Miks peaks drg kaitseliine pikali jooksma, kui ollakse juba va tagalas?
Akf Kriku oli siinkohal ilmselgelt irooniline.Ulfhednar kirjutas: ↑13 Aug, 2023 22:25Miks peaks drg kaitseliine pikali jooksma, kui ollakse juba va tagalas?
Drg konseptsioon peaks olema endiselt va logistika halvamine ja elavjõu sidumine selliselt, et neid kaitseliine poleks enam võimalik rahuldavalt varustada.
Kui üks vits ei toimi, siis tuleb teisi kasutada.
Edukas partisanitegevus on läbi aegade toetunud kohalikule elanikkonnale. Hersoni oblasti elanikkond oli enne sõda napilt miljon, Zaporižje oblastil 1.6 M (sellest Herson 279 000, Zaporižija 710 000, andmed "Wikipediast"). Mõlemad oblastid on praegu okupeeritud osaliselt, pealinnad on Ukraina valduses. On väga raske öelda, kui palju praegu Hersoni ja Zaporižija oblastite okupeeritud osadesse elanikke jäänud on, kuid võimalik, et vähem kui seal on vene sõjaväge.
Kindlasti pole ukrainlased sellele mõelnud ega sõja algusest seda võimaluste piires rakendanud (sarkasm)
Täiesti nõus. Piisab sellest, kui vaadata maastikku Ukraina okupeeritud alades ja saab selgeks, et kergejalaväel on seal toimetamiseks piiratud võimalused. Lage, suured vahemaad -- isegi kui ukrainlased oleks etteladustanud, siis sõda on kestnud ~1.5 a ja need piirkonnad on olnud okupeeritud algusest peale. Sinna midagi suurtes kogustes juurde saata on no-go. Partisanivõitlus suudab kindlasti saavutada efekti, aga ühena kujundavast tegevusest konventsionaalse läbimurde saavutamise toetamiseks. Ja nii ukrainlased juba toimetavad.Kriku kirjutas: ↑14 Aug, 2023 8:00Kui väita, et partisanid ei peaks kohalike hulgast tulema, vaid UA oleks pidanud mehhaniseeritud brigaadide asemel mingeid partisaniüksusi treenima, siis on väga raske ette kujutada, kuidas need vajalikus koguses üle rindejoone pidanuks toimetama.
Kokkuvõttes on kogu see jutt minu arust tühi loba nagu nendegi oma, kes muudkui rääkisid, et Eesti kaitsmine peaks toimuma metsavendluse, mitte konventsionaalse armee vormis. See on õnneks suht vakka jäänud viimase 10-15 aastaga, aga 1990-ndatel paljud päris haritud inimesed ajasid sellist.
(https://meduza.io/feature/2022/02/26/ka ... i-segodnya)Ei Ukraina relvajõud ega ork ei paista lootvat sügavatele läbimurretele rindel – vägede edenemine on äärmiselt aeglane.
Mõlemad armeed on öppinud ennast kaitsma, toetudes suurtükiväele, miinidele ja luuredroonidele.
Täna on mõlemad pooled keskendunud vastase varustuse (peamiselt suurtükiväe) ja isikkoosseisu hävitamisele, lootes sellega vastast "väsitada" ja alles pärast seda minna otsustavale pealetungile.
Southern Front Update - 8/14/2023
Romanov Lite, a high-profile Russian milblogger, has called out the Russian military elite's 'cover up' of recent losses.
He claims that recent raids across the Dnipro river near Kherson have been far more successful than publicly acknowledged and that Ukrainian forces still hold significant territory in the area (despite only committing a small, unsupported force to the mission).
He also claims that Russia's rejection of reality is what has allowed Ukrainian forces to establish a foothold across the Antonivskyi bridge, where there was a further breakthrough last night.
He finishes his post with the following statement:
"I'm afraid there's a risk that soon we will hear how 'the left bank of the Dnieper is not convenient for defense'. Although during the withdrawal from Kherson it was declared as more favorable for defense...."
Staromaiorske-Staromlynivka...
AFAIK, since the guns of the 55th Artillery Brigade (ZSU) have cut to pieces the Russian last-ditch attempt to ‘reinforce’ their garrison inside the village, on Friday (11 July), Urozhaine was free of Russians as of Saturday. However, mopping-up and de-mining is still in the process. Indeed, Ukrainian naval infantry has meanwhile pushed further south, and is meanwhile fighting along the northern edge of Zavitne Bazhannia.
Further west, after experiencing immense problems with minefields north of that village, over the last two months (density of minefields there is something like ‘5 per square metre!’, and that over the depth of something like 10km!!), since around Thursday (10 July), troops of the 23th Mech are well inside the north-western side of Pryyutne.
Robotyne….
It seems the ZSU has concluded it has to take Robotyne before continuing in southern direction. This is why fierce close-range combat is raging in the centre of the same, as Ukrainians are advancing from north, east and west: the latter because the last two days they not only captured two Russian defence lines west of Robotyne, but also entered northern Kopani.
East of Robotyne: the stretch of the Russian 2nd Line under Ukrainian control is meanwhile about 2,000 metres long, and ‘ending’ inside northern Verbove. Read: all the desperate counterattacks by BARS-3 and BARS-14 were defeated and pushed back. As expected, the ZSU is leaveing the 100th Reconnaissance Brigade in Verbove on its own (why causing trouble with a relatively fresh unit, if one can beat 3-4 mauled ones, nearby), and is in the process of reaching Novoprokopivka from the east.
BTW, the command of the 58th CAA has managed to find a unit to reinforce to Novoprokopivka: 108th VDV Regiment. It was re-deployed there from the banks of Dnipro (i.e. from the 49th CAA).
Oleshky – Kozachi Laheri…
it’s similar in regards of developments in this area. I’m not sure if Ukrainian attack over the Dnipro into the Kozachi Laheri region was ‘just a raid’, or if they really have created a bridgehead there, and are on advance in direction of Pidstepne, or not. Can only confirm that, yes, the ZSU has a bridgehead north-west of Oleshky, but right now, I do not ‘see’ how should it ‘exploit’ the same: not even how it might manage to drive the Russian artillery out of the range to Kherson (which is heavily shelled, every day, causing lots of civilian casualties).
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