Venemaa majandus ja sanktsioonid II

[Gideonic]

Vene naftat veavad suuresti laiali Kreeka tankerid

https://twitter.com/robinbrooksiif/stat ... xuy7OaVjLQ

[_dumbuser_]

Isuäratava nimega kitsa silmavaatega tegelaste papufirma tahab orkistani turule minna. https://twitter.com/bamr69/status/1668330234767380482

[kalvis]

Vene naftat veavad suuresti laiali Kreeka tankerid

https://twitter.com/robinbrooksiif/stat ... xuy7OaVjLQ

EL diplomaatidel peaks nüüd tööd olema. Kõigepealt tuleb Kreeka (tõenäoliselt ka Küprose) valitsus ette võtta ja viidata kas ikka riik soovib täita EL seatud piiranguid. Järgmine etapp peaks Kreeka naftaveo piiranguid tutvustama Kreeka reederfirmadele ja nõuda seaduste täitmist. Vastasel juhul saab reederfirma ise trahvi.

[Poti soldat]

Üks uus aspekt Hiina rollist, ma pole päris kindel milline teema selle jaoks kõige õigem on aga midagi sobivamat ka ei paistnud. Ilmneb et pool aastat enne sõja algust hakkas Hiina paljude eri firmade alt suurtes kogustes LNGd kokku ostma. Selle tegevuse tulemusel oli sõja puhkemise järel maailmas märksa vähem LNGd saadaval, muutes Euroopa palju haavatavamaks. Ning muidugi samaaegselt oli Gasprom nende omanduses olevad maagaasihoidlad Euroopas tühjaks jätnud.

China’s Big Gas Bet Raises Questions About Complicity With Russia

By Steven R. Miles, the fellow for global natural gas and energy transitions at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, and Gabriel B. Collins, a fellow at the Center for Energy Studies at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy and a senior visiting research fellow at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.

JUNE 12, 2023, 5:04 PM
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent overtures to Ukraine and attempts to frame China as a neutral player and potential arbiter of peace between Russia and Ukraine shake the diplomatic landscape. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has vehemently denied that Xi was informed in advance about the invasion plans and even asked Putin during his visit to delay the attack until after the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics. Yet suspicions remain about what the PRC knew and whether it used that knowledge to support Russia’s aims. Such suspicions may be well-founded, given the strategic interests that Eurasia’s two authoritarian titans share. A successful Russian revanchist conquest of Ukraine would be a powerful precedent for Beijing potentially using force against Taiwan.

We have uncovered data regarding the PRC’s energy activities that raise questions that support these suspicions. We have reviewed data from more than 600 discrete liquefied natural gas (LNG) purchase transactions worldwide over the past 18 years. They provide a quantifiable set of metrics that inform a more nuanced understanding of PRC interests and actions before and after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Two key themes have emerged, neither of which have been publicly discussed to date.

First, Chinese LNG buyers stood out from every other group of global purchasers in the six months leading up to Russia’s invasion. From Sept. 1, 2021, through the end of February 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine, almost a dozen PRC entities, including state-owned companies China National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC), Sinopec, and Sinochem, bought more than 91 percent of all global LNG purchased worldwide under term deals (typically spanning four years or longer). These methane molecules came from projects that are either newly online or about to enter service, predominantly in the United States and Qatar.

Once the war started, PRC buyers continued to sign deals, accounting for 57 percent of worldwide term LNG purchases through April 2022 as others began to scramble for supplies. During the seven months from Sept. 1, 2021 to April 1, 2022, Chinese companies contracted for more than 23 million metric tons of LNG per year—more than twice what they had purchased in any prior full calendar year. For perspective, from 2006 (China’s first purchases in the dataset) through 2020, the PRC on average contracted for about 5 million metric tons per year of new LNG supplies annually and averaged only about 15 percent of new LNG procurement worldwide. In no year before 2021 did PRC entities acquire more than 9.1 mmtpa, or 45.7 percent, of total new supplies contracted for globally.

Unusually, Beijing’s LNG buying spree during this six month period was executed through 22 separate contracts signed by 11 different companies, all but one of which was owned by the PRC at either the national or local governmental level. Further, 9 of the 20 PRC entities in our dataset do not appear to have contracted for LNG prior to September 2021, and several of these (for instance, Shenzhen Gas, Sinopec, and SPIC) only contracted for LNG during the fourth quarter of 2021—when PRC buyers virtually monopolized global LNG procurement. Almost every contract during this pre-invasion buying spree was for a small quantity that, by itself, flew under the radar, but which together took most of the available near-term supplies off the market.

Second, this PRC monopsony soaked up near-term LNG supplies. Chinese buyers’ agreements with American, Qatari, and Russian suppliers (90 percent of total volumes contracted during the relevant period) were due to begin delivering gas within one to two years of signing. This contrasted with prior periods, in which PRC buyers would contract with new LNG projects that would not deliver gas for three to five years in most cases. Their shift toward near-term supplies thus raises questions on both the tactical and structural levels.

The context is critical. As the PRC was buying up almost all of the term LNG that would soon be available, Russian state-owned company Gazprom was reducing pipeline gas exports to Europe in 2021 and tightening the gas market. Gazprom, which owned roughly 25 percent of European gas storage capacity, left most of its storage in the EU close to empty for the winter of 2021-22.

...

https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/06/12/ch ... ar-energy/

[vilhelm]

Forbes'is artikkel Euroopa kohanemisest ilma Vene gaasita ja seal hinnang Gazpromi maagaasi tarnele Euroopasse 2023.a.

https://www.forbes.ru/mneniya/490797-ka ... rezit-zimu

Ööpäeva keskmine gaasi tarnimine torujuhtmete kaudu Euroopasse Gazpromi poolt on sel aastal 68 miljoni kuupmeetrit. Selle pealt on tehtud prognoos, et selle aasta jooksul tarnib Gazprom gaasi Euroopasse 25 miljardit kuupmeetrit, mis on 37 miljardit kuupmeetrit vähem kui 2022. aastal. Vähenemine 60%.

[lamba-ants]

Dokumendid paljastavad Eesti ettevõtte salajase ärimudeli: Venemaa rikkuritele tarnitakse Saksamaa luksusautosid ja nende varuosi, kuigi see ei tohiks olla võimalik.
https://ekspress.delfi.ee/artikkel/1202 ... a-eliidini

[kaugeltuuriv]

Panen siia magusateemat lisaks.Norra maiusetootja Freya on skandaali sattunud,kuna tema tütarettevõtted läbi skeemitamise jätkavad Venemaal tegutsemist.Tänu sellele,keeldus Norra Turismiliit lepingust nendega.Nimelt oli Liidul leping Freyaga,et müüa toodangut Turismiliidu infopunktides,Liidu lennujaamade müügipuntides ja ka nn.turismibutiikides.
Asi pandi nii suure kella külge,et kutsutakse selle firma toodangut üleriigiliselt boikottima.

[kaugeltuuriv]

Dokumendid paljastavad Eesti ettevõtte salajase ärimudeli: Venemaa rikkuritele tarnitakse Saksamaa luksusautosid ja nende varuosi, kuigi see ei tohiks olla võimalik.
https://ekspress.delfi.ee/artikkel/1202 ... a-eliidini

Muud midagi,artikli alusel peaks Maksuamet ja Kaitsepolitsei toimetama kiire juurdluse ning selle järel tegema kopsakad trahvid koos skeemitamises süüdi olevate isikute vanglasse saatamisega nii paariks-kolmeks aastaks.

[davidsoniharald]

Dokumendid paljastavad Eesti ettevõtte salajase ärimudeli: Venemaa rikkuritele tarnitakse Saksamaa luksusautosid ja nende varuosi, kuigi see ei tohiks olla võimalik.
https://ekspress.delfi.ee/artikkel/1202 ... a-eliidini

Eesti firma aadress kohe nii ilusti näha dokumendi fotodes: Punane 14a, 319/3, Tallinn. Astuge lahkesti läbi, pakkuge suitsu.

[metsataat]

Seal terve ärimaja:
https://www.google.com/maps/@59.4320318 ... ?entry=ttu

[Marvin]

Panen siia magusateemat lisaks.Norra maiusetootja Freya on skandaali sattunud,kuna tema tütarettevõtted läbi skeemitamise jätkavad Venemaal tegutsemist.Tänu sellele,keeldus Norra Turismiliit lepingust nendega.Nimelt oli Liidul leping Freyaga,et müüa toodangut Turismiliidu infopunktides,Liidu lennujaamade müügipuntides ja ka nn.turismibutiikides.
Asi pandi nii suure kella külge,et kutsutakse selle firma toodangut üleriigiliselt boikottima.

Parandagu mind need, kel aega guugeldada, aga kas mitte Kraft-Freia-Marabou polnud endise Philip Morrise tütarfirma Kraft Foodsi kaubamärgid, mis pärast Krafti poolitamist nüüd sellele samale Mondelezile kuuluvad?

[Crispy]

Käisin ka eile poes kommiriiulis. Mondelezi tooted jäid ostmata kuigi varem oleks ilmselt midagi nende valikust ostnud

[soul]

Täna algas Peterburi rahvusvaheline majandusfoorum, siin meeleoluks ülevaade.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2SrKeAL5Ueg

Kõrgeim külaline on Ungari välisminister Péter Szijjártókes, kes astub üles koos putiniga.
https://thebell.global.ssl.fastly.net/p ... -bloomberg

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... ify%20wall

Putin’s Economic Forum Puts Russia’s Isolation on Display

Pilte stendidest.
https://twitter.com/novayagazeta_eu/sta ... 3133264896

[Rebane11]

Ungari suund on Venemaale ülioluline. Austria neutraalseks saamine sai teoks tänu sellele et koos Sveitsiga tekiks saar, mis poolitaks NATO väed. Venesõbralik Ungari sobib sinna nagu valatud.

[Tempere]

Uskumatuna tundub, et siiamaani veel mõni NATOs (Türgi välja arvata) ja Euroopa Liidus olev riik saadab oma nii kõrge esindaja orkide juurde mingile foorumile. Tõestab järjekordselt, et see seltskond tuleb ühtsest Euroopa perest välja heita.