VF relvaüksuste tegevus Põhja-Kaukaasias (inglise keeles)

[kaur3]

“Russia boosts counterinsurgency efforts in North Caucasus”
Jane’s Intelligence Review, Februrary 2006

Russia’s long-standing emphasis on traditional force structure in counter-insurgency operations is obsolete. Denis Trifanov examines how special forces are now leading the way in tackling insurgency in the North Caucasus republics.


Continued attacks against Russian targets in Chechnya and the resurgence of militant Islamism in other North Caucasus republics have prompted the Russian government to reassess its counterinsurgency strategy. Now, at least on paper, the focus is firmly on the development of stronger special forces capabilities.
Previously, efforts had focused on scaling up deployments of regular troops and improving the ground attack capabilities of the Russian air force. When Russia launched its second attack against Chechen rebels in 1999, its armed and paramilitary forces were trained primarily for large-scale, theatre-wide operations against regular armed formations. Although the Soviet/Russian military has fought three low-intensity wars in the past 20 years and accumulated a substantial amount of operational experience in the process, counterinsurgency techniques were only recently incorporated into combat training. There are indications that the situation is slowly changing.
A Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) source told JIR that Russia's Security Council has tasked all security agencies that operate special forces units in the Caucasus with investing more in their training and equipment and with drawing up longer-term plans for the development of their respective special forces arms. The agencies that will be affected by these changes are the MoD, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ministerstvo vnutrennikh del: MVD) and the Federal Security Service (Federalnaya sluzhba bezopasnosti: FSB).
The military doctrine has been updated to incorporate the lessons learned from previous low-intensity conflicts, and revised procurement programmes place greater emphasis on special forces needs. The inflexible and cumbersome chain of command, which is ill-suited for counterter-rorist operations, is being modified.

Shifting priorities
The renewed focus on counterinsurgency doctrine and capabilities reflects the Kremlin's belief that negotiations with insurgents in and around Chechnya are futile, that the insurgency can only be defeated through targeted killings of rebel leaders and special forces raids against the remaining rebel units, and that the bulk of Russia's forces are incapable of delivering on these objectives.
Conventional warfare methods were used in the first phase of the second Chechen campaign (1999-2002), but Russian forces have now been forced to adapt to the changing nature of the insurgency. The rebels no longer have the resources and manpower needed to fight pitched battles with Russian troops in the open. They have also given up attempts to seize and hold on to urban centres. This means that the "cleansing" operations that Russian special forces previously relied upon are no longer effective.
An FSB officer told JIR that most rebel groups now avoid urban warfare altogether, preferring to confront federal forces in the mountains. This demands that Russian special forces have higher levels of training and better equipment. The new situation also calls for improved co-ordination between various MoD forces and different security agencies operating in and around Chechnya


Past failures
Transforming Russian special forces capabilities is no easy task. A presidential administration official told JIR that President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly demanded that the chiefs of his security agencies incorporate the lessons learned from past special forces failures into their development strategies. There is, unfortunately, a long list of such failures.
Between 1995 and 1996, FSB and MoD special forces units failed on two occasions to free civilian hostages captured by Chechen rebels in operations that caused hundreds of civilian casualties. In early 2000, an elite defence intelligence (Glavnoe razvedovatelnoe upravlenie: GRU) commando unit that had parachuted behind Chechen rebel lines was tracked down and destroyed by rebel forces. In 2003, the gas used by an FSB special forces unit during a hostage-release operation in a Moscow t
theatre killed more than 150 civilians. On 3 September 2004, Russian special forces stormed a school in the North Ossetian town of Beslan where Chechen rebels held over 1,000 children and teachers hostage. The offensive resulted in over 300 civilian casualties. The high casualty rate has been blamed on poor operational planning and co-ordination arrangements - the school was stormed simultaneously by special forces units from three federal agencies, along with scores of local policemen.

New chain of command
Following the Beslan school siege, steps were taken to streamline the decision-making process during counterinsurgency operations and improve co-ordination between special forces units from different federal agencies. Now, all special forces units are under the direction of Russia's Combined Group of Forces (Obedinennaya gruppirovka voysk: OGV) in the North Caucasus. While the OGV previously controlled only Ministry of Defence forces deployed in Chechnya, its area of operation has been extended to the entire region.
Because Ministry of Internal Affairs troops and special forces units have assumed primary responsibility for counterinsur-gency operations in and around Chechnya, the Combined Group of Forces is now commanded by an MVD general.
A joint intelligence and operational planning command that brings together MoD, MVD and FSB officers was established as part of the OGV. Each North Caucasus region, Chechnya included, has received an interagency operational control group (Gruppa operativnogo upravleniya: GrOU), which is subordinated to the OGV. The control groups have assumed responsibility for planning and executing all special forces operations, which were previously directed by the local headquarters of individual agencies.
JIR spoke to a source close to Dmitriy Kozak, Putin's envoy to the Southern Federal District (which includes the North Caucasus), who strongly backed the chain of command reform. He said: "The old system did not make any sense and led to direct competition for the same rebel targets between special forces units from the MoD, the MVD and the FSB." The source added that, as co-ordination improves, the OGV expects each agency to find a narrower operational niche and stick to it There are indications that this 'division of labour' policy is delivering its first results:
MVD and FSB units focus onunderground rebel cells in towns and villages. In addition, FSB special forces units provide physical protection to Russian intelligence officers and search for hostages.
During the rebel attack on Nalchik in October 2005, federal forces managed to regain control of the town and kill or capture 60 per cent of the rebels in just four hours, a clear improvement on similar operations conducted in the past. The offensive against the attackers was led by a
Ministry of Internal Affairs special forces unit. Local police and MoD troops securedthe rear of the fighting unit but did not engage the rebels. Efficient deployment of sniper and anti-tank guided missile sub-units ensured that key enemy targets were quickly suppressed without the need for close air
and artillery support MoD special forces units focus on search- and-destroy operations in the mountainous areas of Chechnya and the regions adjacent to it One such unit was responsible in early 2005 for tracking down and killing the Chechen rebel leader Asian Maskhadov. The MoD's competitive advantages are its air force and airborne and missile capabilities, which can be used by special forces during mountain warfare operations. A General Staff source with previous experience in Chechnya told JIR that past attempts to deploy MVD and FSB commando teams against rebel units operating along the Georgian and Dagestani borders had been unsuccessful. They were lightly armed, had no specialised mountain warfare equipment, poor terrain orientation skills and no trained forward air control officers to ensure effective co-ordination with the air force. According to Russian military officials, the new division of labour among security agencies has significantly reduced the number of rebel bases in the Chechen and Dagestani mountains.

Boosting capabilities
Russia seeks to expand the range of special forces units at its disposal. It also seeks to gradually increase the total number of special forces servicemen on standby duty. A Russian Security Council official told JIR that Moscow needs a fully integrated cross-agency special forces corps that could be rapidly deployed in a Chechnya-type low-intensity conflict with only air support from the regular armed forces. He said: "Russia seeks capabilities it did not have in Chechnya in 1994 and 1999, when a lack of deployable special forces forced us to rely on regular army units manned by poorly trained and ill quipped conscripts. These units were not prepared for urban warfare and suffered heavy casualties as a result"
The MoD, MVD and FSB are scaling up their special forces deployments in and around Chechnya. In total, around 4,000 special forces servicemen are believed to be On active duty in the North Caucasus. The MoD is reforming its defence intelligence spetsnaz (special forces) corps. In Chechnya, the MoD set up two new special forces squads in late 2003 - Vostok (East) and Zapad (West) - under the command of the intelligence chief of the MoD's 42nd motor rifle division. These units are staffed exclusively by ethnic Chechens loyal to Moscow. Their mission is to identify and eliminate active rebel units and their commanders. In mid-2005, Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov announced that the MoD was setting up two special forces mountain warfare brigades in the North Caucasus. Manned by contract servicemen with previous airborne, marine or defence intelligence experience, the brigades will use an entirely new range of personal weapons and reconnaissance equipment and will be supported by a squadron of Russia's new Ka-52 attack helicopters. An MoD source confirmed to JIR that the Ministry of Finance had inserted a special line item into the 2006 defence budget for this project.
Meanwhile, the Ministry of Internal Affairs is emerging as Russia's principal counterterrorism body. Its 200,000-strong paramilitary force, Interior Troops (Vnutrenniye voyska: VV), has assumed full responsibility for the operations of federal forces in Chechnya. Currently, all 20 Russian military outposts in Chechnya are manned by W contract soldiers. The ministry has created an integrated anti-terrorism and organised crime centre (Departament po borbe s organizovannoi prestupnostyu i terrorizmom: DBOPiT), which has a dedicated strategic analysis and intelligence unit, and a special forces command. The command has assumed responsibility over three types of special forces units -specialised designation police units (Otryad militsii osobennogo naznacheniya: OMON), special rapid response anti-terrorist squads (Spetsialnyi otryad bystrogo reagirovaniya: SOBR), and W special forces units.
Ministry of Internal Affairs sources claim that the co-ordination of these three forces has improved as a result In counterinsur-gency operations, all MVD special forces units will now be deployed under a unified command. The size of the MVD special forces corps is constantly expanding. The MVD now operates 12 special forces units in Chechnya and four units in other North Caucasus republics. The MVD also operates six smaller rapid reaction squads, called temporary operations groups (Vremennye spetsializirovannye operativnye gruppy: VSOG), in the region. These are responsible for tracking down and killing members of 'dormant' rebel cells. A senior MVD official told JIR that in 2005 alone, MVD special forces units carried out 70 search-and-destroy operations and over 1,000 reconnaissance raids.

Way forward
The focus on counterinsurgency capabilities marks a radical departure from Russia's long-standing fixation on conventional warfare threats. The change is reflected in Russians 2006-2008 procurement plans. In 2006, the national security procurement budget is set to grow from RUR 132 billion
(USD4.7 billion) to over RUR200 billion (USD 6.9 billion). Moscow, for the first time since 1991, is investing in projects such as the development of a new special forces kit (the first deliveries are scheduled for early 2007), deliveries of the new generation of personal infantry weapons and tactical radios, and the production of the Kh-101 air-launched cruise missile that the MoD says will be used to support counterterrorism operations in the Caucasus.
The MoD is also investing in better close air support capabilities. Two modernisation programmes are currently under way. The Su-27 fighter is being converted into a multi purpose tactical bomber capable of engaging point targets. The modernised version carries a new onboard multipurpose radar system and a range of precision-guided bombs and air-to-surface missiles. The Su-25 ground attack jet, widely used in Chechnya to support special forces units, is being fitted with terrain-mapping radar and an improved head-up display (HUD) system. Various sources indicate that between five and 12 Su-25s are currently being upgraded and should re-enter service by the end of 2006.
The focus on asymmetrical warfare is also reflected in the 2003 defence White Paper that was developed by Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov and which currently serves as Russia's defence doctrine. The document builds on Russia's operational experience in Chechnya, stressing the need to transform tbe Russian military into a professional force that is capable of fighting low-intensity conflicts with a greater degree of sophistication. While Russia's previous doctrines focused on theatre-wide combined-arms operations, the 2003 White Paper discusses the use of armed forces in counterterrorist operations against irregular armed groups operating in difficult environments such as the Caucasus and Central Asia's mountainous areas. The White Paper expressly calls for more and better special forces and more precision-guided weaponry to support the deployment of such groups.
The government sources consulted by JIR assert that the ongoing reform of Russia's counterinsurgency capabilities is already delivering visible results. They point out that according to December 2005 figures released by the MVD and the FSB, federal forces in Chechnya made significant strategic gains in 2005. The Russians succeeded in killing or capturing at least 650 active rebels. Of the 200 rebel commanders on the FSB most-wanted list drawn up in 2000, 190 have been 'neutralised'. No successful rebel attack against federal targets was launched in 2005. For the first time since 1999, the federal forces lost less than 100 servicemen in Chechnya.
The picture is less rosy in Dagestan, Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria. The rebels have shifted some of their activity to these republics, and the number of dashes between separatists and federal units has grown in 2005 as a result. However, government sources claim that the situation is not a full-blown insurgency and that a new Chechnya-type armed conflict elsewhere in the North Caucasus is unlikely. They point to deep religious and ethnic divisions within militant groups in the North Caucasus. They are also confident that the growing intensity of Russian coun-terinsurgency operations in the region has shifted the balance in Moscow's favour. Moreover, most government and independent sources expect Moscow to further scale up its activity in the North Caucasus in the run-up to the 2008 presidential elections.
Despite the progress that has been made, the transformation of Russia's counterinsur-gency capabilities is set to remain a long and painstaking process with unpredictable outcomes. The knowledge gained in local conflicts is rapidly lost because the military is unable to retain and professionally advance its commissioned and noncommissioned officers with operational experience. The focus on special forces requires a new kind of soldier - motivated, well-trained and capable of taking the initiative. The Russian system of recruitment and training, built with a conscript army in mind, is ill-suited for producing such servicemen en masse. Development of robust special forces is severely constrained by the inefficiency and the sheer size of Russia's military machine, which is still dominated by Soviet-era officials unable to appreciate the complexity of modern-day threats and the new set of defence requirements.

[uusmario]

Nii öelda jätkuks, kuna Spets Naz, kui sõna pärineb üsna tavaliste venekeelsete sõnade tähtedests (специального назначения), nende sõnade tähendus tõlkes on ju tegelikult lihtne "eriüksus".Sellest tulenevalt on VF armees "Spets Naz"-e palju, GRU spetsnaz (GRU eriväed), Mereväe spetsnaz (mereväe eriüksus), Alfa ja Võmpel (FSB eriväed).Sõna spetsnaz tähendab eelkõige üksuse eesmärki, mitte selle nime.

Aga jah, tõelise Spetsnazina on eelkõige tuntud kui GRU üksused (vast teene Suvorovi poolt).Kuid see ei tähenda, et nad ainukesed oleks.

[kaur3]

Siin võtab sõna 1 ofitserskii GRU mees.
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid ... 7396986040

[denis23]

They point out that according to December 2005 figures released by the MVD and the FSB, federal forces in Chechnya made significant strategic gains in 2005. The Russians succeeded in killing or capturing at least 650 active rebels. Of the 200 rebel commanders on the FSB most-wanted list drawn up in 2000, 190 have been 'neutralised'. No successful rebel attack against federal targets was launched in 2005. For the first time since 1999, the federal forces lost less than 100 servicemen in Chechnya.

Nii et väidetavalt kaotati vähem kui 100 meest ning tapeti 650 tchecheeni? Seda ma küll ei usu, arvan et kui siia lisada MVD ning kohalikke lojalistide kaotused need on ikka palju suuremad. Samuti mulle kuidagi tundub väheusutavaks et tapeti 95% välikomandööre.
Kuid see et muudatused on venemaale positiivsed, seda on jah näha, seal.

[Peter[L]]

Vähemalt minu teada on tänapäeva RF armees olemas selline väeliik nagu Spets Naz. Nagu oli VDV ja merejalavägi. Lihtsalt olud on muutunud ja Afgaani pärandina - väikesed gruppid, helikopterid jne.
Samas on loomulikult Spets Naz ka vene eriüksuste koondnimetus.

Et saada mingit ülevaadet RF eriüksustest, peame vaatama neid ametkondade kaupa.
Kaitseministeerium: erinevad väeliikide eriüksused, kes koosnevad ajateenijatest + lisaks GRU Spets Naz - mis on hoopis omaette üksus - koosneb proffesionaalsetest võitlejatest, kes on saanud luurealase ettevalmistuse. Tegutsevad üldjuhul üksinda - sisseimbumine ja muud erioperatsioonid.

Siseministeerium: VV + selle Spets Naz - näiteks Vitjaz - Tulipunased baretid - või kuidas seda tõlkida? Politseioperatsioonid, oma süsteemi eriolukorrad, kontrollpostid, jne. Praegusel momendil põhiline relvastatud jõud Tšetseenias.

MVD tsiviilimiilitsa eriüksused: SOBR - spetsiaalne kiirreageerimis üksus - koosneb endistest Spets Naz'st pärit võitlejatest - praporid või ohvitserid - väga tugev ettevalmistus - võitlus organiseeritud kuritegevusega - ehk tuntud miniseriaalist "Brigada" - võtavad osa ka eriolukordade lahendamisest - Budjonovsk jne.
OMON-OMSN- miilitsa eriüksused - regioonse alluvusega- sellest ka väga erinev kvaliteet- sõltuvalt regioonist. Tavapärased miilitsa erioperatsioonid. Massirahutused jne.

FSB: C - ehk SSO - Erioperatsioonide teenistus- suhteliselt vähetuntud - tegeleb sellega millega A'l ja V'l ei ole mahti tegeleda. - tegelikult rohkem üldine ettevalmistus nn terrorismivastaseks võitluseks.
"V" - tuntud ka kui Vimpel ja Vega. Algselt loodud erioperatsioonide teostamiseks väljaspool riigipiire, hiljem tuumarelva alane spetsialiseerumine - tuumaobjektide kaitsmine rahu ajal; mobiilsete tuumaseadildiste ründamine sõja olukorras - praegu sisuliselt "A" farm üksus - kuigi laiema spetsialiteediga.
"A" - Kurikuulus "Alfa" - Ise eelistavad ennast pidada ikka grupiks "A", millise nimelisena nad ka loodi. Alfa, on ajkirjanike poolt pandud nimi Vilnjuse teletorni vallutamise päevilt, mille edevad ametnikud vahepeal ka ametlikuks nimeks võtsid. Vene eriüksuste hirarhia tipp - väga kitsalt spetsialiseerunud. Sõidukite(rongide, laevade, busside, jne) ja hoonete vallutamine pantvangide tingimustes. Üliefektiivsed lähitulevahetuses - käsivõitlusse ei lasku. Parim ettevalmistus, varustus ja spetsiaalselt valmistatud relvad. Oma sõnul pole nende operatsioonide käigus, nende käe läbi hukkunud ükski pantvang.

[Kapten Trumm]

Budjonnovski operatsiooni ajal oli Alfa meestega musti kilekotte omajagu, kui meediat uskuda. Niiet nad ei ole võitmatud, kuulikindlad ja ilmeksimatud, nagu paljud NSVL dessantväest rääkivate mängufilmise mõju all olevad inimesed räägivad ja vist ka arvavad.

[Peter[L]]

Ära lasku populismi Sinu puhul pole see ju eriti tavaline. Isegi Hollywoodi filmid ei kajasta ilmeksimatuid tegelasi. Vene filmid on vähe reaalsemad. Aga see selleks.
Loomulikult pole imemehi olemas. Minu jaoks on olemas teatav mõõdupuu - mida nimetan proffesionaalsuseks. Ja minu väitel "Alfa" mehed seda on.
Peakski ehk siis defineerima mõiste "proffesionaalsus"olemuse.
"Proffesionaalid on inimesed, kes lahendavad standardolukordi aju kasutamata" - ehk esmapilgul liiga robotlik - kuid tooksin välja paar momenti -
1. Mõtlemine on väga aeglane tegevus
2. Vaba ajumahtu on võimalik kasutada eriolukordade lahendamiseks.
3.Eksimine on inimlik - et seda välistada - kasuta rutiine
Aga me ei tulnud ju siia filosofeerima - tagasi...
Budjonovsk - kolm musta kotti. Siis Pervomaisk- kaks ja tagatipuks Beslan - kümme. Mitte väga väärikas CV.
Esitasin viktoriinis küsimuse Beslani hukkunud "Alfa" meeste kohta. Arnold tegi aga natuke vale järelduse - tavaline vene bardakk.
Laias plaanis on tal muidugi õigus. See seal valitses. Aga põhjused olid laiemad. Põhiline, ehk see, et keegi ei julgenud võtta vastutust ja asi lükati kohalikele. Eks oma rolli mängis ka Budjonovski järgne eriüksuslaste "memo", kus ühe punktina märgiti, et tormijooksust osavõtjad ei peaks tegelema "kõrvaliste ülesanetega" ehk siis ringkaitse korraldamisega. Sellega tegeles seal kohalik OMON, kellel ...
Aga sündinud tragöödias polnud ka see põhitegur. Asi oli juhuses.
Aga mis peab toimuma, kui isegi proffesionaalid(minu väitel) eiravad kõige elementaarsemaid nõudeid(minna tulevahetusse ilma kuulivestita)?
Selles, on selle asja point. Mis neid selleks sundis?
Tegelikult võiks ka küsida - miks nad ei keeldunud Budjonovskis rünnakust - pidades seda absoluutselt mõtetuks. Olid nad ju keeldunud ründamast vene "valget maja". Kump on ohtlikum, kas totraid käske eirav, või nende mõtekust kaaluv sõjaväeline üksus?

See pole kiidulaul mingile eriüksusele - ehk vaid üritus mõelda nende seisukohast.

Poolik toortõlge Budjonovskist eriüksuslaste silme läbi:

http://www.hot.ee/tshetseenia/budjonovsk.html

[Kapten Trumm]

Ja nende vastane oli kes? Mitte regulaararmee, vaid midagi partisanide taolist.

Mille vastu ma protesteerin, on arvamus, et need üksused on kõikvõimsad, kõige paremad, võitmatud ja vigastamatud. Paljud inimesed arvavad seda tõsimeeli, et vastupanu on mõttetu.

Kui nad satuvad nt 1-2 täisrelvis Scoutsi rühmaga kokku, on nad ilmselt väga surnud. Triibuline särk kuuli ei peata ja kolmest salvest padrunitest kauaks ei jätku, ole nii hea laskur kui tahes.

Sellest vaikib vee ajalugu kaua, kuidas omal ajal vallutati kaaperdatud reisilennukeid - tungiti salongi ja lasti koos terroristidega pooled reisijad ka maha. Professionaalne?

Nad on head, kuid mitte parimad ja mitte surematud. Mina teeks nende asemel panuse Briti SAS-le - näiteks võis eeskujuks tuua eduka Iraani saatkonna vabastamise tormijooksuga Londonis, mis möödus tõesti ilma üleliigsete "kõrvalkahjudeta".