Gruusia sõja kohta ka mingid materjalid olemas. Aga jällegi, "ebaseksikate artiklite" kohta mingeid analüüse ja numbreid ei leia.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.ar ... UB1069.pdf
Russian forces proved less proficient in operational and tactical logistics. Despite the short duration of the war and the relatively small area over which it was fought, there are indications that the Russian ground logistics system was severely taxed.
The former Georgian Deputy Defense Minister remarked that the Georgian side was aware of serious Russian problems keeping up with the demand for food, fuel, and ammunition. Some Georgian officials believe that one of the reasons the Russian army halted its advance at the town of Igoeti, some 30 kilometers from the capital of Tbilisi, was its logistical incapability of advancing further. First-hand Russian accounts support this picture of a logistics system unable to cope with the demands placed on it.
RUSSIAN LESSONS LEARNED IN THE WAR WITH GEORGIA
All services in the Russian armed forces experienced considerable problems with equipment during the war. For the ground forces, the reliability of their armored vehicles seemed to be the most troubling issue related to equipment. But survivability was also an issue, in part due to lack of reactive armor, but also due simply to the low quality of Russian-made armored vehicles, which proved much more vulnerable than their Western counterparts to aircraft, artillery, other armored vehicles, and shoulder-fired anti-armor weapons.
As to the men in uniform, 270 perished in the five days and more than 1,000 were wounded. The Georgian Army suffered the heaviest casualties on August 8 and 9 as a result of Russian air raids
http://tinyurl.com/zbfbt8y
The armour on the Soviet-made combat vehicles turned out to be insufficient, in particular in urban warfare.
The armoured personnel carriers could not resist anti-tank rockets or mines or small calibre armour piercing ammunition. This is why Russian troops prefer to travel sitting on top of their vehicles rather than inside them.
Since tanks are vulnerable in mountainous areas, a Tank Support Combat Vehicle (with the Russian acronym BMPT) armed with nine weapon systems and an advanced target acquisition system has been developed in Russia.
The armed forces ordered the first 10 serial production BMPTs in 2007 after concluding State Tests and the first deliveries were planned for 2008,
but no BMPTs were available to the NCMD.
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The early losses more or less put a halt to the Russian air assault on 9 August, and it did not regain pace until the following day.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1 ... 0902975539
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Ainus vähe põhjalikum kirjutis on see:
http://www.cast.ru/files/The_Tanks_of_August_sm_eng.pdf
(baseerub VF poolsetel ametlikel avalikustatud andmetel)
After careful study of all the available sources, researchers have been able to establish not just the names of those killed but also the circumstances of their deaths, in most cases. That information has been used to conduct detailed analysis of permanent Russian losses during the conflict.
The key event of the second day of the war on August 9 was the Russian forces’ first attempt at taking Tskhinvali. Eleven Russian servicemen were killed when a Russian convoy moving towards the city came under heavy shelling, and during the subsequent street battles in Tskhinvali.
The third day of the war, August 10, was relatively quiet, without any heavy battles. But three servicemen of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division’s 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment were killed in a single episode when Russian troops came under Georgian artillery fire. Another three died in several road traffic accidents as large numbers of Russian troops were moving along a narrow mountain road.
On August 11, the Russian forces began a counteroffensive, advancing deep into Georgian territory. There were several small clashes with Georgian troops. Nevertheless, the losses that day were much heavier than the day before. Several more soldiers died in road accidents. Five servicemen died from non-combat causes when active combat operations were already over; another two died in hospital from their injuries.
Of the 67 casualties recognized by the Russian MoD, many died from causes other than hostile fire. The inquiry committee of the Russian Prosecutor-General’s office has established that only 48 Russian servicemen were killed as a result of hostile action. The rest died in accidents involving mishandled firearms, friendly fire incidents and road accidents.
The number of lives claimed by road accidents was especially high. Troops were rushing into the conflict zone along narrow mountain roads, often at night, which contributed to the sorry statistics. To illustrate, out of the 30 injured servicemen of the 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment, only two cases could be attributed to hostile fire. The rest received their injuries, including broken limbs, head injuries and concussions, on the road. Out of the nine soldiers of the 292nd Combined Artillery Regiment who were injured, eight were hurt in
a single road accident. Meanwhile, the units that had been well prepared for mountainous terrain, such as the 70th, 71st, 135th and 693rd Motorized Rifle Regiments, did not suffer any serious non-combat losses.
Sixteen of the Russian servicemen killed during the war were officers, two were warrant officers, and the remaining 44 sergeants and privates. Of the eight senior officers killed during the conflict, five (a colonel, a lieutenant colonel and three majors) served in the Air Force. All of them died when their planes were downed.
The 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 135th Motorized Rifle Regiment was one of the two main battalion-strength tactical combat groups that entered South Ossetia on August 8, only a few hours after the Georgian assault began. The battalion sustained its heaviest losses on August 9, as it was trying to enter Tskhinvali to lift the blockade of the Russian peacekeepers’ compound, where the same regiment’s 2nd Battalion was stationed. Upon entering the city, the 1st Battalion was drawn into a street fight, where it lost several infantry fighting vehicles and scores of soldiers, eight of whom were killed.
Direct fire (small arms, armor-mounted guns and anti-tank weapons) was the single biggest cause of death, claiming 25 people. Another 15 soldiers were killed by Georgian artillery, mortars and MLR systems. The latter category of Georgian weapons claimed three soldiers of the 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment on the night of August 10-11. Six people died when several Russian planes and helicopters were either shot down or crashed. One of these six died in a friendly fire incident. At least two Russian soldiers were killed in accidents involving firearms after the end of combat operations.
Cause of death Servicemen killed:
Direct fire 25 ; Indirect fire 15 ; Road accident 9 ; Unknown 8 ; Air incidents 6 ; Other 2 ; Total 65
About 250 Russian servicemen received injuries in August 2008. According to the inquiry committee of the Prosecutor-General’s office, only 162 of those cases were combat losses inflicted by the adversary. The rest were mostly head injuries and broken bones, confirming reports of the large number of road accidents during troop movement into South Ossetia.
Four Russian soldiers were missing after the war ended. Two of them were later found at their permanent living addresses in Russia.
The Russian command has not released any official information about the losses of military equipment during the war. Independent calculations have been made using the available images and footage, as well as media reports and the recollections of eyewitnesses. Russia lost three main battle tanks during combat operations:
one T-72B(M), one T-72B and one T-62M.5
All of them were lost to hostile fire. There were much greater losses in the light armored vehicles category - at least 20 such vehicles were destroyed. Known losses include at least nine BMP-1 vehicles, three BMP-2, two BTR-80, one BMD-2, three BRDM-2A and one MT-LB.6 Russia sustained no losses in artillery, MLRS or air defense systems.
Apart from armor, there were also serious losses in cars and trucks. In the Southern Compound of the Russian peacekeepers, which came under heavy artillery and tank fire on August 8, almost the entire fleet of cars and trucks (at least 20 vehicles) was destroyed.
During battles on August 9, Georgian artillery destroyed ten GAZ-66 trucks of the mortar batteries belonging to the 135th and 693rd Motorized Rifle Regiments. The trucks were all parked in close proximity on the roadside. Two Ural-4320 trucks were lost on August 11 during an air raid by Georgian Mi-24 attack helicopters. Several other trucks were damaged in serious road accidents.
The overall number of South Ossetian combatants killed during the war is therefore about 90 people. Most
of these losses happened on August 8-9 in and around Tskhinvali. The South Ossetian losses of equipment included two BMP-2 vehicles. One T-55 tank was hit from a grenade launcher; its driver was killed. Nevertheless, the tank remained operable and mobile.
The Authors:
Mikhail Barabanov. Graduated from the Moscow National University of Culture, then worked for the Moscow City Government.
Anton Lavrov. Graduated from the Tver State Technical University. An independent military analyst and one of the most prominent independent Russian researchers of the 2008 Russian-Georgian War.
Ruslan Pukhov is director of the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST) since 1997. In 1996 he graduated from the School of International Information of MGIMO University under the Russian Foreign Ministry. Since 2007 Member of the Public Advisory Board of the Russian Defense Ministry.
Vyacheslav Tseluiko. Graduated from the Physics and Technology faculty of the Kharkiv Karazin National University, where he is now a Research Associate at the Political Science department.
