Tsitaat lõpust: Erinevatel ja ametlikult kinnitamata andmetel on Iisraeli käsutuses 100-300 tuumalõhkepead.
Milleks on väikeriigil vaja sellist kohutavat relvastust- et maailmas rahu hoida
100-300
100-300
Lugesin tänasest (15.12.05) Postimehest järgmist kirjatükki (lk. 10)
Tsitaat lõpust: Erinevatel ja ametlikult kinnitamata andmetel on Iisraeli käsutuses 100-300 tuumalõhkepead.
Milleks on väikeriigil vaja sellist kohutavat relvastust- et maailmas rahu hoida
Tsitaat lõpust: Erinevatel ja ametlikult kinnitamata andmetel on Iisraeli käsutuses 100-300 tuumalõhkepead.
Milleks on väikeriigil vaja sellist kohutavat relvastust- et maailmas rahu hoida
Nii paradokssaalne kui see ka ei ole, siis võib väita, et Iisralei tuumarelvad on suutnud selles regioonis viimastel aastakümnetel suurema sõja ära hoida. Alates Iisraeli riigi loomisest (loodan, et siin ei hakata nüüd filosofeerima selle üle, kas Iisraeli riigi oleks pidanud sellele kohale looma või mitte) 1940. aastate lõpus on juudid olnud pidevalt suuremate Araabia riikide rünnakute all. Rohkem kui ühe korra on Araabia riigid alustanud Iisralei vastu sõda eesmärgiga see riik merre pühkida, kuid täna Iisraeli militariseeritusele, USA abile ja Araabia riikide armeede käpardlikkusele on need katsed lõppenud Araabia riikide jaoks nigelasti.
Pärast seda, kui on muutunud avalikuks saladuseks Iisralei tuumarelvade olemasolu, on lakanud ka suuremd rünnakud selle riigi vastu.
Arvestades tänapäevase sõjatehnika arengut ja Iisraeli territooriumi väiksust (umbes 25 000 ruutkilomeetrit ehk pool Eestit) on tuumarelvad ilmselt viimaseks teguriks, mis hoiab ära Araabia riikide-poolse agressiooni. Vaadates Iraani presidendi viimase aja avalikke esinemisi (arvestamata seda, kas nende esinemiste sisuga nõustuda või mitte), siis jääb mulje, et ega see agressiooni-oht nii kauge ja ebamäärane ei olegi.
Samas mõistavad juudid ilmselt ise väga hästi, et tuumarelvade kasutamine selles piirkonnas tähendaks ka Iisraelile endale keskkonnakatastroofi.
Teatud mõttes sarnaneb olukord Külma sõja aegse NATO-Nõukogude Liidu vastasseisuga, kus kumbki pool mõistis, et tuumasõja alustamine tähendaks katastroofi kogu mõlemale osapoolele ja seetõttu seda sõda ei alustatudki.
Pärast seda, kui on muutunud avalikuks saladuseks Iisralei tuumarelvade olemasolu, on lakanud ka suuremd rünnakud selle riigi vastu.
Arvestades tänapäevase sõjatehnika arengut ja Iisraeli territooriumi väiksust (umbes 25 000 ruutkilomeetrit ehk pool Eestit) on tuumarelvad ilmselt viimaseks teguriks, mis hoiab ära Araabia riikide-poolse agressiooni. Vaadates Iraani presidendi viimase aja avalikke esinemisi (arvestamata seda, kas nende esinemiste sisuga nõustuda või mitte), siis jääb mulje, et ega see agressiooni-oht nii kauge ja ebamäärane ei olegi.
Samas mõistavad juudid ilmselt ise väga hästi, et tuumarelvade kasutamine selles piirkonnas tähendaks ka Iisraelile endale keskkonnakatastroofi.
Teatud mõttes sarnaneb olukord Külma sõja aegse NATO-Nõukogude Liidu vastasseisuga, kus kumbki pool mõistis, et tuumasõja alustamine tähendaks katastroofi kogu mõlemale osapoolele ja seetõttu seda sõda ei alustatudki.
Mis jutt see on,et Araabia riigid on korduvalt vaest Juudiriiki rünnanud.
1948-49 Iisraeli väed okupeerivad ÜRO poolt Palestiinale määratud aladest 6700 km2 ja Jeruusalemma lääneosa(linn pidi olema rahvusv.haldusüksus).Ligi miljon araablast põgenes.
1956 Israeli kallaletung Egiptusele.
1967 Iisraeli uus kallaletung Egiptusele ja Süüriale.Okupeeris hulgaliselt nende alasid.
1973 Araabia-Iisraeli sõjas said juudid lüüa ja tagastas Egiptusele ja Süüriale okupeeritud alad.
1982 Iisraeli väed vallutasid ligi 40% Liibanoni territooriumist ja lahkusid sealt alles 1985.
Need sündmused peaksid näitama Iisraeli riigi tõelise pale.See imelik riiklik moodustis (mida hakkas looma Suurbritannia ja viis lõpule USA) on juba algusest peale olnud piirkonna vaenuõhutajaks ja agressoriks.
1948-49 Iisraeli väed okupeerivad ÜRO poolt Palestiinale määratud aladest 6700 km2 ja Jeruusalemma lääneosa(linn pidi olema rahvusv.haldusüksus).Ligi miljon araablast põgenes.
1956 Israeli kallaletung Egiptusele.
1967 Iisraeli uus kallaletung Egiptusele ja Süüriale.Okupeeris hulgaliselt nende alasid.
1973 Araabia-Iisraeli sõjas said juudid lüüa ja tagastas Egiptusele ja Süüriale okupeeritud alad.
1982 Iisraeli väed vallutasid ligi 40% Liibanoni territooriumist ja lahkusid sealt alles 1985.
Need sündmused peaksid näitama Iisraeli riigi tõelise pale.See imelik riiklik moodustis (mida hakkas looma Suurbritannia ja viis lõpule USA) on juba algusest peale olnud piirkonna vaenuõhutajaks ja agressoriks.
Suurem osa ajaloolasi on seisukohal, et 1967. aastal andis Iisrael lihtsalt enneteva löögi. Umbes nii, nagu Saksamaa andis 1941. aastal ennetava löögi Nõukogude Liidule.1967 Iisraeli uus kallaletung Egiptusele ja Süüriale.Okupeeris hulgaliselt nende alasid.
1973 Araabia-Iisraeli sõjas said juudid lüüa ja tagastas Egiptusele ja Süüriale okupeeritud alad.
1973. aasta Yom Kippuri sõja algatasid Araabia riigid.
Ärge saage minust valesti aru. Ma ei taha öelda, et Iisrael oleks igati puhas poiss, aga igal juhul on fakt see, et Iisraelil on halvad suhted oma suurte naabritega ja need suhted on korduvalt läinud üle täiemahuliseks sõjaks. Iisralei tuumarelv on lihtsalt teatud tasakaalustavaks faktoriks juudiriigi ja tema arvukate vastaste vahel.
A4 jutt täitsa õige.
Milleks juutidele tuumarelv? Selle mängu erinevatest nootidest annab aimu järgnev lugu.
Sorri, moderaator, linki pole kahjuks anda
Israel: Scenarios of a Strike Against Iran
Dec 15, 2005
Summary
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's latest inflammatory statements, in which he called the Holocaust a "myth" and suggested that Israel's Jews be relocated to Europe or even Alaska, are part of a series of provocations that have severely escalated political tensions between Iran and Israel. Furthermore, Israeli military officials have said that Iran is within months of being able to produce nuclear weapons. Because of its extreme vulnerability to a nuclear attack, Israel's threshold for using the military option to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear capability is lower than the United States'. Should Israel decide to attack Iran's nuclear facilities, the operation would be risky, difficult and politically delicate -- but not impossible.
Analysis
In a Dec. 14 live televised speech, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad denied that the Holocaust happened, saying the Jewish nation had "invented a myth that Jews were massacred and place this above God, religion, and prophets." Ahmadinejad's comments, which drew immediate responses from both the European Union and Israel, only inflamed political tensions between Israel and Iran.
The Israeli government is moving swiftly into a position where it will be forced to decide at what point Iran will move beyond Israel's national security interests, referred to as a "red line." Iran could begin enriching uranium as soon as March 2006 and start producing nuclear weapons in three years, according to a Dec. 13 Israeli army assessment given to the Israeli Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz also warned the committee that Iran will reach the "point of no return" regarding its nuclear capability by the end of March 2006. Halutz's comments echoed those made by U.N. nuclear watchdog head Mohamed ElBaradei.
Though Israel certainly commands the weaponry to effectively take out Iranian nuclear facilities, the strike route is more problematic. Israel could attack via Iraq, a path that would require U.S. cooperation (which Israel certainly could secure) but that might not be the most practical option. Israel could ask Saudi Arabia for cooperation, but the Saudis would not be likely to acquiesce. The third -- and pragmatically best, though not trouble-free -- option would be to ask Turkey to use its airspace to launch attacks against Iran's nuclear facilities.
Israel striking Iran via Iraq with U.S. collusion is a moot point. If Washington finds itself ready to use force against Tehran, it would be more politically expedient for the United States to attack Iran alone and avoid the political blowback of attacking a Muslim country jointly with Israel. However, with more to lose if Iran becomes nuclear, Israel would have more incentive to strike than the United States would. In that case, the Israelis would be prepared to act unilaterally, without Washington's assistance -- meaning without using Iraqi airspace -- or perhaps even publicly admitted knowledge. However, if Washington or Israel should launch a strike against Iran, the two allies will coordinate with each other -- probably behind the scenes.
In the event that Israel does decide to launch military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities, IDF would have several options, including a nuclear strike using Jericho II missiles. However, the political consequences of wielding a nuclear weapon against Iran would be costly; thus, a conventional option -- though much more difficult -- would be politically more expedient.
The most likely conventional option would be an Israeli Air Force (IAF) airstrike using F-15I Ra'am (Thunder) strike fighters from the 69th Squadron based at Hatzerim Air Base in the Northern Negev, about 50 miles south of Tel Aviv. The F-15I, similar to the U.S. Air Force's F-15E Strike Eagle, uses long-range technology with air superiority capabilities. Twenty-five F-15Is have been used in the IAF since 1999. Capable of carrying as much ordnance as a World War II heavy bomber, the F-15I can also deploy precision-guided munitions and can penetrate enemy air space at low levels and high speeds.
The precedent for Israel to use airstrikes as a conventional response is seen in the Israeli IAF bombing of the Iraqi reactor Osirak in 1981. The IAF also has repeatedly demonstrated the ability to conduct long-range strikes, such as the 1976 raid on Entebbe -- 2,600 miles from Israel -- and the 1985 attack against Palestine Liberation Organization headquarters in Tunis, 1,500 miles from Israel.
The IAF strike package will have to include other aircraft besides the F-15Is. Once they enter Iranian airspace, the Israelis will have to suppress Iranian air defenses. This would most likely be accomplished by F-16Is in the "Wild Weasel" role. On the way to the nuclear facilities, separate strike packages would have to neutralize the Iranian air force's (IRIAF) 3rd Tactical Air Base at Hamadan in order to prevent its F-4 fighters from interfering with the raid. On the way out, the IRIAF 2nd Tactical Air Base at Tabriz, with its F-5s and MiG-29s, would have to be neutralized. All of these strike aircraft -- those sent against the nuclear facilities, the Wild Weasels and those sent against the Iranian air bases, would need their own fighter escorts as well.
Because of the size and dispersion of Iran's nuclear program, the Israelis would be unable to take it out with a single strike as was done at Osirak. Rather, Israel would have to carry out multiple strikes and possibly even a brief air campaign along the lines of the U.S. 'Desert Fox' operation in 1998. In order to sustain such an operation, the Israelis would almost certainly have to use Turkish airspace -- and, due to the length of the operation, the IAF would not be able to use Turkish airspace without Ankara's knowledge and approval. This is, of course, assuming the Turks would grant the Jewish state permission to use its airspace to attack another Muslim country; in 2003, Ankara refused to allow its NATO ally Washington to use its territory to invade Iraq.
Turkey and Israel do have a well-developed security relationship, including a deal signed in April for $200 million worth of Israeli-made unmanned aerial vehicles for the Turkish army and the training of Turkish air force pilots in electronic warfare inside Israel. Israeli aerospace companies have upgraded Turkey's fleet of U.S.-made F-4 fighters with new electronics and the ability to attack air defense sites. For its part, Turkey allowed the IAF to use its practice bombing ranges in Eastern Anatolia, where the mountainous terrain closely resembles Iran's.
Because the IAF routinely flies to Turkey to use the Anatolian bombing ranges, the movement of Israeli aircraft in that direction might not arouse much suspicion, depending on the level of tensions at the time. IAF refueling and surveillance aircraft, which would be required to support the strikes, can safely orbit inside Turkish airspace. In addition, any damaged IAF aircraft or shot down Israeli air crews would have a better chance of landing or surviving in Turkey or the Kurdish areas of Iraq than they would in Saudi Arabia, Syria or western Iraq.
If Turkey were to allow Israel to use its airspace for an attack against Iran, Ankara would have to balance the repercussions from other Muslim countries and its own population with the risk of allowing the Iranians to possess nuclear weapons. With such weapons, Tehran could become emboldened enough to attempt to resume its leadership of the worldwide Islamist movement. Part of this could include undermining or even attacking secular Muslim regimes like Turkey's.
The United States and Israel might already be trying to sway Ankara toward their side. Washington has been trying to gain Ankara's support for the U.S. policy toward Tehran's nuclear program. Since Dec. 10, FBI Director Robert Mueller and CIA Director Porter Goss have visited Ankara. During Goss' visit, Ankara was specifically asked to help the U.S. deal with the Iranian nuclear issue. The IDF's Halutz is scheduled to travel to Turkey on Dec. 22.
At first glance, a sustained air campaign targeting Iran's nuclear program looks difficult for the IAF. However, Israel has shown itself to be very resourceful in the past when confronted with challenges. The main impediment to Israeli military action will be the difficulty of securing a route for the striking aircraft. This would require a serious political shift in Ankara, but as the "point of no return" draws closer in Tehran, tensions and loyalties in the region could change rapidly.
Milleks juutidele tuumarelv? Selle mängu erinevatest nootidest annab aimu järgnev lugu.
Sorri, moderaator, linki pole kahjuks anda
Israel: Scenarios of a Strike Against Iran
Dec 15, 2005
Summary
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's latest inflammatory statements, in which he called the Holocaust a "myth" and suggested that Israel's Jews be relocated to Europe or even Alaska, are part of a series of provocations that have severely escalated political tensions between Iran and Israel. Furthermore, Israeli military officials have said that Iran is within months of being able to produce nuclear weapons. Because of its extreme vulnerability to a nuclear attack, Israel's threshold for using the military option to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear capability is lower than the United States'. Should Israel decide to attack Iran's nuclear facilities, the operation would be risky, difficult and politically delicate -- but not impossible.
Analysis
In a Dec. 14 live televised speech, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad denied that the Holocaust happened, saying the Jewish nation had "invented a myth that Jews were massacred and place this above God, religion, and prophets." Ahmadinejad's comments, which drew immediate responses from both the European Union and Israel, only inflamed political tensions between Israel and Iran.
The Israeli government is moving swiftly into a position where it will be forced to decide at what point Iran will move beyond Israel's national security interests, referred to as a "red line." Iran could begin enriching uranium as soon as March 2006 and start producing nuclear weapons in three years, according to a Dec. 13 Israeli army assessment given to the Israeli Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz also warned the committee that Iran will reach the "point of no return" regarding its nuclear capability by the end of March 2006. Halutz's comments echoed those made by U.N. nuclear watchdog head Mohamed ElBaradei.
Though Israel certainly commands the weaponry to effectively take out Iranian nuclear facilities, the strike route is more problematic. Israel could attack via Iraq, a path that would require U.S. cooperation (which Israel certainly could secure) but that might not be the most practical option. Israel could ask Saudi Arabia for cooperation, but the Saudis would not be likely to acquiesce. The third -- and pragmatically best, though not trouble-free -- option would be to ask Turkey to use its airspace to launch attacks against Iran's nuclear facilities.
Israel striking Iran via Iraq with U.S. collusion is a moot point. If Washington finds itself ready to use force against Tehran, it would be more politically expedient for the United States to attack Iran alone and avoid the political blowback of attacking a Muslim country jointly with Israel. However, with more to lose if Iran becomes nuclear, Israel would have more incentive to strike than the United States would. In that case, the Israelis would be prepared to act unilaterally, without Washington's assistance -- meaning without using Iraqi airspace -- or perhaps even publicly admitted knowledge. However, if Washington or Israel should launch a strike against Iran, the two allies will coordinate with each other -- probably behind the scenes.
In the event that Israel does decide to launch military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities, IDF would have several options, including a nuclear strike using Jericho II missiles. However, the political consequences of wielding a nuclear weapon against Iran would be costly; thus, a conventional option -- though much more difficult -- would be politically more expedient.
The most likely conventional option would be an Israeli Air Force (IAF) airstrike using F-15I Ra'am (Thunder) strike fighters from the 69th Squadron based at Hatzerim Air Base in the Northern Negev, about 50 miles south of Tel Aviv. The F-15I, similar to the U.S. Air Force's F-15E Strike Eagle, uses long-range technology with air superiority capabilities. Twenty-five F-15Is have been used in the IAF since 1999. Capable of carrying as much ordnance as a World War II heavy bomber, the F-15I can also deploy precision-guided munitions and can penetrate enemy air space at low levels and high speeds.
The precedent for Israel to use airstrikes as a conventional response is seen in the Israeli IAF bombing of the Iraqi reactor Osirak in 1981. The IAF also has repeatedly demonstrated the ability to conduct long-range strikes, such as the 1976 raid on Entebbe -- 2,600 miles from Israel -- and the 1985 attack against Palestine Liberation Organization headquarters in Tunis, 1,500 miles from Israel.
The IAF strike package will have to include other aircraft besides the F-15Is. Once they enter Iranian airspace, the Israelis will have to suppress Iranian air defenses. This would most likely be accomplished by F-16Is in the "Wild Weasel" role. On the way to the nuclear facilities, separate strike packages would have to neutralize the Iranian air force's (IRIAF) 3rd Tactical Air Base at Hamadan in order to prevent its F-4 fighters from interfering with the raid. On the way out, the IRIAF 2nd Tactical Air Base at Tabriz, with its F-5s and MiG-29s, would have to be neutralized. All of these strike aircraft -- those sent against the nuclear facilities, the Wild Weasels and those sent against the Iranian air bases, would need their own fighter escorts as well.
Because of the size and dispersion of Iran's nuclear program, the Israelis would be unable to take it out with a single strike as was done at Osirak. Rather, Israel would have to carry out multiple strikes and possibly even a brief air campaign along the lines of the U.S. 'Desert Fox' operation in 1998. In order to sustain such an operation, the Israelis would almost certainly have to use Turkish airspace -- and, due to the length of the operation, the IAF would not be able to use Turkish airspace without Ankara's knowledge and approval. This is, of course, assuming the Turks would grant the Jewish state permission to use its airspace to attack another Muslim country; in 2003, Ankara refused to allow its NATO ally Washington to use its territory to invade Iraq.
Turkey and Israel do have a well-developed security relationship, including a deal signed in April for $200 million worth of Israeli-made unmanned aerial vehicles for the Turkish army and the training of Turkish air force pilots in electronic warfare inside Israel. Israeli aerospace companies have upgraded Turkey's fleet of U.S.-made F-4 fighters with new electronics and the ability to attack air defense sites. For its part, Turkey allowed the IAF to use its practice bombing ranges in Eastern Anatolia, where the mountainous terrain closely resembles Iran's.
Because the IAF routinely flies to Turkey to use the Anatolian bombing ranges, the movement of Israeli aircraft in that direction might not arouse much suspicion, depending on the level of tensions at the time. IAF refueling and surveillance aircraft, which would be required to support the strikes, can safely orbit inside Turkish airspace. In addition, any damaged IAF aircraft or shot down Israeli air crews would have a better chance of landing or surviving in Turkey or the Kurdish areas of Iraq than they would in Saudi Arabia, Syria or western Iraq.
If Turkey were to allow Israel to use its airspace for an attack against Iran, Ankara would have to balance the repercussions from other Muslim countries and its own population with the risk of allowing the Iranians to possess nuclear weapons. With such weapons, Tehran could become emboldened enough to attempt to resume its leadership of the worldwide Islamist movement. Part of this could include undermining or even attacking secular Muslim regimes like Turkey's.
The United States and Israel might already be trying to sway Ankara toward their side. Washington has been trying to gain Ankara's support for the U.S. policy toward Tehran's nuclear program. Since Dec. 10, FBI Director Robert Mueller and CIA Director Porter Goss have visited Ankara. During Goss' visit, Ankara was specifically asked to help the U.S. deal with the Iranian nuclear issue. The IDF's Halutz is scheduled to travel to Turkey on Dec. 22.
At first glance, a sustained air campaign targeting Iran's nuclear program looks difficult for the IAF. However, Israel has shown itself to be very resourceful in the past when confronted with challenges. The main impediment to Israeli military action will be the difficulty of securing a route for the striking aircraft. This would require a serious political shift in Ankara, but as the "point of no return" draws closer in Tehran, tensions and loyalties in the region could change rapidly.
tjah...aga mis kasu on tasakaalust, mis kogu aja siia-sinnapoole kaldub ja neil pidevalt hõõgub. tegu on sõna otseses mõttes lähis-ida mädapaisega, mis piirkonnale vaevusi tekitab, mida üks pool püüab ravida, teine pool aga alles hoida. ratsionaalsest seisukohast oleks vähemalt sealsele piirkonnale kasulikum, kui neid tuumarelvi poleks ning see äpardunud riigimoodustis naabrite poolt kaotataks. mul on tõsine kahtlus, et seda hoitakse teatud lääneriikide poolt juhtumast just selleks, et luua kunstlik pingeallikas ida-lääne suhetes, et provotseerida araabiamaid, et näidata "õigustust" oma sõjaliseks kohaloluks seal piirkonnas, et aeg-ajalt araabiamaade suhtes iisraeli nimel "profülaktilisi" ja "preventiivseid" sõjalisi aktsioone sooritada jmt. ei pea just geenius olema, märkamaks, et teatud seltskonnad teevad kõik võimaliku, et pidevalt kuskil mingi pinge valitseks.A4 kirjutas:Ärge saage minust valesti aru. Ma ei taha öelda, et Iisrael oleks igati puhas poiss, aga igal juhul on fakt see, et Iisraelil on halvad suhted oma suurte naabritega ja need suhted on korduvalt läinud üle täiemahuliseks sõjaks. Iisralei tuumarelv on lihtsalt teatud tasakaalustavaks faktoriks juudiriigi ja tema arvukate vastaste vahel.
samas - kui iisrael naabrite poolt vallutataks, siis ei muutuks seal lokaalselt midagi peale "terroristide" etnilise kuuluvuse - palestiinlaste-araablaste asemel hakkaks rahvarohketes kohtades popsti lõhki minema juudi-äärmuslased. täitsa huvitav oleks, mis sõna "terroristi" asemel nende kohta kasutataks? arvatavasti midagi a'la "pahade arabite poolt äärmuseni viidud juudi vabadusvõitlejad" vmt.
aga kui uskuda juudijutte sellest, kui rahuarmastavad nad tegelikult on ja kuidas nad mõistavad taolisi suitsiidipommitamis kõigiti hukka (
), siis võib ju oletada, et saabuks ikkagi rahu ja kõik sealsed mured oleks murtud. pealegi...mis neid viriseda - euroopa ja usa võtaks neid ju põgenikena avalisüli vastu.või....äkki nende massilist siiaimbumist just kardetakse? oli ju ka sõjaeelses euroopas juudikontsentratsioon (eriti just nende "getodesse" (palun siinkohal pöörata tähelepanu asjaolule, et getodesse koondusid juudid varasemal ajal puha vabatahtlikult, et ümbritseva maailma mõjudest vähem osa saada, et oma kultuuri ja eluviisi säilitada) ja pisematesse isoleeritud kogukondadesse koondumine) suurem, kui tänapäeval, mis lõigi karjuva ja silmatorkava lõhe nende ja kohalike vahele, susisedes ja lõpuks vihkamiseks plahvatades. on üsna ilmne, et nende arvukuse suurenedes kogunevad nad taas omaette, hakkavad silmatorkavalt omi asju ajama ja see võib põhjustada uue vihkamislaine (paljud meist mäletavad, et ka meil siin olid alles hiljuti omad kohalikud venelaste getod - igasugu "hiinalinnad", ja muud sõjaväelaste elupiirkonnad, kus vohas hoopis teine kultuur ja elulaad, mille poole meie, eestlased vaatasime kogu aja varjatult või varjamatult viltu, millede asukaid me vihkasime ja nendega posikesepõlves ka valusaid lööminguid pidasime. kusjuures meie ja nende rassiline erinevus oli palju väiksem ning ka nende eluviis ei erinenud meie omast nii palju, kui ehtsa juudi ja ehtsa eurooplase puhul. arvan, et ainult idioot ei näeks nende kahe vastandumise vahel selgeid paralleele). eriti praegu, mil nad keskmise eurooplase silmis mitte kõige paremas nimekirjas pole (see, et neid riiklikul tasandil poputatakse, ei tähenda midagi - kui üldine poliitkorrektsus seda nõuab, räägiks ka mina presidendi või ministrina neist ainult head...teatavatel põhjustel...aga tavakodanik vaatab neile ikkagi kergelt viltu, olgugi, mitte lihtsalt RAHVUSE vaid pigem erinevate kommete ja põhimõtte "iga roju oma koju" pärast.)
Satakas esitas siin oma versiooni väikerahvaste solidaarsusest 
Kui nüüd proovida objektiivsemalt võtta, siis on juudid ikka kõvasti valu saanud küll.
Esmalt peksti mööda maailma laiali,
Seejärel kotiti neid erinevates riikides omasoodu (antisemitism).
Juudid võtsid kätte ja hakkasid siis oma raamatu järgsesse koju kogunema (sionism). Kahjuks olid seal teised raamaturahvad ka jaol.
Vahepeal tulid võimule vuntisedega mehed, kes tahtsid nad üldse ära koristada.
Lõpuks saadi kriitiline mass kokku ning tehti palestiinlastele 1:0 ära. Naabrid tulid siis palestiinalstele appi ja hakkas kogu see tänapäeva ulatuv kamm pihta.
Hetkeolukord on siis selline, et juutidele ärapanijad proovivad vahendeid terrorismist kuni tuumarelvadeni. Juudid peavad sebima kogu spektris.
Müts maha, et tüübid oma raamatu eest võitlevad. Ja päris hästi on neil see välja tulnud.
Mingi aeg tagasi oli siin teemaks patriotism, Kas juutide patriotism, mis põhineb usul on vale patriotism? Missugune on see õige patriotism?
Kui nüüd proovida objektiivsemalt võtta, siis on juudid ikka kõvasti valu saanud küll.
Esmalt peksti mööda maailma laiali,
Seejärel kotiti neid erinevates riikides omasoodu (antisemitism).
Juudid võtsid kätte ja hakkasid siis oma raamatu järgsesse koju kogunema (sionism). Kahjuks olid seal teised raamaturahvad ka jaol.
Vahepeal tulid võimule vuntisedega mehed, kes tahtsid nad üldse ära koristada.
Lõpuks saadi kriitiline mass kokku ning tehti palestiinlastele 1:0 ära. Naabrid tulid siis palestiinalstele appi ja hakkas kogu see tänapäeva ulatuv kamm pihta.
Hetkeolukord on siis selline, et juutidele ärapanijad proovivad vahendeid terrorismist kuni tuumarelvadeni. Juudid peavad sebima kogu spektris.
Müts maha, et tüübid oma raamatu eest võitlevad. Ja päris hästi on neil see välja tulnud.
Mingi aeg tagasi oli siin teemaks patriotism, Kas juutide patriotism, mis põhineb usul on vale patriotism? Missugune on see õige patriotism?
Kumb pool seda ravida üritab,kas palestiinlased või,Israel lahkub Gazast,seejärel läheb laseb mingi palestiinlane ennast juute täis restoranis õhku,ei paista just ravimise moodi.
Minuteada,ehitab Iraan praegu usinalt tuumarelva,mis on minu arvates hulga hullem kui Israeli tuumarelvad,kui israeli juhtidel on mõistus peas,siis Iraani juhil seda kohe kindlasti ei ole.
Minuteada,ehitab Iraan praegu usinalt tuumarelva,mis on minu arvates hulga hullem kui Israeli tuumarelvad,kui israeli juhtidel on mõistus peas,siis Iraani juhil seda kohe kindlasti ei ole.
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