enam väga paika pidada.

[Hydrazine]

Gripen NG'ga on see värk mis SU-35'gagi... igasugu lubadusi võib pakkuda. Kui Gripen NG kusagil kogustena oleks juba ja ennast mingilgi moel juba õigustanud, siis vast oleks asi märksa parem.

[Kilo Tango]

Gripen NG'ga on see värk mis SU-35'gagi... igasugu lubadusi võib pakkuda. Kui Gripen NG kusagil kogustena oleks juba ja ennast mingilgi moel juba õigustanud, siis vast oleks asi märksa parem.

Njah. Teisalt on Rafael küll kogustena olemas aga ei ole ennast eriti õigustanud. Mine võta siis kinni. Jääbki ainult F-18. Seda aga ei taheta poliitilistel põhjustel (vist).

[Hydrazine]

Njah. Teisalt on Rafael

Ära solvu, et ma norin aga kaks sõjatööstuse kuulsat nime aetakse pidevalt segi.

Lennuk on siiski RAFALE.

[Hydrazine]

Ja tänapäeval on maailmas järgi ainult kolm riiki, kes suudavad absoluutselt oma vahenditega hävitaja(mingisuguse) kokku klopsida ja needki piirid hägunevad, globaliseerumine on asja nimi. Sa annad mulle titaani ma kriban sulle natuke radarisofi vastu.

[man21]

Hiljuti alles oli prantsmannide dok, kus nende lennukikandja seilas ja Rafaled lendlesid ja lendurid rääkisid tarka juttu.

[Kilo Tango]

Delfi märkas kah sagimist kui Rootsi kunn oli isiklikult läinud asja uurima: http://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/v ... d=30021689

[nokkloom]

Wikileaksi leak siis konkursi kohta. Kuna Wikileaks hüppab pidevalt ühest kohast teise ja seetõttu on aadresside postitamine üpriski kasutu, kopeerisin lihtsalt teksti maha. Dokumendid on pärit 2009 aasta keskpaigast.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000634

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA AND PM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2019
TAGS: PREL MASS ETTC BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL'S FIGHTER PURCHASE: ENDGAME STRATEGY

REF: A. BRASILIA 216
¶B. BRASILIA 41

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Lisa Kubiske. Reason: 1.4(d)

¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST. With two months
remaining before the Government of Brazil decides on a next
generation fighter aircraft, the U.S. competitor, Boeing's
F18 Super Hornet is still perceived by many Brazilians in and
outside the GOB as a likely second or even third-place
finisher, despite having the best aircraft and best offset
package. Most Brazilian contacts tell us that they do not
believe the USG is supporting the sale strongly, raising
doubts in their minds about our long term reliability as a
partner. Between now and July, there will be several
opportunities to assure the Brazilians at senior levels that
the USG will be behind the sale. Paragraphs 3-7 below
contain proposed steps to address key Brazilian concerns and
maximize chances for selection of the U.S. competitor. Among
these steps, high level contacts, especially by the President
and Secretary will be critical to overcome the perception of
a lack of U.S. support. We also need to underscore our
assurances that technology transfer has been approved and
highlight the superiority of Boeing's proposal to that of its
French competitor. As noted reftels, Embassy believes State
will play a critical role in roviding assurances that will be
essential to a winning bid. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (S/NF) As the FX2 competition moves into its final
stages, the U.S. has a strong offer from Boeing for the F18
Super Hornet that comes with a huge package of industrial
cooperation and a competitive overall cost. While we can be
confident that the Super Hornet would be Brazil,s choice
based on its superior capabilities and attractive offset
package, it still has no better than a fifty/fifty chance of
success because of political support for the French
competitor and a lingering belief among some Brazilian
leaders that a close relationship with the U.S. may not be to
Brazil,s advantage. Winning the FX2 endgame, therefore,
will depend on an effective strategy to overcome our
political disadvantages and allow the Super Hornet,s
superiority be the deciding factor. Such a strategy must
address several key issues:

Perception of a lack of USG support
-----------------------------------

¶3. (S/NF) With the French sale effort being managed directly
from President Sarkozy,s cabinet and ongoing Swedish
engagement on the Ministerial level, the USG is perceived by
most Brazilians as lukewarm at best in its support for the
FX2 sale. This is a critical disadvantage in a Brazilian
society that depends on personal relationships as a
foundation for business. The difficulty is exacerbated by
the separation between government and industry in the United
States. We cannot, for example, offer government financing
to support a state owned company as can our competitors. To
address this problem, high level contacts will be essential,
particularly from the Department of State which is assumed by
the Brazilian Air Force to be restrictive of mil-mil
ooperation. In such contacts, U.S. officials will need to
highlight expanding U.S.-Brazil partnership and how
cooperation with the United States as Brazil modernizes its
obsolescent military will not only provide the best
operational capabilities, but will enhance our overall
cooperation. This is why we have been forward leaning in
approving transfers of technology in support of this sale.
In addition to taking advantage of the near-term
opportunities for high level contacts presented by MOD
Jobim,s May 20 visit to Washington And Secretary Clinton,s
possible visit to Brazil in late May, Embassy believes that
phone calls between Presidents Obama and Lula, between NSA
Jones and Presidential Foreign Affairs Advisor Marco Aurelio
Garcia, and between SecDef Gates and MOD Jobim, would boost
our case significantly.

Tech Transfer
-------------

¶4. (S/NF) Although the major decisions to approve the

BRASILIA 00000634 002 OF 003


transfer of technology for the FX2 sale have been made,
Brazilian leaders continue to doubt U.S. ability to follow
through. While the problem has been mitigated by an
effective public affairs strategy, we still hear that, absent
specific high level State Department assurances, the
Brazilians cannot be sure. It may well be that the
Brazilians want to keep tech transfer doubts alive in order
to have a ready-made excuse for buying an inferior plane,
should political leaders decide to do so. Repeated concerns
about unreleasable source code could have a similar basis.
Finally, we have heard that there are concerns on Capitol
Hill about the possibility of a South American arms race.
Should these reach Brazilian ears, there will be additional
worries that Congress will intervene to block the sale.
Embassy recommends the following as next steps to strengthen
our case on tech transfer:

-- An advocacy letter from President Obama to President Lula
-- A letter from Secretary Clinton to MOD Jobim stating that
the USG has approved the transfer of all appropriate
technology.
-- Interagency guidance on source code (cleared for April
Revista Forca Area article) should be disseminated for use.
-- All high-level contacts, including by Secretaries of
State and Defense and POTUS should include reassurance that
tech transfer has been approved.
-- Washington agencies should begin consultations with
appropriate Hill staff as early as possible to overcome
misperceptions that arms sales to Brazil could be
destabilizing.

Financing
---------

¶5. (S/NF) U.S. inability to offer government financing or
guarantees puts the Super Hornet at a significant
disadvantage to its competitors. EXIM is prohibited from
engaging in sales of defense articles, leaving Brazil to
depend on commercial financing at higher rates. According to
Washington agencies, it would be possible to seek
Congressional relief for EXIM to support the sale. This has
been done in the past on rare occasions. The Brazilian Air
Force finance office has told us that even a statement that
we are willing to seek such legislative action would be
considered a positive sign. Embassy recommends that
Washington explore the possibility of legislative action to
allow EXIM Financing and respond by the May 29 deadline to
the GOB request to provide information on government
financing options.

Making the Case
---------------

¶6. (S/NF) We have been successful in getting across the
points that the Super Hornet is a highly capable aircraft,
and now need to focus on the broader picture -- how
partnership on the fighter sale will yield benefits for both
sides both in military terms and in economic benefits. As
the world,s largest aerospace company, Boeing is able to
offer a much greater scope of opportunities for Brazilian
industry, including some outside of the FX2 offset program.
The early June visit of Brazilian legislators to Washington
will be an opportunity to get the message to political
leaders. By focusing on key Senators, we have the
opportunity to bring on board individuals who can influence
the decision makers and ensure that the people who will have
to approve spending Brazilian government money understand
that the F18 offers them the best value. Embassy will
continue to highlight tech transfer and Expand our message
to include economic benefits to Brazil of the Boeing
proposal. We also recommend the following:

-- Make an expert on the aerospace industry available for
interview to highlight economic health of Boeing compared to
its competitors.
-- Use visit of Brazilian Congress to drive home message
that partnership with the U.S. entails benefits to both sides
that go well beyond offset program. Ensure that Brazilian
Senators understand significantly lower life
cycle costs of the Super Hornet.

BRASILIA 00000634 003 OF 003


-- Arrange for an interview of the SecDef, or other senior
Administration representative, with a prominent Brazilian
journalist to underline importance of U.S.-Brazilian
partnership and how the FX2 sale will help.

Attack the French Bid
---------------------

¶7. (S/NF) Although the French offer a less capable fighter
at a higher cost, the Rafale has been the presumptive winner
since the inception of the FX2 competition. While the
technical evaluations of the aircraft should result in a
significant advantage for the Super Hornet, we need to take
steps to erode the French political edge. While a major
element of this will be highlighting Boeing,s lower cost,
there are several other measures that can make a case against
the French. The first step will be to remind the Brazilians
that their interest in the Rafale was driven by an assumption
that the United States would not release technology. Since
we have approved release of the relevant technology, we
should ask if Brazil still needs the French as a safety.
Over the last few months, the French sales effort has been
based on a misleading, if not fraudulent, claim that their
plane involves only French content (rendering it free of
meddlesome U.S. export controls). This is not the case. A
DTSA analysis found a high level of U.S. content, including
targeting systems, radar components and safety systems that
will require U.S. licenses. Next steps:

-- Although it does not appear that the tech data provided
with the French bid violated ITAR regs, PM/DDTC and DTSA
should continue to monitor French marketing to ensure
Dassault does not skirt ITAR restrictions.
-- Investigate India,s decision to drop the Rafale from its
fighter competition to see if there is a reason that would
make the aircraft less attractive to Brazil.
-- Ensure the Brazilians are aware that we expect to be
issuing retransfer licenses for U.S.-origin components on the
French plane and have already approved transfer of some
technical data.

KUBISKE

S E C R E T BRASILIA 000952

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR D, P, T, AND WHA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2019

TAG MASS, PREL, BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL,S AIR FORCE COMMANDER ASKS FOR STATE ASSURANCES ON TECH TRANSFER BY AUGUST 6

REF: BRASILIA 888

Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION LISA KUBISKE, REASON 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (S/NF) At a July 30 dinner for visiting SouthCom Commander General Doug Fraser, Brazil,s Air Force (BRAF) commander, Brigadier Juniti Saito (protect), pulled Ambassador Sobel and Political Counselor aside to discuss the FX-2 Fighter purchase. He said that there was no question from a technical point of view that the F18 was the superior aircraft. &We have been flying U.S. equipment for decades,8 he said, ∧ we know that it is dependable and that maintenance is simple and cost-effective through FMS.8 That has to be factored into the cost of the new fighter, he said, as the BRAF will likely be using the plane for thirty or forty years. It is the best decision, he said, and the French can,t complain as they just signed a USD 14 billion deal with Brazil (for submarines and helicopters).

¶2. (S/NF) Saito stressed, however, that the question regarding USG commitment to technology transfer remains &a significant political barrier8 that is extremely important to overcome. Saito asked whether the letter he had requested that assured technology transfer (reftel) would be forthcoming. The Ambassador assured him that we understood how important it was to overcome this issue, and said he believed it was in the final stage of approval. Relieved, Saito said he needed the letter in hand by August 6. He said, however, that the decision would not be announced until &after September 7.8 (Note: French President Sarkozy will visit Brazil next month and attend national day festivities on September 7 as part of the &Year of France in Brazil8 activities. End note.)

¶3. (S/NF) Saito reiterated how important President Obama,s discussion on the FX-2 sale with President Lula at Aquila had been, saying, &It opened the door for me to approach the Ambassador as I have.8 He said that President Lula had instructed Defense Minister Jobim and Brigadeiro Saito to meet with General Jones during his upcoming visit and requested an office call by General Jones.

¶4. (S/NF) Comment: This was Saito,s clearest expression that he plans to recommend the F18. Post is working to set up a meeting between General Jones and Brigadier Saito on August 4. Post further understands that Under Secretary Tauscher is prepared to deliver the letter Saito requested to Defense Minister Jobim and Foreign Minister Amorim during the visit, and believes this will be seen as a significant sign of USG support for Boeing,s offer. SOBEL

Natuke kaevamist ei tee kunagi paha

[Kapten Trumm]

Infoajastu võlud - kaevame natuke wikileaksis, leiame vastavad allikad saatkondade kirjavahetusest ja võime rääkida kindlas toonis "NII OLI"

Otsige sealt ka vastust küsimusele, miks Soome Horneti ostis - ka sellel teemal on küllalt spekulatsioone

[nokkloom]

Väga kindlas toonis pole mõtet ka rääkida, aga kindlasti saab rääkida kindlamas. Soome Hornetite kohta (nagu ka Eesti kohta) pole veel midagi lekitatud. Üks, mis eile veel väljas ei olnud, kui teised kopeerisin:

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 000003

SIPDIS
STATE FOR T, PM AND WHA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/05
TAGS: PREL ETTC MASS BR
SUBJECT: FX2 at the End of 2009

REF: BRASILIA 1124; IIR 6 809 0156 10

CLASSIFIED BY: Lisa Kubiske, Charge d'Affaires a.i.; REASON: 1.4(D)

¶1. (C) As 2009 comes to end, Brazil's FX2 competition remains undecided. It had been expected that President Lula would make a decision before the end of the year, so as to be able to complete the sale during his tenure. Practically speaking, however, even if a Presidential decision were to be made immediately, the time needed for contract negotiation and appropriation of funds means that the final decision to buy the planes will fall to the next President in 2011. Embassy contacts in the Ministry of External Relations and Ministry of Defense believe that Defense Minister Jobim will meet with Lula later in January to try to make a decision.

SEPTEMBER: RAFALE PREFERRED

¶2. (C) Lula has made no secret of his preference for the Dassault Rafale, announcing during President Sarkozy's September 7 visit (ref a) that he planned to negotiate the purchase with France, before even reading the Brazilian Air Force's (BRAF) technical evaluation. During the following three months, it was clear that Lula had instructed his government, including Jobim, to focus on making the deal with France work. In September, Lula told the Brazilian press that negotiations with France would focus on attaining a price for the aircraft similar to what Boeing and Saab were asking. (Reportedly, Dassault's best offer was 40% higher.) Despite another Sarkozy visit to Brazil in November and Jobim's later stop in Paris, the French were not able to meet Brazilian requests for a lower price, but their lack of responsiveness (ref b) did not seem to affect the Brazilian preference. Initial statements in September from Lula and FM Amorim attempted to portray the French as somehow offering a superior level of technology transfer as justification for the higher price, but as details emerged from the technical evaluation process, it became clear that all three competitors were generally meeting BRAF tech transfer requirements.

DECEMBER: NEW MOD INTEREST IN BOEING, SAAB STILL A CONTENDER

¶3. (C) During October and November, contacts by Embassy officials and Boeing representatives were received politely, but with little real interest as the focus remained on the French. In recent weeks, however, there has been a notable change from the Minister of Defense. Beginning with A/S Valenzuela's December 14 meeting with Jobim (reported septel), there has been renewed interest in the USG/Boeing proposal. While Jobim repeated concerns about "bad precedents" for policies regarding transfer of U.S.-origin technology (in reality complaints about export licensing procedures), he said he understood that the USG had a new approach and was interested in Boeing's industrial cooperation offer. Boeing has strengthened its case by promoting its new "Global Super Hornet" initiative, which would transfer important elements of production of all F/A 18 aircraft (including those for the U.S. military) to Brazil. By globalizing Super Hornet production and including Brazil in the process, Boeing not only is in position to create and maintain more jobs in Brazil, but can assuage Brazilian paranoia about theoretical USG cutoffs of fighter supply by pointing out that any such cutoff would affect the U.S. Navy as well. In a recent interview with the newspaper Folha de Sao Paulo, Jobim was careful not to commit, mentioning the "strategic alliance" with France but also noting that cost, technology transfer and overall aircraft capability were important.

¶4. (C) Along with the revival of Boeing's hopes, the Swedish Gripen remains a strong competitor. As noted in ref b, many Brazilians perceive it to be an attractive alternative to the Rafale because it has the lowest sticker price. Saab's plan to co-develop the new generation Gripen with Brazil has also garnered support in Brazil's aviation industry among those who believe that such development will increase local aircraft design capabilities. Jobim, however, has been openly dismissive of the Swedes on the basis of the Gripen's lesser capability and because the "New Generation" variant offered to Brazil does not yet exist. A recent story in Isto C) magazine with sourcing to the BRAF pointed out that military aircraft development programs normally run over deadlines and budgets, negating the Gripen's purported price advantage.

¶5. (C) COMMENT. While the Rafale's high price and doubts about the Gripen's development would seem to make the Super Hornet the obvious choice, the fact remains that Lula is reluctant to buy an American aircraft. It is possible that the renewed interest in the USG offer is merely a ploy to gain leverage on the French or that the delay in the decision is intended to allow Dassault to find a way to lower its price. In Mission's view, the chance to win the FX2 competition is real. We know that the Super Hornet received the most favorable technical evaluation from the BRAF and is the choice of the operators. We have also been successful in answering most of the doubts raised about USG technology transfer policies, particularly with the technical evaluation team. There remains, however, the formidable obstacle of convincing Lula. Our goal now should be to make sure that Jobim has as strong a case as possible to take to Lula in January. Mission recommends the following steps: B7 Continue to underline full USG support in all high-level contacts with Brazil. As Mission has pointed out previously, repeated assurances from President Obama to Lula in the course of their normal contacts are the single most effective means of making our case. B7 Use Ambassador-Designate Shannon's initial contacts with the Brazilian leadership to make the point that we have worked hard to ensure we have the best offer. B7 Maintain our public affairs campaign to highlight that not only has the USG completed its approval of tech transfer, but Boeing is confident enough in the offer to be prepared to shift part of production (including hundreds of jobs) to Brazil. B7 Coordinate with Boeing to ensure the advantages of the Global Super Hornet program are made known to the Brazilian Congress and media. KUBISKE

[Gideonic]

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articl ... -flux.html

[Gideonic]

Nonii 2 aastat vahepeal läinud aga tundub et Gripen võitis ...
http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/the-d ... ns-brazil/

[ivanorav]

Just-just, Soomlased kadedusest rohelised ! Soome uudistest käis veel läbi,et Ameerikamaa törjuti konkursist välja ebaausate vötete pärast (kuulasid telefonkönesid pealt! !) Käed löödi 35-le lennukile.

Kahjuks ei leia uudist enam üles, kadeduskomitee tsensuur on asjal olnud!