VF toimetab? Infokillud ja uudised, mis mujale ei sobi.

[Roamless]

Paduvene https://t.me/citizen_opinion/18242

Lugesin ka, puhas paskvill, sobib pigem propaganda alla, mingit "luureinfot" ei ole, ainult tüüpiline väljamõeldud ja rõvedalt ulmeline laim. Ja jutt on nii p...k, et uskuda võivad ainult siseriiklikud ajupestud klounid.

[olevtoom]

Paduvene https://t.me/citizen_opinion/18242

Lugesin ka, puhas paskvill, sobib pigem propaganda alla, mingit "luureinfot" ei ole, ainult tüüpiline väljamõeldud ja rõvedalt ulmeline laim. ...

See ju tüüpiline t!blade võte: räägi teiste kohta seda, mida sa ise teed.

[ruger]

Saksamaal väike juhtum

More than 270 cars were damaged throughout Germany by order of the Russian Federation, the suspects masquerading as radical climate activists, writes Der Spiegel. Such cases have been recorded in Berlin, Brandenburg, Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg, the magazine reports. He recounts how a van carrying three men 20, 17 and 18 years old with IDs from Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic was detained in Berlin on the night of December 11. They had supplies for construction work, including sprayers with assembly foam. In the morning it turned out that 43 cars were damaged in a neighboring area overnight - their exhaust pipes were glued with installation foam. Stickers with the slogan "Be greener!" were left on the windows of the attacked cars " and a photo of the candidate for chancellor from the "green" party Robert Habek.
After this, an article titled "Climate radicals attack cars with construction foam" was published in Bild magazine, and social networks began to criticize the "greens". But apparently, the media and the public have deliberately mislead. Referring to sources in German law enforcement authorities, Spiegel writes that the trail of sabotagers may lead to Moscow. According to the data, three diversion suspects, who were investigated by police, were recruited on purpose via chat and received several thousand euros for damaging cars.
The publication notes that similar cases have recently occurred in France and the UK. So, in Paris, after the Hamas attack on Israel, hundreds of stars of David appeared on the walls and facades of buildings, painted with stencils - a couple from Moldova was caught with a handcuffed. The spouses confessed that they were performing work at the request of a friendly Russian businessman. In London, police found propaganda materials against Khabek during searches on a spying case against a group of Bulgarian refugees.

https://www.dw.com/ru/vlasti-frg-podozr ... acebook-dw

[kaur3]

Moderaatoris tõstavad asja õigesse kohta kui vaja. Iisraelis toimetavad Iraani käsilased põhimõtteliselt sama käekirjaga. Haaretz kirjutab nii https://archive.ph/BE6c2

How Iranian 'Agents' Are Trolling Israel: $20 for Graffiti, With a Bonus for Arson

Alongside trolling efforts, the Shin Bet and police investigations have revealed a concerning escalation of activity: some agents were also tasked with gathering intelligence on Knesset members, a former defense minister, and another high-ranking security figure. One agent was instructed to collect addresses of Israeli ministers and to set fire to a police car, a bus and a truck — though he refused. Others, as noted, were also tasked with violence, though they refused to carry out the missision or were stopped before they could actually assassinate Israeli officials. Similar dynamics were also on display in the U.S. during the last election, when Iranian operatives also plotted an assassination of Donald Trump that was thwarted.
While John le Carré's spies were tortured souls navigating the paradoxes of the Cold War world, Iran's agents in Israel are a distinctly a product of the digital age: Socially isolated individuals who spend their time in the dark corners of the internet, only to be lured down a rabbit hole with offers that are both tempting and dangerous. They're like couriers, except that instead of working for a food delivery app, they're carrying out missions for an intelligence agency.
More than anything, their success is the result of years of governmental neglect of the digital sphere, which eventually morphed into an active embrace of a culture where fake and anonymous accounts operate unchecked. To paraphrase the saying, those who lie down with bots shouldn't be surprised to wake up and find that they have come to life, and that Iran has learned to weaponize them.

[HAT]

Ukraina luureteenistused valmistuvad Lääne kuraatorite abiga mitmeteks kõrgetasemelisteks Venemaa-vastasteks provokatsioonideks.https://t.me/dva_majors/64326

Läänemere vetes on plaanis õhku lasta Venemaal toodetud miinidega välismaa laev ..., rõhutas svr ./color]:



Nood 2majorit juba haistavad teenistust ja suurt raha laevastiku kaitsel sarnaselt Aafika piirkonnas.

[ruger]

Sama väidab ka osaliselt Soome sõjaväeluure

Finnish Military Intelligence warns that Russia may at some point conduct sabotage on vital military or civilian infrastructure.

https://x.com/1stFinFreecorps/status/18 ... 5650794758

[ruger]

orkide sabotaažiüksus Euroopas

Intelligence officials have identified a new Russian unit, the SSD, responsible for sabotage, assassinations and espionage across Europe and beyond.

SSD was created in 2023 in response to Western support for Ukraine. It is based in Moscow's GRU headquarters. It absorbed Unit 29155, linked to the 2018 Skripal poisoning, and has taken over some FSB functions.

Operations attributed to the SSD include:

Attempted assassinations, sabotage, recruiting spies from Ukraine, Serbia, and developing countries. Infiltration of Western companies and universities.

Key figures:

Colonel-General Andrei Averyanov, a veteran of Russia's wars in Chechnya, is wanted by Czech authorities for an ammunition depot explosion in 2014.

His deputy, Lieutenant-General Ivan Kasianenko, reportedly coordinated the Skripal poisoning and oversees operations in Europe and Wagner's African operations post-Prigozhin.

Source: WSJ

https://x.com/clashreport/status/1890644984577065104

[ruger]

Läti vastuluureasutus VDD avaldas oma 2024 aasta kokkuvõtte-huvitavat lugemist

https://vdd.gov.lv/uploads/materials/40 ... t-2024.pdf

[ruger]

orkid saatsid 2022 aastal oma sabotaažirühma(d) Euroopasse UKR tulevate pagulaste varjus. Sellest kirjutab Saksa ajaleht BILD(tsiteerides all pool olevat RUSI artiklit). Samuti ajaloost kriminaalide värbamisel eri aktide toimepanemises.

It has now become known that a Russian sabotage team was intercepted on its way to Germany in 2022. The sabotage professionals from the GRU secret service wanted to enter the country as part of the refugee wave and had specific targets in mind. Now a team has successfully "entered".

"The Kremlin activates sleeper teams, sends out new ones: mobilization for the Moscow underground army," writes the @BILD . Their mission is to carry out attacks on civilian and military facilities. There is apparently a "Kremlin blackout plan," it continues.

https://x.com/Grnfink2/status/1896128466615210013

Pikemalt kirjutatakse RUSI artiklis
https://rusi.tandfonline.com/doi/full/1 ... 232#d1e295

[ruger]

Rumeenia saatis välja orkide sõjaväeatašee ja tema abi

Russian military attache and his deputy were expelled from Romania

https://x.com/AlexandruC4/status/1897299000065450114

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs informs that the Romanian authorities have decided to declare persona non grata on the territory of Romania of the military, aero and naval attaché of the Russian Federation in Bucharest, Alexander Chuprina, as well as of his deputy, Yevgeny Ignatiev, for carrying out activities that contravene the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961.

These elements were communicated to the Russian side today, March 5, 2025, on the occasion of the convocation to the MAE headquarters, at the disposal of Minister Emil Hurezeanu, of the charge d’affaires of the Russian Embassy in Bucharest.

“Russia will give an adequate answer” to Romania, Moscow announced after declaring two Russian diplomats as persona non gratae

The name of the deputy military attaché of the Russian Embassy in Bucharest, Colonel Evgheni Ignatiev, appears in an interception of the prosecutors targeting Călin Georgescu.

Context

According to G4Media sources, prosecutors have discovered “compromising” conversations and recordings, including a phone call with Marian Motocu, investigated for legionary propaganda and anti-Semitic and xenophobic messages on social media.

In this discussion, Calin Georgescu tells Motocu: “If things go well, I will start in January. There is a plan, there is a strategy that only I know. When it is to be, as I told you a year ago, things have not been connected, for many reasons, then you will have your place in this action. Staying close to this man”, namely George Mocanu. It would be about a close friend of Calin Georgescu, who came from Canada.

After the discussion with Calin Georgescu, Motocu called the Russian Embassy and asked for contact with Colonel Evgeny Ignatiev, the deputy military attaché of the Russian Embassy in Bucharest. The operator at the Russian Embassy asked him to wait until he made the telephone link, but at the other end of the wire no one answered.

https://www.g4media.ro/breaking-atasatu ... aniei.html

[ruger]

Rumeenias peeti kinni grupp, keda kahtlustatakse riigireetmises orkide kasuks.

Six people detained in Romania for treason. They are accused of negotiating with Russian agents Romania's exit from NATO / The group was organized as a military structure with a staff

https://x.com/AlexandruC4/status/1897551027286471073

[NAFO ep]

Rumeenias peeti kinni grupp, keda kahtlustatakse riigireetmises orkide kasuks.

Six people detained in Romania for treason. They are accused of negotiating with Russian agents Romania's exit from NATO / The group was organized as a military structure with a staff

https://x.com/AlexandruC4/status/1897551027286471073

Meil siin samuti sarnaste ideedega jõuk ju! (va 2. punkt)

IMG_2042.jpeg (170.2 KiB) Vaadatud 1427 korda

[ruger]

Saksa ajakirjandus-Focus: Saksamaal oskas ennast jälitajate eest ära peita orkide GRU sabotaažiüksus, mis sisenes veebruari keskel riiki Tšehhist

Suspected #GRU sabotage unit enters Germany via Czechia in mid February. They are monitored by intel services as they travel to Leipzig and Hannover. Then, they vanish without a trace

https://x.com/LCueilleur/status/1897939913489678430

Deutsche Sicherheitsbehörden entdecken eine GRU-Terrorgruppe auf dem Weg nach Deutschland, mit dem Ziel, Anschläge auf zivile und militärische Einrichtungen zu verüben. Doch sie verlieren die Spur der Verdächtigen.

Am 16. Februar 2025 geriet ein grauer Mercedes-Sprinter an der sächsischen Grenze zu Tschechien ins Visier der Bundespolizei. An Bord: vier Männer und eine Frau mit wenig Gepäck. Auf den ersten Blick wirkte es wie eine gewöhnliche Kontrolle – doch sie war alles andere als das.

Die deutschen Sicherheitsbehörden waren bereits informiert und vorbereitet. Ein Hinweis von Nachrichtendiensten aus Nordmazedonien und Tschechien hatte sie aufgeschreckt. Eine Terrorgruppe des russischen Militärgeheimdienstes GRU sollte auf dem Weg nach Deutschland sein. Ihr Auftrag: Anschläge auf zivile und militärische Einrichtungen. Das berichtet die „Bild“.
Vorbereitung der deutschen Sicherheitsbehörden

Die Sicherheitskräfte warteten an der Grenze, als der Sprinter mit mazedonischem Kennzeichen bei Bad Gottleuba im Erzgebirge einreiste. Die Kontrolle verlief zunächst ohne besondere Vorkommnisse, bis im Fahrzeug ein verdächtiges Handy entdeckt und unauffällig ausgelesen wurde.

Direkt nach dieser Entdeckung begannen der Militärische Abschirmdienst (MAD) und das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV), die Verdächtigen zu überwachen. Mehrere Zivilfahrzeuge folgten dem Sprinter, um den Kontakt zur Gruppe zu halten, ohne aufzufallen.
Identität der Verdächtigen: GRU-Agenten unter Beobachtung

Schon nach kurzer Zeit war klar, dass es sich bei einem der Männer um einen ausgebildeten Saboteur des GRU handelte, schreibt die „Bild“. Der 30-Jährige, ein ehemaliger Elite-Absolvent einer GRU-Schule für russische Spezialeinheiten, war in verschiedenen Sabotage-Techniken wie Sprengstoffanschlägen, elektronischen Angriffen und dem Einsatz von Giften geschult. Der Sprinter setzte seine Fahrt fort, während die Beobachtungsgruppe weiterhin diskret hinterherfuhr.
Versteckspiel und Verwirrung in Leipzig und Hannover

Die Gruppe machte als nächstes Halt in Leipzig. Dort stieg die Frau mit einem kleinen Rollkoffer aus, verschwand schnell in einem Plattenbau in der Nähe der Innenstadt. Niemand folgte ihr. Die Verdächtigen setzten ihre Fahrt fort, und der Sprinter steuerte Hannover-Bemerode an. Zwei der Männer stiegen dort aus und blieben zurück. Der Sprinter war nun im ländlichen Raum unterwegs, und die Sicherheitskräfte mussten mit größerem Abstand weiterverfolgen, um nicht aufzufallen.

Trotz aller Bemühungen verloren die Behörden schließlich die Spur des Fahrzeugs. Die Verdächtigen waren in Deutschland abgetaucht – der Sprinter war nicht mehr zu finden, wie die „Bild“ berichtet. Die Ermittlungen gehen weiter. Fakt ist: Der GRU setzt auf verdeckte Operationen, um wichtige Einrichtungen zu treffen, die das Land während der geopolitischen Spannungen stützen.

Angesichts der Situation schließt Innenministerin Nancy Faeser nicht aus, dass auch dieser Vorfall Teil eines umfassenderen Plans ist, die militärische Unterstützung Deutschlands für die Ukraine zu untergraben.

https://www.focus.de/panorama/russische ... 54167.html

[Lemet]

Venemaal Astrahani oblastis koolevad kariloomad.

https://www.facebook.com/share/r/1BARMv5geQ/

[ruger]

orkid (rahapesu)ostavad Stockholmi saarestiku maatükke läbi variisikute. Nende juhiks on Eestist päris NSVL-i lõpus Rootsi emigreeunud tegelane, praeguseks ehitusfirma juht, kes ka ehitas orkidele Rootsi kiriku.

”A Russian network is buying up plots of land in the northern inlet of the Stockholm archipelago through relatives…

The network has been involved in an extensive money laundering racket and is linked to one of the Russian regime's designated intelligence

https://x.com/balticjam/status/1898781982626324823

54-year-old man has a central role

Russian-speaking, crime-active networks are not unique in dealing with money laundering. But the scope stands out.

"It's a running band," the chief financial police chief said.

She mentions that the Russian-speaking networks can also be used to circumvent sanctions issued against countries or people.

According to the report, criminal gains are usually traded abroad.

But not always.

Aftonbladet can now reveal that a Russian-speaking network with links to money laundering and to a platform for the Russian regime's intelligence work in Sweden, has bought plots, among other things, at the entrance to Stockholm's northern archipelago.

A 54-year-old man appears as a central network.

He came to Sweden as an 18-year-old from the Soviet Union. In 1989 he applied for a residence and work permit in Sweden, but the application was rejected by the Swedish National Immigration Service.
Not like other churches

He appealed to the government and in 1991, then Labour Minister Mona Sahlin ran over previous decisions and gave the 54-year-old residence permit. Shortly thereafter, Estonia became independent and the man's residence permit in Sweden later became permanent.

https://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/a/qP ... s-skargard