Läänemerest saamas uus Bosporus?

[kaur3]

2 päris mõtlemapanevat lugu venelaste naftavedude suurendamise plaanidest piki Soome lahte ja Läänemerd.

1. lugu. "TURNING THE BALTIC SEA INTO A SECOND BOSPORUS?"

http://jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2371976

2. lugu "Russia: Working Around Belarus"
Mar 15, 2007

Summary

Russian state oil firm Transneft is planning to redirect half of the oil normally shipped to Europe via Belarus to the Baltic Pipeline System, which will carry it to the port of Primorsk for waterborne shipping. This decision will not only strip Belarus of transit fees, it also will broaden Russia's oil export market. Thus, while Russian oil shipments to Europe might become more reliable, they might also become smaller.

Analysis

Russian state oil firm Transneft's president, Semyon Vainshtok, said March 13 that the company plans to redirect half of the nearly 2 million barrels per day of crude normally shipped to Europe via Belarus to the Baltic Pipeline System (BPS) near St. Petersburg, opting for more expensive (but more secure) waterborne shipments. The line extension to do this will stretch from the Russian city of Unecha, near the Belarusian border, to the port of Primorsk, near Finland. The extensions and port upgrades probably will not take more than 18 months to complete, since this is a relatively inexpensive plan that does not require approval of any non-Russian entity.

Transneft's decision works out well for Russia in several ways. First, it will end Moscow's dependence on Minsk to ship oil to Europe while stripping income from Belarus, a country whose ties with Russia are fraying. Second, using the port of Primorsk will allow Russia to ship crude to the United States, since Primorsk will have the capacity to handle supertankers. Third, since Russian oil will be available to more customers, Moscow can stop automatically selling its oil to Europe and allow bidding for its product. This means that even though Russia will be able to show its European energy customers that it can, in fact, be a reliable supplier, oil sales to Europe might decrease -- which means Europe needs to start shopping around for other energy suppliers soon.

Until Jan. 1, to reward Belarus for its historical loyalty, Russia sent it subsidized oil -- and more oil than it needed so Minsk could sell the excess to Europe at market rates and pocket the profit. However, Russia called off that deal in January. In retaliation, Belarus increased the transit fees for the oil Russia shipped across Belarus to Europe. This led to a dispute that interrupted oil flow to Poland and Germany for several days. If Russia can bypass Belarus and send its oil via tanker to Europe, Belarus will lose about $1 billion a year in transit fees, potentially crippling its economy. Economically and politically marginalized, Belarus paradoxically would be forced to rely on Russia even more than before.

The beauty of the BPS plan is that the system is easily expandable and the plan is economically possible -- though not necessarily as profitable as existing export options -- since Russia will no longer be paying increased transit fees to Belarus and will expand its market for oil exports beyond Europe. Russia will fork over an estimated $3 billion for the project; however, this is a price Russia is willing to pay for its energy security. The pipeline's capacity will expand to about 8.2 million barrels per year -- about a third of which will be filled by oil diverted away from Belarus. Also, the port of Primorsk will be deepened to accommodate very large crude carriers with a 1.5 million to 2.2 million-barrel capacity -- more than double the 733,000-barrel capacity of the largest tankers it handles now.

Sending oil to the port of Primorsk also literally opens up a world of possibilities for Russian oil exports. After Primorsk is deepened, Russia will be able to ship its oil via supertankers to a broader customer base that includes the United States. This, in turn, means that buying Russian oil will become more competitive. Until now, the Russians have had no choice but to sell their Urals crude to Europe, and the dearth of purchasers has forced the Russians to sell at a discount. If Russian oil is shipped out from an expanded Primorsk port, Transneft will be able to better ply the international market, weakening the Europeans' buying power.

The BPS expansion will broaden Russia's energy customer base and end the country's dependence on Belarus as an oil transit state. However, once the project is complete, Russia will have to take full responsibility for the security of its oil exports.

Eesti reostustõrjevõiemkuse kohta leidsin vaid selle loo. Võib-olla on kellegil uuemat infot.

http://www.postimees.ee/280206/esileht/ ... 193435.php

[Tux]

Reostustõrjevõime on veel ka Muuga sadamas olemas, aga muidu on tõesti asi nutune. Alles pani Koplis 10 000 tonnine tanker madalikule, kui see oleks olnud ühepõhjaline, siis oleks sajandi katastroof ka juba käes olnud. Ühesõnaga paari tonniga saab kuidagi hakkama, kui välisabi kutsuda, aga 10 000 tonni ei korja mitte kuidagi kokku ja siis on kalanduse ja rannikul oleva turismiga pikaks ajaks asjad ühel pool. Venemaalt tulevad aga ka 100 000 tonnised tankerid...
Soome Merepääste Keskuse andmeil põrkavad laevad talvel Soome lahel kolonnis sõites umbes korra kuni kaks nädalas kokku. Enamasti on need väiksed kõksud kus laevad lekkima ei hakka ja põhja ei lähe aga tõenäosusteooria ütleb meile, et varsti võiks ka suurem pauk tulla.
Kui asi huvitab, siis http://www.helcom.fi/ ja http://www.fimr.fi/en/itamerikanta.html lehekülgedelt leiab veidi rohkem andmeid.

[kaur3]

19.04.2007 RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT SPELLING OUT BALTIC OIL TRANSPORT PLAN.

BPS has quickly grown to a staggering capacity of 75 million tons annually as of 2006. Moscow’s intention to double that capacity poses clear threats to the maritime environment and navigation safety in the already congested Baltic Sea, particularly in its narrow passages and in the straits leading to the North Sea.

http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.ph ... id=2372109

[kaur3]

The BPS-2 pipeline is intended to redirect Russian oil exports toward the Baltic Sea at the expense of the existing Druzhba pipeline, which runs (with ramifications) through Belarus, Ukraine, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland, and the eastern part of Federal Germany. The new line would, however, run through Russian territory northward to the Baltic sea, instead of transiting those countries.

The throughput capacity of BPS-2 will be 50 to 75 million tons annually, aiming to match the existing 75 million ton capacity of the BPS-1 system, which runs from Russia’s interior to Primorsk and was completed in 2006. The port of Primorsk is being correspondingly enlarged for an uploading capacity of 150 million tons annually, to be shipped through the Baltic Sea by tankers. This figure is twice the annual volume of Russian- and Russian-loaded oil transiting the Bosporus, three times the volume shipped annually from Novorossiysk, and three times the capacity of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline.

http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.ph ... id=2372185

[oleeg]

Neetult nutune tundub see olukord

o

[potentate]

Venemaalt ei tule muud kui sitta!
On alati tulnud ja jääbki tulema.

[kaur3]

Eestis paistab reageerimisvõime paranevat.

Eesti plaanib järgmisel aastal kulutada enam kui 363 miljonit krooni merereostuse ja ohtlike kemikaalidega seotud õnnetuste likvideerimiseks vajaliku eritehnika ostmiseks.

http://www.postimees.ee/080607/esileht/ ... 265225.php

[Kapten Trumm]

Vene naftatransiidi kolimine meie raudteelt ja sadamatest Primorski sadamasse Peterburi all on kahe teraga mõõk.

Põhimõtteliselt on meil valida tiksuvate pommide vahel raudteel või tiksuvate pommide järel merel.

Kui Eesti riigi haldussuutlikkuse üle reostuse korral võime veel hambaid teritada, siis Venemaal on see asi veel hullem. Ja ühepõhjalised tankerid hakkavad tossutama mööda Soome lahte. Ja venelastel on p**** dõmm. Venes võivad isegi mingid moodsad koristuslaevad olla, kuid vene riigi asjaajamist teades (mis on kordi hullem meie omast) ei hakka nende suutlikkus kunagi miskit olema.

Eestil on keskkonna mõttes selgelt soodsam lasta vana skeemiga, sest muidu hakkab sama mass naftat vagunite asemel tossutama mööda Soome lahte. Alles üks küna seal ära uppus ja eesti riik selle tühjaks pumpama pidi (tühine 40 tonni kütust).

[araterI]

Balti meres on teoreetiliselt ühepõhjalised tankerid keelatud aga rahvusvahelises vees on selle kontroll problemaatiline.

Kui Eesti nihutab oma merepiiri (ja Soomel ei jää siis ka vist muud üle) siis on võimalik rahulikult käia inspekteerimas IGAT tankerit, mis emma-kumma territoriaalvetest läbi sõidab.

Riigikaitseliselt on territoriaalmere nihutamine + EI Gaasijuhtmele hetkel olulisem teema kui oma tankide soetamine.

[Tux]

http://www.helsinki.fi/aleksanteri/civp ... ations.htm leiab paar soomlaste analüüsi nagu:
"North European Gas Pipeline" by Sven Friedrich and Jürgen Neumüller.
(Üks huvitav number siin on: 120 000 miini paigaldatud aastatel 1914-1945)
ja
Risks in Oil Transportation in the Gulf of Finland - “Not a Question of If – But When” by Piia Nikula and Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen